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ABSTRACT
As technology improves, traditional systems are being interconnected into larger systems of
systems (SoS) that operate in diverse contexts, where numerous perturbations exist that
threaten the ability of the SoS to deliver acceptable value to its diverse set of stakeholders.
Furthermore, the systems of systems themselves can change form voluntarily or involuntarily in
response to contextual variability or stakeholder whims. Various system properties, or "-ilities"
have been defined that may help traditional systems provide value to stakeholders in spite of
change, but they have not specifically addressed the issue of systems operating within larger
systems of systems. This dissertation defines the concept of viability for engineered systems, as
a likelihood that systems will satisfy their stakeholder needs over the system's expected
lifetime, and identifies and develops strategies that system architects can use to create viable
systems. The concept of viability helps system architects design systems that can survive
contextual perturbations, whether they are from entities outside the traditional system
boundary, or from other constituent systems within a SoS.
In addition to external perturbations, this dissertation addresses the need to ensure that
endogenous changes made to improve value delivery, do not inadvertently cause unintended
interactions that harm the system overall. This is particularly a concern with the proliferation
of systems of systems, and the recent drive towards making systems more changeable as a
mechanism for value sustainment in dynamic environments. A new "ility", pliability, is
introduced that specifies the limits on how a system can change, without "breaking" or
violating an architecture that was intended and validated. Like changeability, pliability
increases robustness by allowing systems to voluntarily change in response to dynamic
contexts, and increases survivability and robustness by increasing the likelihood that
unintentional changes are still within the set of allowable instances. It also distinguishes
allowable changes from those that would require validation, reducing the effort required to get
those changes approved by a diverse set of stakeholders.
Thesis Chair: Daniel E. Hastings
Title: Dean for Undergraduate Education, Cecil and Ida Green Education Professor of
Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems
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1 INTRODUCTION
"Change is the law of life, and those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss
the future."
- John F. Kennedy
1.1 MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH
Although some of the basic concepts of Systems Engineering (SE) can be traced back to ancient
times, formal research and instruction in the field began in the 1940s and 1950s at institutions
such as Bell Laboratories and MIT (Brill, 1998; Hall, 1962). In its infancy, SE was typically
practiced by engineers trained in other disciplines (such as mechanical or electrical
engineering), who needed to combine individual components into holistic systems, so that
higher-level functionality could be realized. As stakeholder needs increased, so too did the
level of complexity of the systems they formed, and researchers began developing system
engineering methods and techniques to overcome the numerous challenges that arose. Over
the years, these methods and techniques proved to be successful in numerous major projects,
such as missile defense and the Apollo missions, and subsequently SE became a distinct
engineering discipline, with graduate and undergraduate degree programs worldwide,
dedicated conferences and journals, and ardent practitioners spanning a diverse set of
industries.
1.1.1 THE RISE OF SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
Most systems designed in the last century were traditional in the sense that they consisted of
components that were not very useful on their own, but interacted in such a way that they
produced a higher-level functionality that was useful. In the last decade, technology
(particularly communication technology) has improved significantly, allowing traditional
systems to be connected together to form larger, more complex systems of systems (SoS). For
example, as recently as 2004, standalone video game consoles, such as the Sony PlayStation 2,
were state-of-the-art in the consumer electronics market. Although these consoles had
powerful graphics processors, multi-functionality (e.g. the ability to play DVD movies as well as
games), and innovative user interface devices, they were essentially just incremental
improvements on traditional video game systems that have been in homes since the late 1970s.
However, starting with the seventh generation in 2005 (Long, 2012), video game consoles
began to be inter-connected into massive systems of systems that allowed gamers and vendors
from all over the world to play and interact with each other creating a virtual marketplace
worth billions of dollars. In order for this to happen, however, system engineers had to create a
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suitable network infrastructure including multitudes of servers that authenticate and match
users for games, deliver premium streaming content such as movie rentals, and process credit
card transactions between customers and vendors. Additionally, since these systems of
systems cross international boundaries, there are non-trivial social, legal and contextual issues
that need to be addressed in order for the overall system to be successful.
While video game consoles have always been at the cutting-edge of consumer electronics, even
traditional home appliances are being connected together to form systems of systems. As seen
in the Consumer Electronics show of 2012, some "smart" appliances can regulate their energy
use via a connection to a "smart grid" energy infrastructure that consists of other power-
consuming devices and power suppliers. This means that instead of an appliance acting as a
stand-alone system with its user, it can regulate its energy usage based on the usage of other
devices attached to the grid, and the cost of energy at any given time. Some new appliances
also boast Internet connectivity where users can interact with third party vendors and their
appliances to do online grocery shopping, for example (LG Electronics, 2012). Of course,
systems of systems are not limited to home appliances and entertainment devices. The
proliferation of systems of systems has also extended into industries such as health care
information systems, banking and critical infrastructure. Of course, the US military has been
combining mechanized arms into larger Joint Task Forces and other similar systems of systems
for years, but recent efforts, such as the US Army modernization program, highlight that the
drive is continuing, if not accelerating.
The Army's new information network remains our top modernization priority. With tighter
budgets but an active threat environment, the Army will have to produce a force that is smaller
yet still highly capable. The Network is the core of that smaller but highly capable force.
Secretary of Army John McHugh (2012)
The new information network that the US Army is developing is a massive SoS that extends
right down to the soldier level. The US Army's official website describes the Army's new mobile
network as follows:
The Army's mobile network will enable Soldiers to access key information anytime, anyplace;
share information to facilitate fire and maneuver, and survive in close combat; provide
collaboration capability to aid in seizing and controlling key terrain; employ lethal and non-lethal
capabilities, coupled with sensors, to effectively engage targets at extended ranges; distinguish
among friend, enemy, neutral and noncombatant; and integrate indirectfires.
("Networking the Soldier," 2012)
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1.1.1.1 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RISE OF SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
Three factors are driving the rise of systems of systems, as shown in Figure 1-1. First,
technology improvements, particularly in data storage, manipulation and transmission, make
inter-connection of independent systems into larger systems of systems technically feasible.
Reduction in costs, particularly manufacturing, computing and bandwidth, make these
capabilities financially feasible as well. The combination of these two factors leads to these
new capabilities being available as options for particular SoS designs. As these options become
available, stakeholder expectations rise as a result. The increase in stakeholder expectations
drives research and development to increase technology levels and decrease costs even more,
enabling new capabilities to emerge and raising stakeholder expectations even further. While
the proliferation of systems of systems are creating opportunities for users and stakeholders
that were unheard of decades ago, it is also creating significant challenges for the system
engineers and architects that are responsible for designing, building and testing them.
Unfortunately, SoS techniques are not developing as quickly as the systems themselves.
FIGURE 1-1: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RISE OF SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
1.1.2 SoS ENGINEERING CHALLENGES
As illustrated in Table 1-1, when traditional systems are interconnected into larger systems of
systems, the SoS itself is often quite different from its constituent systems in many ways. Some
might argue that the number of components in a SoS is at least the sum of the number of
components that make up in each of its constituents systems. Thus, a SoS always has more
components that the systems they are made up of, if "sub-components" are counted. Even if
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"sub-components" are not counted as components, many systems of systems scale to
tremendous sizes, particularly if co-location of components is not required. Instead of being
bound to physical locations and enclosures, the constituent systems of many systems of
systems are geographically separated. This often makes synchronizing and coordinating tasks
more difficult than a traditional, hardwired system, but allows for the SoS to influence (and be
influenced by) many different environments. Different manufacturers may also have made the
constituent systems at different periods of time and under different specifications, creating
potential interoperability issues. The operational and managerial independence of the
constituent systems also adds significantly to the complexity of the overall SoS. The system
response, i.e. the outputs given a particular set of inputs, is in many cases non-deterministic
and subject not only to stochastic natural processes, but also to real-time choices made by
operational and strategic decision makers. The social aspect of many systems of systems, can
add a considerable amount of complexity above the technological aspects necessary for the SoS
to work. For example, Facebook consists of not only millions of diverse devices communicating
and coordinating their actions, but also millions of human users interacting as well. The actions
of the humans change the experience for other users on Facebook, for better or for worse, and
introduce uncertainty into the overall benefit of the SoS to its stakeholders. In systems of
systems, there are often many stakeholders with diverse interests that influence the design and
operation of the SoS throughout its entire lifecycle. For example, a Joint Task force may have
units from the Army, Navy and Air Force, each with their own command structures and needs.
Furthermore, while in many traditional systems, the human operator is outside the system,
they must often be considered within a constituent system while in a SoS.
TABLE 1-1: VIDEO GAME SYSTEM VS. VIDEO GAME SOS
LifepanSeveral Years Indefinite
# o Co ponntsHundreds Millions
LocaionLocal Global
ConextSingle Diverse
HuanExogenous Endogenous
FormStatic Dynamic
BehaiorEasy to Predict Difficult to Predict
Woth$100s $1,000,000,000S
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Since system complexity tends to increase with size (Lankford, 2003) systems of systems can be
expensive to design, build, test, launch, operate and maintain. With shrinking budgets,
particularly in public projects, stakeholders expect critical systems of systems to have long
lifetimes. Often the difference in lifespan between a system and a SoS can be due to the fact
that systems of systems are often unique, whereas traditional systems tend not to be. A
system like an Apple iPhone, for example, is only expected to be useful for a couple of years
before it is replaced with something else. There are millions of iPhones in the world today, and
like all gadgets, they come and go. There is only one Facebook, however, and even though it is
expected to evolve and grow with new technology, partners and services, it is not expected to
go away anytime soon. Such is the case with other systems of systems, such as major
metropolitan transportation systems, as well. While their constituent systems, such as
computers, trains, and even human operators, are expected to come and go, the systems of
systems themselves is expected to last indefinitely.
The complexity and extended lifetime of systems of systems presents many challenges to
system architects. In addition to having multiple stakeholders, many complex systems of
systems operate in diverse contexts, which can become unfavorable at times. The longer a
system exists, and the more interactive it is with its environment, the more likely it is that
something will change that can threaten the overall value the system provides to its
stakeholders. Systems of systems are particularly prone to contextual fluctuations, since they
tend to have multiple stakeholders and geographically dispersed components. Changes in
context can adversely affect the system and in some cases, render it useless. Sudden, major
disruptions can be particularly disastrous, such as the 2011 tsunami that caused the Chernobyl-
scale nuclear meltdown in Japan (Figure 1-2) (McNeill, 2011), and the $170 million dollar
security breach that shut down the Sony PlayStation Network (Snuder, 2011). Slower
contextual changes can have major impacts as well, such as how cell phone technology is
gradually making landline phone systems obsolete (Passikoff, 2012). It is clear, then, that a
complex system, which is expected to continue to provide value to stakeholders over its entire
lifetime, will need to be able to do so even if the context changes inimically.
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FIGURE 1-2: FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER, JAPAN, 2011
1.1.2.1 VIABLE SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
A system architect can develop a feasible system, if it meets functional requirements and
satisfies constraints for a particular context. For example, a system architect can design a
factory that is feasible, because it combines the efforts of humans and machines to turn raw
materials into finished goods that the stakeholders can sell for a profit. However, as discussed
in this section, it is not good enough for most complex systems to only "work" for a short
period of time and under one particular context. Rather, stakeholders require that their
systems continue to be useful over a long period of time and variety of contexts. If the system
stops being useful to its stakeholders, we can assume that its very existence is threatened,
unless there are some legacy inheritance or contractual obligations preventing it from being
discontinued. Thus, the issue for modern system architects is to not only design feasible
systems, but also ones that will exist through long periods of time and possibly varying
contexts. In other words, stakeholders seem to want viable systems (or viable systems of
systems, for that matter), instead of just feasible ones. A viable business model is a concept
that can be turned into a profitable business that could exist for a period of time and under
certain contexts, but what does it mean for an engineered system to be viable and what
properties enable viability? Do viable systems have to be robust? Survivable? Autonomous?
These issues form the basis of the first research question.
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What does it mean for an engineered system to be viable? How
does viability relate to existing "-ilities" already defined?
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1.1.2.2 INDEPENDENCE WITHIN A SoS
To illustrate some of the human issues involved with merging traditional systems into system of
systems, consider an individual laptop owner interacting with his/her laptop (Figure 1-3).
Although the system boundary can be drawn in many different ways, we can say that the
system is the laptop and the individual owner is both the stakeholder and the operator of the
system. Most modern laptop are essentially von Neumann machines (Von Neumann, 2012) and
will produce the same outputs for a given set of inputs. For example, taking any two, identically
configured laptops from an assembly line and providing them with the same inputs, will always
result in the exact same outputs. Therefore, if the stakeholder understands what his/her needs
are, then it should not be difficult for the stakeholder to determine if the laptop will meet
them.
Human
(Stakeholder)
Inputs Outputs
I I
OF~~ LpopS
FIGURE 1-3: BLACK BOX REPRESENTATION OF A SIMPLE SYSTEM WITH HUMAN OPERATOR
Although laptops are standalone, traditional systems, they can easily be components in larger
systems of systems via a connection to the Internet. Facebook is one such example of a system
of systems that consists of millions of people, businesses and electronic devices all
interconnected via the Internet. The users of Facebook are on diverse devices, differing in
hardware (laptops, cell phones, etc.) and software (Windows, Linux, etc.) and can be
considered clients. Although each device is a black box, a traditional system itself similar to
that shown in Figure 1-3 from the perspective of the SoS, the clients that make up the largest
portion of Facebook's constituent systems consist of both the device and the user together
(Figure 1-4). This is because from the SoS perspective, the behavior, and in particular the
decisions, that the human stakeholders controlling the devices make, significantly affect the
overall experience for other clients, and thus the overall benefit Facebook provides to its
stakeholders. In fact, while the devices are important for the Facebook experience, and their
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differences are significant (e.g. Facebook on mobile devices can be a less satisfying experience
than the desktop version), the human interaction on Facebook is really the whole point, and the
devices, servers and other subsystems are really just tools and components necessary to enable
and enhance that interaction.
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FIGURE 1-4: BLACK BOX EXAMPLE OF A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS AND ITS STAKEHOLDERS
The human component is an obvious strength, but also a weakness for Facebook. If the user is
considered part of the constituent system, then that system no longer acts like von Neumann
machine. The outputs, and the behavior of a human interacting with a laptop, are generally
not deterministic. Humans, like many constituent systems in other systems of systems, are
independent and can choose how they wish to participate in the SoS, and/or whether or not
they wish to participate at all. Also, unlike the devices they use to communicate with, no two
humans are alike and while their actions may be similar, they are not exactly the same. In fact,
the same human may act differently from moment to moment, depending on a variety of
factors, such as the weather, his/her mood, what he/she had for breakfast that morning, etc.
Unlike the system in Figure 1-3, the stochastic nature makes predicting the behavior of the
constituent systems difficult, which creates problems for stakeholders trying to determine
whether the SoS will meet their needs. If the owner of a laptop wants to do something, then
she just gives the correct inputs and the laptop does it. The owners of the Facebook however,
can only exert that kind of control on part of the SoS (such as the servers). As for the
independent constituent systems, the SoS owners can only try to influence the behavior of the
constituent systems and thus, the overall SoS itself, which is not a trivial matter.
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Research into determining how stakeholders with diverse interests and influence can affect the
value delivery of a complex SoS (Shah, 2013) is just one of the many research threads currently
looking at effective management of systems of systems. However, it is important to
understand how the independence of constituent systems and the diversity of the stakeholders
affect the viability of the constituent systems as well as of the SoS itself. This forms the basis of
the second research question:
Research Question 2 (RQ2): How does viability of constituent systems relate to the viability of
systems of systems?
1.1.2.3 STRATEGIES FOR ENABLING VIABILITY
Once system architects understand what properties enable a system that operates in dynamic
environments to provide acceptable value to stakeholders, they need to implement these
properties into their designs. As with functional requirements, enabling non-functional "-
ilities" can be expensive, and typically involves tradeoffs. Decision makers are forced to select
between alternatives that balance benefit, cost and risk according to their needs, but in
systems of systems, the problem is often compounded due to diverse stakeholders and
conflicting risk mitigation strategies (Ellison & Woody, 2007). Systems engineering design
principles to aid designing systems in resisting the harmful effects of contextual changes have
been identified in the literature (Jackson, 2010; Richards, 2009), but many of the case studies
upon which they were developed and validated, involved traditional systems, such as a satellite
constellation-based radar system. There has been some debate as to whether traditional
systems engineering methods and practices are still valid at the SoS level (Dickerson, 2009).
This is a particularly challenging question, since the literature is unclear as to the definition of a
system of systems, and how it is distinct from a traditional system (Chattopadhyay, 2008). This
is not surprising, since the definition of a "system" itself is also ambiguous (Backlund, 2000).
Regardless, systems of systems have certain characteristic properties that are differentiated
from traditional systems, and it is important to determine how these qualities might affect its
ability to resist the harmful effects of contextual change. This leads to the following research
questions:
Research Question 3 (RQ3): Do existing system-level strategies for enabling systems to resist
the harmful effects of contextual change apply to systems of systems as well? Are there
additional strategies that enable viability in systems, particularly systems of systems?
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1.1.2.4 ENDOGENOUS CHANGES
In addition to exogenous contextual changes, systems of systems often experience endogenous
change as well. Often, decision makers implement endogenous changes to mitigate the
harmful effects of a contextual change, or take advantage of new opportunities. Systems of
systems are continuously changing to the point where the activities of the SoS can be thought
of as a "wave" (Dahmann, Rebovich, Lowry, Lane, & Baldwin, 2011). In this "wave" model, the
SoS goes through various changes, some of which can be made immediately, some of which can
be made only after an analysis is performed, while others require a significant re-engineering
effort that results in an "evolution" in the system architecture (Figure 1-5).
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FIGURE 1-5: WAVE MODEL OF SOS ENGINEERING
(DAHMANN, ET AL., 2011)
The likelihood that a system will change is higher for systems that have long lifetimes, operate
in dynamic contexts, or have complex behavior. Perhaps there will be a change in components,
in either the number and type of components, or their attributes and capabilities. This is
particularly an issue with systems of systems, since they go through evolutionary development
as components are added, removed and changed over time (Maier, 1998). Even if the
components themselves do not change, what they do within the overall system might change.
For example, certain F-16s, acting as components of a larger military SoS, may change from air-
to-air combat roles to air-to-surface attack roles. An emergency response dispatcher may
process calls in a priority queuing manner (based on location or some other factor), instead of a
first-in, first-out (FIFO) sequence. Of course, changes often do not occur in isolation. A change
in components, will often require operational changes as well, and vice-versa. If the wireless
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LAN suddenly fails, then mobile system components may be forced to operate near an available
Ethernet port. Similarly, a decision to operate certain components in a mobile fashion may
require batteries or some other portable power source instead of an AC power supply.
There has been increasing research studying how, when and why systems need to change in
response to shifts in context (McManus and Hastings, 2006). Some examples include:
* Designing latent capabilities that grant the ability to change at a later date (e.g., de
Neufville and Scholtes, 2011)
* The ability to change during operational phases (e.g., Gupta and Goyal, 1989)
* The ability to change easily / rapidly (e.g., McGaughey, 1999)
* The ability to change in size only (e.g., Elkins et al., 2004)
The terms "flexible", "adaptable", "agile", and "modifiable" are some of the labels that
researchers have used to describe the ability to change. Unfortunately, researchers have been
inconsistent with their definitions and meaning when applied to systems engineering. This
makes it very difficult for stakeholders to communicate the properties that they desire, and for
architects to know that they have met those requirements. The ability to change, known as
changeability (Ross et al., 2008), is an important quality of a system that allows stakeholders to
reduce the impact of uncertainty of future contexts. However, not all changes are beneficial
and care must be taken by architects to ensure that any modifications to the components, or
the way they operate, will not reduce value delivery to its stakeholders.
While it may seem that the more a system can change, the better it will be able to respond to
shifts in context, but there are limits. In their minds, and sometimes in documents, system
architects have a concept of operations (CONOPs) 1 that describes how the components within
the system function and interact with each other to produce value to the stakeholders within
the context of an operational environment (Mekdeci et al, 2011). A change in one of the
components, their capabilities, or in the way the components interact or function, may violate
an aspect of the CONOPs, and cause a reduction in value delivery. It is important then to only
change what should be changed, and not change what should not. For this reason, there may
be a significant bureaucratic hurdle in getting changes "approved" before they are allowed in a
complex, critical system of systems. While the benefits of having the ability to change has
been demonstrated numerous times in the literature, what has been lacking is a property that
architects can use to set boundaries around the change that a system is allowed to undergo.
1 To some researchers and practitioners, the word "CONOPs" refers to documentation that describes how a system
works, rather than the concept itself of how the system works.
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This is important so that decision makers can make certain changes to the SoS without the need
to re-architect the system and get approval from stakeholders. The fourth research question
addresses this issue.
Research Question 4 (RQ4): Is changeability always a good thing? What can system architects
do to enable positive change in complex systems, while restricting change that can be harmful?
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions posed in this chapter are repeated below for reference:
RQ1: What does it mean for an engineered system to be viable? How does viability relate to
existing "-ilities" already defined?
RQ2: How does viability of constituent systems relate to the viability of systems of systems?
RQ3: Do existing system-level strategies for enabling systems to resist the harmful effects of
contextual change apply to systems of systems as well? Are there additional strategies that
enable viability in systems, particularly systems of systems?
RQ4: Is changeability always a good thing? What can system architects do to enable positive
change in complex systems, while restricting change that can be harmful?
1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
Following this introductory chapter, the dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: Maritime Security Case Study. Although several case studies will be cited from the
literature to derive perturbation and SoS properties, as well as survivability design principles
and approaches, an empirical study based on a maritime security system of systems (MarSec)
will be the primary case study that will be discussed throughout this dissertation. The reasons
for selecting maritime security as the case study are given in Chapter 2, as well as an overview
of the stakeholder needs, context, existing components under consideration and initial
perturbations of interest. At the end of the chapter, an overview of modeling and simulation
techniques is given, as well as an explanation of the discrete-event simulation (DES) that was
used to model the maritime security SoS and to generate the quantitative performance data.
Chapter 3: Value Delivery in a Dynamic Context. This chapter provides a summary of what is
known and what has previously been done in the technical literature, in regards to how value
delivery is threatened, and sustained.
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Chapter 4: Engineering for Viability. The case for a new "ility", viability, is made in this chapter
by showing that the current definitions of survivability and other related "-ilities" are confused
in the literature, and do not address the full scope of the value sustainment, particularly the
case where the context remains static, and yet the system still produces value.
Chapter 5: Viability Strategies for Systems. In this chapter, existing design principles for
viability in the technical literature is discussed and it is shown that the list of principles vary by
author. To clarify the literature, existing viability design principles are divided into general
heuristics and specific design patterns.
Chapter 6: Applying Viability Strategies to Systems of Systems. In this chapter, existing
strategies for enabling viability in systems are applied to systems of systems at both the system
and SoS levels. It is also shown, through the North American power grid case study, that the
existing strategies are not complete, and that the strategy of intensity regulation (i.e. throttling)
is a strategy that is used to avoid and prevent perturbations within a SoS from becoming a
cascading failure.
Chapter 7: Additional Viability Strategies. Using the concept of viability (i.e. avoiding things
the system cannot survive, and surviving what it cannot avoid), the concept of system context
and a cause-effect mapping, and various perturbations of interest to the MarSec case study are
developed in this chapter. Then, strategies are deduced for avoiding or surviving those
perturbations, and validated with historical case studies, such as Operation Titanic in WWII and
Amazon's EC2 cloud Service Level Agreement.
Chapter 8: Endogenous Change. This chapter answers research question 3 by showing
examples from historical case studies, as well as the MarSec that show that changeability is not
always a good thing.
Chapter 9: System Architecture and Pliability. In this chapter, a new "ility", pliability is
introduced, which both restricts change, and facilitates it.
Chapter 10: Conclusions. A summary of the major contributions is presented, along with
concise, direct answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 1. In addition, outstanding
questions that may pose as interesting research opportunities for future studies are discussed.
1.4 SUMMARY
This introductory chapter highlighted the problem of system architects trying to design complex
systems that are expected to provide value to stakeholders over long periods. In particular,
systems are increasingly being interconnected to form large, systems of systems that could last
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indefinitely, and have multiple stakeholders and diverse contexts. As seen with some of the
recent, large-scale SoS failures such as the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, the larger and more
complex a system is, the more likely it will encounter something that will change, whether it is
stakeholder needs, the context or even the system itself. An applicable concept, viability, has
been defined for biological systems and organizations, but it has not been defined for
engineered systems. This chapter developed research questions revolving around defining
viability for engineered systems and developing strategies for enabling it, particularly in
systems of systems, and highlighted a research approach on how those questions will be
answered. The chapter ended with a description of the organization of this dissertation,
highlighting what is to be expected in each chapter. The literature review begins in Chapter 3,
but first, the next chapter discusses the selection of the case study that was simulated to
provide empirical evidence for some of the concepts tested and developed in this research.
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2 RESEARCH APPROACH
To answer the questions posed in Section 1.2, an approach based on (Ross & Rhodes, 2008a)
was used (Figure 2-1). First, the literature was reviewed for existing "-ilities" that may help
systems maintain value delivery in spite of perturbations, as well help or hinder exogenous
change. These normative definitions were carefully studied, and problems and gaps were
identified in the literature. To address some of these issues, a new "ility" (viability) was
proposed. This research then identified existing design principles and strategies, either
explicitly stated or implied in the literature, and examined historical case studies to form a
descriptive research basis of what principles and/or strategies are currently being used.
The existing value sustainment strategies were then examined from a systems of systems
perspective, and shown to be incomplete by providing an example of a missing value
sustainment strategy that is particularly common for systems of systems. Using the concept of
viability and applying a new approach to examining complex systems for perturbations,
additional value sustainment strategies were induced from historical case studies and validated
with the MarSec SoS simulation (Section 2.4). In other cases, viability strategies were deduced
from deficiencies identified during cause-effect mappings of the MarSec SoS (Section 7.3), and
validated with examples from historical cases. Finally, to address the issue of endogenous
change, the incorporation of CONOPs into system architectures and "pliability" is introduced.
The entire research approach is illustrated in Figure 2-2.
FIGURE 2-1: UNDERLYING STRUCTURE OF THE SEARI RESEARCH PROGRAM
(ROSS & RHODES, 2008A)
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FIGURE 2-2: RESEARCH APPROACH
2.1 A MARITIME SECURITY SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
In the research approach shown in Figure 2-2, historical case studies, such as the North
American power grid and the Northeastern Blackout of 2003 are the primary empirical source
used to test some relevant, existing "-ilities" and value sustainment strategies, as well as
develop and empirically validate new "-ilities" and strategies developed in this dissertation.
However, to strengthen the empirical evidence, and to help illustrate concepts described in this
dissertation, a quantitative model of a system of systems was developed. A quantitative model
allows for experimentation, and requires an analysis and specification of the system at a level of
detail necessary to assess its performance. This level of depth, where the low-level interaction
of constituent systems can be aggregated into higher-level functions, is necessary for validating
certain concepts and is not easily obtained when looking at historical case studies.
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2.2 SELECTION CRITERIA FOR SOS USED AS A QUANTITATE
MODEL:
The choice of SoS for quantitative modeling was not arbitrary. Rather, it was selected based on
five criteria:
Strong Systems of Systems Characteristics. Part of the research objectives focuses on the
differences between traditional systems and systems of systems as it relates to value
sustainment, thus the quantitative model should be of a system that has strong SoS
characteristics.
Dynamic Context. Much of the research in this dissertation involves contextual change. A
suitable SoS would be one in which the context includes perturbations of varying type and
duration.
Quantitative Performance Metrics. In order to assess the effectiveness of certain value
sustainment strategies and to compare competing designs, the quantitative model must be
able to produce quantitative performance data.
Precedence. The quantitative model should be based on a system of systems that has been
previously identified and used in the literature as a SoS case study.
Representativeness. The design principles, methods and concepts developed in this research
should be generalizable to other systems of systems that are similar to the one in the
quantitative model.
2.3 MARITIME SECURITY SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
Based on the criteria described in Section 2.2, the SoS selected to be modeled was a Maritime
Security System of Systems (MarSec). This section will describe what a MarSec is, and how it
satisfies the criteria described in Section 2.2.
2.3.1 OBJECTIVES
Not all maritime security system of systems are the same, but they typically share the goal of
ensuring that ships entering a particular body of water are complying with appropriate rules
and regulations. At a minimum, maritime security systems of systems are responsible for
maintaining a certain degree of situational awareness over a particular body of water, known as
the Area of Interest (Aol). Usually, the MarSec is required to know the location, identity and
heading information of any ship within the Area of Interest (Aol). In many cases, the MarSec is
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responsible for enforcing the laws and regulations governing the AOl as well, and this typically
means tracking and intercepting any possible ships that may be violating those rules.
2.3.2 COMPONENTS
The primary effectors of the MarSec are manned and unmanned vehicles. All of the unmanned
vehicles are aerial (i.e. UAVs) while the manned vehicles include both aerial and naval. These
vehicles are not merely components of a larger system, but systems in their own right. In
addition to the vehicles, there are supporting systems, such as command center, radar towers
and ground control stations. The selection of components that constitute the MarSec is
variable, and one of the ways in which strategies can be tested and induced, but design options
for the MarSec in the quantitative model included the following:
Operational UAVs (OUAV). UAVs used for operational functions, such as detection of targets.
Tactical UAVs (TUAV). UAVs used for identification and observation of targets.
Manned Patrol Boats (MPB). Manned patrol boats used for detection, identification,
observation and interception of targets.
Manned Helicopters (MHel). Manned helicopters used for identification and observation of
targets.
Manned Patrol Aircraft (MPA). Manned patrol aircraft used for identification and observation
of targets.
Command Center. Center used for coordination of tasks between the vehicles of the MarSec.
Airbases. The location where manned patrol aircraft reside when not in use as well as the
location for the ground control stations controlling the UAVs. The distance between the UAVs
and the ground control station impacts the quality of the communications.
Docks. The location where manned patrol boats reside when not in use.
2.3.3 SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS
A MarSec exhibits some of the key properties that distinguish systems of systems from
traditional systems (Mekdeci, Ross, Rhodes, & Hastings, 2011a), including the following:
Component Independence. The vehicles themselves are capable of operating independently
and providing value to their own stakeholders outside of the SoS. For example, a UAV that is
part of the SoS, can be used outside of the SoS, for wildlife tracking or to fight forest fires, for
example.
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Distributed Authority. Managerial independence requires that the constituent systems have
the ability to make decisions on their own, or through collaboration with other constituent
systems. A MarSec can be configured such that decision making, such as task assignment, is
done via a central authority, or done collaboratively by the vehicles themselves.
Geographical Separation. Maritime security systems of systems are typically made up of
several vehicles, along with supporting components (e.g. radar towers, ground control stations,
etc.). Unlike traditional, monolithic systems, most of the components within a MarSec are not
co-located, but rather are distributed around a relatively large AOL.
Multi-Functionality. A simple, traditional system is more likely to have a single function or
purpose, whereas a system of system is more likely to be multi-functional. In a MarSec, there
are several tasks that need to be performed, i.e. detect, identify, and if necessary, intercept
targets.
Increased Contextual Diversity. Since components in systems of systems are more likely to be
physically separated than those in traditional systems, it follows that they will be more likely to
be operating under different environmental conditions. While a UAV in one part of the AOI
may be experiencing a relatively high load of including ships, other UAVs in other parts of the
AOI may be idle. Certain vehicles in the MarSec, for example, may be operating on water,
others on land, while others are in the air.
Decreased System Awareness. Since components in the MarSec are often operating under
different contexts, they must share the contextual information with each other in a timely
manner, for all of the components to have the same system awareness at any given time. In
order for that to happen, three things must occur; (1) the important differences in context must
be apparent, (2) stakeholders must be willing to share this information (not always the case,
particularly if the contextual differences are the stakeholder preferences and policies), and (3)
mechanisms must exist for this information to be shared in a timely manner. For these reasons,
components within systems of systems that operate under different contexts may be operating
under incorrect or incomplete information about the system itself, than components within
traditional systems operating under the same context.
Evolutionary Development. Traditional systems are typically assembled during
implementation, before the system is operated. Since components of systems of systems are
often added or removed during the operation of the SoS, what the SoS is composed of may be
continually evolving. Such is the case with a MarSec, which may change its configuration at any
time based on evolving stakeholder needs and contextual considerations. An example of a
35
change might be to replace larger UAVs coordinated by a central authority with swarms of
smaller UAVs that coordinate their tasks collectively.
Abstruse Emergence. In traditional systems, emergent behavior is often part of the design (or
at least expected), and as such, is usually a benefit overall. In systems of systems, particularly
those with evolutionary development, emergent behaviors are more difficult to predict and
often end up being problematic. Such is the case with a MarSec, particularly when disruptions
occur and there is a disconnect in the information sharing between the various components.
This may lead to one component acting and re-acting based on a different set of information
than another, leading to emergent behavior that is difficult to predict.
2.3.4 DYNAMIC CONTEXT
For this quantitative model, the area of interest is a littoral environment, consisting of narrow
water passageway located between two landmasses (Figure 2-3). Typically, all ships above a
certain size are required to have international transponders that pass the relevant identity,
cargo and destination information to local port authorities, although additional confirmation by
the MarSec is sometimes required. The MarSec normally has to identify smaller ships that
typically do not have transponders. Methods of identification include marine radar, visual
inspection and/or direct communication. Although there are many different types of ships that
pass through this AOl, they can be divided into three broad categories; (1) compliant ships, (2)
smugglers, (3) terrorists. Compliant ships are a general category for ships that are complying
with the appropriate laws and regulations, and are not hostile towards the MarSec. Compliant
ships include civilian sailboats, cargo ships, cruise ships, fishing vessels, police boats and friendly
military vessels. Smugglers are non-compliant ships carrying contraband. A vessel of any size
may contain contraband, but larger vessels have more capacity for smuggling. However, cargo
size is not an indicator of cargo importance, as smugglers may hide some of the most
dangerous contraband, such as weapons-grade uranium, aboard smaller vessels. Terrorists are
non-compliant ships that wish to detonate high-impact explosives at the port. For the
quantitative model, terrorists have a Modus Operandi (MO) based on a previous study on a
low-probability, high-impact terrorist attack on a maritime port conducted by the Naval
Postgraduate School (Buschmann et al., 2005) in which terrorists appear to be compliant
civilian vessels until they are close to the port, at which point they head at full speed and
detonate a bomb.
36
PATROL
BOAT DOCK PORT
CENTRAL
COMMAND
COMMUNICATION
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
AIR DETECTION ZONE JAMMING JAMMER
BASE RADIUS DIVIDER RADIUS
FIGURE 2-3: SCREENSHOT OF AOI USED IN THE QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF A MARSEC SOS.
2.3.4.1 CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES
There are numerous contextual considerations that can have a large
performance and survivability of the MarSec. Some of these variables include:
impact on the
Civilian Ship Arrival Rate. The number of ships that enter the AOl, per unit time. This is the
main variable that controls the traffic volume for all the ships, friendly and hostile, that pass
through the AOl.
Smuggler Rate. The percentage of ships entering the AOl that are smugglers.
Terrorist Scenario. Whether or not a terrorist will enter the AOl and attempt to detonate a
bomb in the port.
Jammer. Whether or not a jamming device is located in the AOl, which may interfere with
communication between entities in the MarSec.
2.3.5 QUANTITATIVE PERFORMANCE METRICS
The primary attributes for a MarSec are quantitative in nature. Specifically, performance is
assessed by the following:
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Identification Rate. The ratio of the number of identified ships to the total number of ships
that entered the AOL. The identification rate is used to estimate the probability of
identification, which is the probability that a ship entering the AOI is correctly identified before
it reaches port or leaves the AOl.
Interception Rate. The ratio of the number of intercepted hostile ships (terrorists, smugglers)
to the total number of hostile ships that entered the AOL. The interception rate is used to
estimate the probability of interception, which is the probability that a hostile ship entering the
AOI is intercepted before it reaches port or leaves the AOL.
Probability of Terrorist Bomb Detonation. The probability that a terrorist can successfully
detonate a bomb. In order for a bomb to detonate in the port, a terrorist must have entered
the AOI, and then the terrorist must not have been intercepted before he reached the port.
Suppose P(T) is the probability that a terrorist enters the AOI over some period T that defines a
scenario. The detonation of a bomb (b) is unique event and Boolean in nature. The probability
of a bomb being detonated in a port given that a terrorist has entered the AOI P(B/T), is
determined by looking at n scenarios in which a terrorist has entered the AOI and counting the
number of times a bomb was detonated.
P(BIT) bi)
n
Using Bayes Theorem,
P(BIT) = P(TIB)P(B) (2)
P(T)
rearranging we get
P(B) = (BIT)P(T)(3)
P(T/B)
Since P(TIB) = 1, we can determine the probability of a terrorist detonating a bomb in general
P(B) by
P(B) = bi P(T) (4)
2.3.6 PRECEDENCE
Maritime security systems have been identified as a SoS in the literature (Gonzalez, Piel, Gross,
& Glandrup, 2008), and have also been used by researchers in empirical case studies of systems
of systems (Buurman, Zhang, & Babovic, 2009; Huynh & Osmundson, 2006; Monperrus et al.,
2010).
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2.3.7 REPRESENTATIVENESS
A MarSec is a system that shares many properties and characteristics with other large-scale,
geospatial-centric system of systems including taxi services, emergency response services, and
Joint Forces. These similarities are discussed below:
2.3.7.1 TAXI SERVICES
A major taxi service used previously as a case study for system of systems (Sauser, Boardman, &
Gorod, 2008) is similar in many ways to a maritime security systems of systems. The major
components of a taxi service are a central dispatch and the taxicabs themselves (Figure 2-4).
Like maritime security, the constituent systems are geographically dispersed, they need to
travel to certain locations (i.e. customers and destinations) which appear randomly, and time is
off the essence. Also like maritime security, the constituent systems have operational and
managerial independence. Although they belong to and benefit from being part of the overall
taxicab service, individual taxicabs can choose to pickup/drop-off customers as they see fit, and
choose to participate in various concepts of operations (such as using GPS positioning or not) to
some extent. Customers may call central dispatch and request a cab or they may try hail a
taxicab off the street. Either way, this information is shared between the central dispatch and
the taxicabs, so that the constituent systems maintain situational awareness and the tasks (i.e.
picking up customers) are shared properly. Exactly who determines which taxicab goes where
is an operational consideration that the stakeholders in the taxicab service have to make. Many
taxicab services are virtual systems of systems, in that the constituent systems are not working
together for a common goal, but rather they are merely utilizing each other (in this case the
cabs and the central dispatch) to achieve personal objectives.
FIGURE 2-4: TAXICAB SERVICE IN NEW YORK
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2.3.7.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICES
Emergency Response Services (ERS) are similar to taxicab services , in that they have been used
as a case study for modeling systems of systems (Zhou et al., 2010) , and they have
geographically dispersed constituent systems which must respond to spatially-diverse events in
a timely manner. They consist of fire, ambulance and police services (Figure 2-5), and they also
have a central dispatch (usually 911 emergency services) where calls typically originate and
tasks are disseminated. One major difference between the taxicab service and an ERS, is that in
an ERS, the constituent systems are heterogeneous similar to how they are in a MarSec. The
heterogeneity of the emergency response system is required since different types of tasks are
necessary and different organizations specialize in providing those services. Major accidents
often require fire fighters to rescue victims from vehicles or buildings, Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) crews to tend to the injured and take them to the hospital, and police to secure
the accident scene, direct traffic and conduct an investigation. Most of these services are
unique to their respective organizations; however, some duplication of services is expected.
For example, fire crews often provide basic medical assistance if they are the first to arrive at
the scene of the accident, and they will also assist in, or conduct their own investigation of the
accident, particularly if it involves a fire, chemical spill or something of that nature. Like in a
MarSec, which has vehicles that detect, identify, board, search and rescue, these dissimilar
tasks and constituent systems have to be coordinated which makes the overall concept of
operations more complex than that of a homogenous taxicab service. Also, ERS tend to be
collaborative systems of systems, in that there is usually no central authority that commands all
of the constituent systems, rather they combine their efforts to achieve common goals (i.e.
maintain public health and safety).
FIGURE 2-5: POLICE, FIRE AND EMS VEHICLES AS PART OF AN ERS
40
2.3.7.3 JOINT FORCES
A Joint Force (JF), sometimes called a Joint Task Force (JTF), is a general term applied to a force
composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments
(Figure 2-6), operating under a single joint force commander (Staff, 2010). JFs are typically used
to conduct some major operation in a particular area of interest (i.e. a battlefield), and have
been used numerous times as case studies for systems of systems (Biltgen, 2007; DiMario,
2006; Mittal, Zeigler, Martin, & Sahin, 2008). Similar to the maritime security SoS, taxicab
service and ERSs, JFs are mostly composed of geographically separated constituent systems
that must respond quickly to events that occur in disperse locations within the AOl. A JF is
typically an acknowledged SoS, in that there is a central authority (the joint force commander),
however, there is still some level of managerial and operational independence within the
constituent systems.
FIGURE 2-6: A JOINT FORCE CONSISTING OF COMBINED NAVAL AND AIR FORCES
A summary of some of the SoS properties of these various systems is presented in Table 2-1:
SoS Properties of Various Large-Scale Systems.
41
TABLE 2-1: SOS PROPERTIES OF VARIOUS LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS
Yes (coastal area) Yes (city) Yes (city) Yes (battlefield)
Central authority, Command center,
UAVs, helicopters, dispatch, Central dispatch, troops, tanks,
patrol boats, radar sedans, police, fire, artillery, bombers,
towers, etc. limousines, ambulance destroyers, etc.
minivans
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Traffic, weather,
city bylaws, fuel Traffic, weather, hostile
prices, major weather, city city bylaws, fuel forces, fuel prices,
bylaws, fuel political events,events, politics, prices, major tcnlg
technology prices, major events, etc.
events, etc. upgrades, etc.
Yes No Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
2.4 MODELING A MARITIME SECURITY SOS
2.4.1 CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE MODELING AND SIMULATION TECHNIQUE
This research focuses on architecting systems of systems to maintain value delivery to
stakeholders, throughout, and in spite of, endogenous and exogenous change. It is not
practical to experiment with a large, real-world SoS, especially when testing survivability
strategies where degradation or even destruction of the system is likely. Therefore, modeling
and simulation is used in lieu of an actual system, as a proxy. There are many different ways to
model a system, and a discussion of the choice to implement the MarSec as an agent-based
discrete-event simulation follows.
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2.4.1.1 MODELING OF SYSTEMS
Models are used by researchers to give insight into various designs and contexts when it is
impossible or impractical to use real systems and environments. Although the real systems
and environments may be very complex, all models make some assumptions which may
simplify the underlying relationships enough so that they may tractable. If simple, parametric
models can be made that describe the real phenomenon with enough fidelity that they are
useful to decision makers, then it is often possible to use numerical methods and computing
solutions to explore a full tradespace of millions of designs and contexts. However, if it is
necessary to capture emergent behavior that is not easily simplified, as in the case with many
systems of systems particularly those that involve socio-technical aspects, then simulation is
often necessary.
2.4.1.2 SIMULATION OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS
In choosing the type of simulation to be used, several considerations were made. First, since
time is a critical property of a MarSec, dynamic simulations are required. This means static
simulations, such as traditional Monte Carlo methods, are inappropriate (Law & Kelton, 2000).
The next consideration to make is whether to use discrete or continuous models. Continuous
models are more appropriate for modeling continuous phenomenon, such as electricity flow
through a power grid or climate change caused by C02 emissions. However, endogenous and
exogenous changes in the MarSec are typically discrete. A ship randomly arriving in the AOl, a
UAV being shot down, or a smuggler being identified as hostile entity are all examples of
discrete-events that occur during the operation of a MarSec. It is at these discrete-events that
the state of the system and/or context changes, the effects of which must be determined
through simulation. The last consideration to be made is whether or not the simulation is
deterministic or stochastic. As with many complex systems of systems, there is a large amount
of uncertainty both in context and within the system. Inputs to the system are often random in
both time and space. The arrival of boats in the AOl, for example, can be modeled as a Poisson
process with a mean time between boat arrivals of 1/X, and a random location uniformly
distributed along the border of the AOl. Endogenous events can be stochastic as well, such as
the exact time it takes a human operator to identify a ship once he has a visual from a particular
UAV. Since there is uncertainty in both exogenous and endogenous events, a stochastic
simulation, particularly one that models the extreme conditions, is necessary particularly if
survivability and robustness of the MarSec is a concern.
Discrete-event simulation is a popular technique that has been used to model large-scale
systems of systems like maritime security systems of systems and ERSs (Bruzzone, Tremori, &
Merkuryev, 2011; Gonzalez, 2009; Henderson & Mason, 2005; Leathrum, Mathew, & Mastaglio,
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2011; Ng, 2007; Thomas, 2008). Discrete-event simulations are particularly well suited to
models that have stochastic, dynamic and discrete-event properties, because they simulate
discrete-events in a step-by-step manner, updating the state of the system and its context at
specified time intervals, and allow random variables as inputs (Figure 2-7).
FIGURE 2-7: INFORMATION FLOW THROUGH THE DES
2.4.1.3 AGENT BASED MODELING
Systems of systems have many properties that make assessing value delivery non-trivial. Unlike
many simple systems, equations alone do not adequately describe the relationship between
components. Constituent systems have managerial and operational independence, which
makes modeling of individual behavior and decision making necessary. Action and reaction to
environmental changes is not simply a matter of physics. Instead, constituent systems perform
actions based on the information they have at the time and their own priorities. If humans are
operating some of the constituent systems, then there is typically going to be a stochastic
behavioral element to be considered as well. When the individual behaviors of the constituent
systems interact with each other, the behavior of the overall SoS may not function as expected.
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As an example of the complexity of the overall SoS behavior, consider an ERS that responds to a
large fire that is reported by a 911 call. A single police car, which happened to be in the
neighborhood, is the first to arrive at the location and quickly discovers that it is a false alarm.
All of the other vehicles, however, are still on route to the scene, because this local information
(the fact that it was a false alarm) has not been shared. Whether or not the other constituent
systems continue to the scene or turn back depends on a number of factors such as when the
false alarm is reported, the priorities and protocols of the individual constituent systems (e.g.
does the fire department trust a single police officer's assessment of the situation or do they
need to conduct their own investigation), traffic conditions, and whether or not other events
are happening in the city that require attention. The number of vehicles that still respond to
the false alarm impacts value delivery immediately (such as fuel spent) but more importantly,
may serious impact future events as well. The ability to respond to a major chemical spill that
happens 20 minutes later at the other end of the city will likely depend on how many vehicles
responded to the false fire alarm.
To assess the performance of a MarSec, an agent-based DES was implemented where individual
constituent systems make tactical decisions based on their own behavior characteristics and
the local information they have at some particular time. This way, the individual actions and
reactions can be ascertained and overall behavior of the SoS can be assessed.
2.4.1.4 LIMITATIONS OF AGENT-BASED DES
As with any modeling or simulation technique, agent-based, discrete-event simulations do have
limitations and drawbacks. Almost all mathematical models require simplifying assumptions,
which may affect the validity of the results, and agent-based discrete-event simulations are no
exception. Also, as with any model, the quality of the outputs is strongly correlated with the
quality of the inputs, e.g. if there is an error in the assumption used to determine an input such
as the arrival rate of ships into the AOl, then there may be a significant error in one or more
outputs, such as the probability of detection.
Due to the stochastic nature of the inputs and models, the outputs of the agent-based DES are
typically stochastic themselves. This means that for a given set of inputs, the simulation must
be run multiple times (e.g. "trials") to gather enough samples to estimate the true attributes of
the system. Depending on the level of statistical confidence required, the number of trials
required can significantly increase the computational load. This is a major concern, since
perhaps the largest drawback to agent-based, discrete-event simulations is the considerable
computational effort required to calculate the performance of even one design under once
context. Determining the potential actions and reactions of every entity, for each small
increment of time, is often cumbersome even for modern computers. If the behavior of each
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entity depends on the behavior of all the other entities in the system, then in many cases the
behavior f(n) for the entities in the system is O(n!) meaning that the computation effort
required grows in a factorial relationship with the size of the SoS and context. This can become
a very serious problem if a large tradespace consisting of thousands of designs and potential
contexts is to be explored, and multiple runs have to be made for each design/context pair for
statistical confidence.
2.4.1.5 LIMITATIONS OF OBSERVATIONAL DATA
Simulations are subject to modeling error, and that is a primary argument against using data
from simulations to make design decisions. Observational data from real systems in real
contexts tend to be preferred, but for many even reasons, simulations are not only necessary,
but sometimes more useful even if some observation data exists.
Dependent on real systems and real contexts. Unlike simple systems such as stereos, it is
often impossible or impracticable to build prototypes of real, complex systems, particularly
systems of systems. For example, it would be very unlikely that Sony would be able to build a
prototype of the Sony PlayStation Network that included all of the different stakeholders and
70 million users and electronic devices around the globe. Furthermore, even if actual
prototypes could be built, they cannot (and often should not) be exposed to the actual contexts
that the real systems may encounter. For example, in addition to being extremely expensive
and time consuming, it would be very immoral for stakeholders to attack their own military
systems of systems with live ammunition if there is any danger to the human operators.
Observational data can be still be gathered using prototypes of varying size and fidelity in
contexts that are somewhat similar to actual conditions the systems may face, but this
obviously introduces some uncertainty in the validity of the results. For example,
observational data about a small, manned maritime security SoS operating in Maine might be
available, but how does this data infer the performance of a large, mostly unmanned maritime
security SoS defending the Japanese coastline?
Small sample sizes. Complex systems tend to operate in highly dynamic environments and
often have their own stochastic responses, particularly if human decision making is part of the
concept of operations. Even if observational data is available, there may not be enough
available to accurately predict the system response to particular context. For example, data on
how a system responded to a few, severe thunderstorms may be available, but is this enough to
be able to say with confidence that the system is survivable (or not) to thunderstorms?
Unfortunately, small sample sizes means that the estimates of the performance of the system
will often be clouded by statistical error. To be able to account for the stochastic nature of the
system and its environment, many samples have to be taken which is often not possible in the
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real world, particularly for rare, but important contexts. Most simulations, on the other hand,
can be run thousands of times, reducing the statistical error to trivial levels.
Measurement Error and Intermediate Metrics. Observational data relies on what was
observed. Sometimes, it is difficult to measure certain metrics in the real world and there is a
measurement error that needs to be considered. For example, a person with a stopwatch
timing how long it takes an operator to identify a particular target introduces an measurement
error that includes the ability to determine exactly when the process started and stopped, as
well as a reaction time. Observational data also often doesn't measure intermediate metrics
that may be important, particularly in determining why something happened. For example, an
airplane may crash in a thunderstorm, but why it crashed may be difficult to assess without
something like a black box. Even with a black box, forensic engineers often have to make
inferences about the situational awareness of the pilots from their conversation or whatever
actions were recorded, for example. In simulations, many of these variables can be directly
measured and recorded for tracing purposes.
2.4.1.6 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THE AGENT-BASED DES
A maritime security, agent-based DES was implemented in software, based on a set of
conceptual models of maritime security systems of systems. Verifying and validating the
simulation involves proving that simulation accurately implements the conceptual model (i.e.
verification), and proving that the simulation accurately represents the real system (i.e.
validation) (Figure 2-8). Verification and validation of a simulation is a subjective process.
What is considered valid and/or verified to some, is not to others. The purpose of verification
and validation is to build confidence that the simulation accurately represents the real system,
and that results and insights from the simulation can be applied to the real system. Verification
and validation simply raises the confidence the user has of the simulation. However,
verification and validation can be expensive process with diminishing returns. The relationship
between building confidence in the simulation and the cost is not linear (Figure 2-9). As
confidence is gained in the simulation, the next incremental increase in confidence gained by
performing more verification and validation is vastly outweighed by the cost, such that it
becomes infinitely expensive to gain 100% confidence in the simulation. Thus, a model builder
should only do as much verification and validation necessary for the user to gain enough
confidence in the simulation, and no more.
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FIGURE 2-8: VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF A SIMULATION FIGURE 2-9: VALUE AND COST OF A SIMULATION VS. LEVEL OF
(BANKS & CARSON, 1984) CONFIDENCE IN THAT SIMULATION
(SARGENT, 2005)
It is important to note that there is a risk to the model builder in the amount of verification and
validation done on the model. If the model user is satisfied, then more successful
verification/validation tests will simply improve the confidence. However, if any of these
additional tests fail, then confidence in the model will likely decrease, perhaps enough to make
the model user no longer confident enough in the model to accept it.
The goal of the verification is to make sure that there are no programming errors (bugs) and
that the DES accurately implements the conceptual model correctly. There are several
procedures that can build confidence that the model is verified. None of the procedures are
essential, but all of them can help build (or reduce) confidence in the model. All of these
procedures were performed on the simulation.
Modularity. The code was written in modules, using an object-oriented approach (Law &
Kelton, 1997)
Tracing. A log of sequential events was kept as they occurred (i.e. a trace). This log was
compared with a flow diagram of events from the conceptual model. (Banks & Carson, 1984)
(Law & Kelton, 1997).
Input Integrity. Inputs including hardcoded parameters were verified to have remained
constant after the simulation executed. (Banks & Carson, 1984)
Automatic Error Checking. There are over 100 automatic error checks in the code, to catch
logic problems. For example, if an output of a function can only range between 0 and 1, an
error flag is set if the function returns more than 1 or less than zero.
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Visualization. A real-time animation of the output is generated to improve debugging and help
determine if the DES model matches the conceptual model. (Law & Kelton, 1997)
Range Checking. For a given range of inputs, the simulation produced a reasonable set of
outputs. (Banks & Carson, 1984)
Extreme condition testing. Some extreme values of inputs were used to test if the model. For
example, boats arriving in the AOI every 10 seconds as opposed to every 320 seconds. The
simulation did not break as a result. (C. Nehme, 2008)
Face Validity. Since no real system exists against which the outputs of the simulation can be
compared, it is very difficult to validate the simulation. One of the best methods in lieu of
comparing simulation data against actual data from a real system is to have subject domain
experts take a look at the simulation and its outputs and demonstrate face validity. In the case
of the simulation, the simulation was run for a group of system analysts that have built a similar
MarSec and face validity was demonstrated.
2.5 SUMMARY
This chapter presented details on the research approach used to answer the research questions
posed in Chapter 1. The literature was examined for existing definitions and strategies relating
to viability, and gaps based on differences between the normative and descriptive research was
identified. Those gaps were addressed through a combination of inductive and deductive
reasoning, using historical cases and a quantitative model that was used to validate concepts
and strategies, as well as to provide new ones. This chapter also justified why the MarSec SoS
was chosen for the quantitative model, including the fact that it has strong SoS characteristics,
is fairly representative of a class of important systems of systems, has quantitative performance
metrics which can be easily modeled, and has been used in the past for similar SoS studies.
The next chapter will lay down the conceptual foundation for the remainder of the dissertation.
Definitions of fundamental concepts will be presented, and there will also be a discussion on
the current state of research in value delivery sustainment.
49
3 VALUE DELIVERY IN A DYNAMIC CONTEXT
This chapter begins by setting the basic definitions for many of the important concepts used in
this research, such as system, context and value. Next, the chapter describes various value
sustainment "-ilities" and discusses how they are defined in the literature.
3.1 DEFINING VALUE DELIVERY OF SYSTEMS
3.1.1 SYSTEMS
The term system describes an entity that is composed of other entities, i.e. "components",
which interact with each other within some system boundary (Figure 3-1). A system boundary
separates the system from its context. Context is everything outside the system that may
influence the system, or be influenced by the system. Context includes such things as external
entities, the physical environment and other conditions, with examples given in Table 3-1. An
open system is a system that interacts with its context, whereas a closed system does not.
External
Entity
External
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External
Enrtity
FIGURE 3-1: SYSTEM OPERATING IN ITS CONTEXT
TABLE 3-1: EXAMPLES OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT EXTERNAL ENTITIES OTHER CONDITIONS
Terrain
Weather
Precipitation
Customers
Wild Animals
Enemy Units
Current Date/Time
Laws and Regulations
Market Prices
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There are many types of systems, including natural systems and engineered systems. Many
natural systems, such as ecosystems, do not have a clear, identifiable purpose while others,
such as the repository system found in the human body, do. Engineered systems are artificial
systems designed to provide some value to stakeholders. Henceforth, unless otherwise stated,
the term "system" in this dissertation will refer exclusively to engineered systems. A
traditional system is one that is composed of components that do not produce value to its
stakeholders on their own, but rather has components that must be combined to produce
some useful effect. Table 3-2 provides a few examples of traditional systems.
TABLE 3-2: EXAMPLES OF TRADITIONAL SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND BENEFITS
TRADITIONAL SYSTEM EXAMPLE COMPONENTS BENEFITS TO STAKEHOLDERS
CD player, speakers, amplifier, Ability to hear recorded soundStereo stored on compact discs, ability
wire, radio tuner to hear radio broadcasts
CPU, RAM, hard drive, Ability to read / write documents,
Laptop Computer motherboard, keyboard, perform scientific simulations,
monitor play games
Engine, steering wheel, seats, Ability to transport passengers /
Carwheels cargo from point A to point B, fun
to drive, status symbol
Engineered systems are not to be confused with engineering systems, which are systems that
have both a high degree of technical and social complexity (de Weck, Roos, & Magee, 2012).
Many engineered systems are also engineering systems and vice-versa, but there are
differences. A laptop, for example, is an engineered system but not an engineering system,
because it lacks social complexity. Similarly, there are technically and socially complex systems
that emerge spontaneously but are not designed, such as the Internet itself, which can be
considered an engineering system but not an engineered system.
3.1.2 VALUE
The focus of this dissertation is to study the ways that systems of systems can maintain value
delivery over their lifetimes. Since systems will undoubtedly cost something to design, build
and operate, the overall benefit that a system provides its stakeholders has to be weighed
against its cost. For the purposes of this dissertation, value refers to the net benefit or utility
(i.e. received benefits less costs for receiving those benefits) (Richards, Ross, Hastings, &
Rhodes, 2008) an engineered system provides to its stakeholders, however value can have
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other definitions that are used by decision makers to evaluate and compare system designs
(Ross, O'Neill, Hastings, & Rhodes, 2010).
The design, behavior and context of a system all have an impact on its value delivery. The total
area coverage of a MarSec, for example, is determined by design properties such as the
technical specifications of the payload, behavioral factors such as the altitude and route that
the UAVs are flying, and contextual factors such as the weather and terrain. Not all system
properties or behaviors are relevant to all attributes. For example, the color of the UAVs has no
effect on the total area coverage, but it does influence how visible the UAVs are. Similarly,
while everything outside of the system boundaries can be considered context, very little of it is
actually relevant to the value delivery of the system.
Value is subjective. What is valuable to one stakeholder may not be valuable to another. A car
may be valuable to one person because it gets them from point A to point B, but the same car
may be valuable to someone else because it is fun to drive. Stakeholders assess value by
applying their preferences to system attributes. The attributes of a system are all the relevant
aspects that the system has or does to provide value to the stakeholders. Table 3-3 provides
some examples of stakeholder attributes that are mapped to system objectives. Preferences
(sometimes quantified as "utility functions") are a measure of how well system attributes meet
objectives and therefore provide value to stakeholders. Preference, or utility, curves typically
normalize the utility associated with attributes to a numeric score between 0 and 1, facilitating
comparison with each other when comparing designs.
TABLE 3-3: EXAMPLE OF MAPPING SYSTEM BENEFITS TO SYSTEM ATTRIBUTES
e Minimum time between location revisits
Provide surveillance of enemy territory Toaaracvag
e Maximum acceleration
Fun to drive * Turning radius
* Presence of a convertible roof
0 Noise
e Maximum carrying capacity
Able to transport goods e Maximum range
e Maximum speed
* Color
Aesthetically pleasing 0 Shape
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3.1.3 STAKEHOLDERS AND DECISION MAKERS
Stakeholders are those who are supposed to benefit from the outputs of an engineered system.
A system may have many stakeholders, some of whom directly benefit from the system's
outputs, and others who indirectly benefit. For example, suppose a company designs,
manufacturers and sells stereos. Both the customers and the manufacturer are stakeholders of
the system. The stereo will provide acceptable value to the customer if it does what the
customer wants (e.g. provide good quality sounds), over its lifetime, and at a reasonable cost
(to the customer). In this case, the customer is a stakeholder who directly benefits from the
outputs of the system. If the stereo can meets the needs of the customers and it can be
manufacturers, delivered and sold at a profit, then will provide acceptable value to the
manufacturers. The manufactures indirectly benefit from the outputs of the system (e.g. the
sound quality of the stereo) since if the stereo provides good sound, customers will be more
likely to buy it and the manufacturer will be more likely to make a profit.
In addition to providing direct benefit to stakeholders, engineered systems are designed,
manufactured, and operated by stakeholders. Many of these stakeholders may be the same,
but sometimes they are different. For example, an amusement park ride is typically designed
by one stakeholder, owned by another, operated by an employee and enjoyed by its rider. The
system is designed to be enjoyable to the rider, be safe, operate effectively for a reasonable
lifetime, and have a reasonable cost to the rider to enjoy, the owner to own and the
manufacturer to sell.
Stakeholders are always decision makers, and they assess whether or not the system is meeting
their value expectations. A Decision Maker (DM) is someone who has the authority to make a
decision that can influence the system at the design, strategic or operational level. A Design
Decision Maker (DDM) makes a decision during the design process that influences the
capabilities that the system has. Typically, DDMs are the owners of the systems and the system
architects who do the actual design. A Strategic Decision Maker (SDM) is someone that
typically has a high-level of authority, and makes larger, strategic decisions after the system has
been implemented, either during operations or between operations. Operational Decision
Makers (ODM) typically have low levels of authority and make smaller tactical decisions during
the actual operation of the system. If made during operations, then strategic decisions are
often high-level and involve decision makers with high levels of authority. Decision makers are
typically system architects, operators, owners, or other stakeholders that share common goals,
and can directly influence the system. Example decisions and decision makers for a MarSec are
presented in Table 3-4.
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TABLE 3-4: EXAMPLE OF DECISION MAKING LEVEL AND DECISION MAKER FOR A MARSEC SOS
Adding the option to replace spare batteries on the UAVs Port authority,
with high-powered spotlights. system architect
Removing the spare batteries on all the UAVs and .Strategic Supervisor
replacing them with high-powered spolights.
Shining a spotlight on a target to confirm identity when OeainlUVoeaoOperational UAV operator
visibility is low.I
Decisions are hierarchal in nature, such that design decisions constrain strategic decisions, and
strategic decisions constrain operational decisions. For example, shining a spotlight on a target
(an operational decision) would not be possible if the field commander did not authorize that
spotlights be placed on the UAVs instead of spare batteries. Similarly, the decision to use
spotlights instead of batteries is only possible because of a design decision that allows the
swapping of batteries and spotlights as an option.
Other entities may influence the system's value delivery, intentionally or not. Smugglers may
try to outrun the patrol boats, unintentionally causing the MarSec to divert resources away
from other parts of the AOI as they track and chase the smugglers. Similarly, a pirate ship may
intentionally attack one of the patrol boats of the MarSec, if it feels threatened. Although both
the pirates and smugglers made decisions that had an effect on the value delivery of the
MarSec, they would not be considered decision makers because they do not have the authority
to make voluntary changes to the SoS (even if they force the SoS to makes changes in
response).
3.1.4 EPOCHS AND ERAS
Contexts can be temporally divided into distinct time periods known as epochs and eras. Ross
and Rhodes (2008b) define an epoch to be a period of time for which the system has fixed
context and fixed value expectations. By "fixed", it is implied that certain contextual factors are
allowed to fluctuate in small ways that do not threaten the value delivery of the system. For
example, a municipal power station may divide the year into two distinct epochs; the winter
season and summer season. The key contextual parameter of interest is the demand for
power. For this particular power station, the winter and summer seasons have significantly
different demands for power, perhaps because the municipal is a summer vacation destination
and the population doubles during those months. Demand for power is a continuous,
stochastic variable and not likely to be the same at any given moment in time. Within each
season, there are minor fluctuations in the power demand caused by such factors as the time of
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day and the daily temperature. As long as these fluctuations are within reasonable limits, then
the context can be considered "fixed". Eras are longer periods that are composed of several
epochs in sequence. The entire system lifespan often consists of one era, however if the
system undergoes a major change in its role or definition, then it may signal the end of one era
and the beginning of another. An example of an era change would be when horse-drawn
carriages on rails were replaced with electric trains.
3.2 SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
The Department of Defense (2008a) defines systems of systems as "a set or arrangement of
systems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system
that delivers unique capabilities". The independent and useful systems that make up a SoS are
referred to as constituent systems. Not all of the components in a SoS are constituent systems;
most systems of systems will still require some traditional components that are not systems
themselves, but are required for the overall SoS to function properly. Some may argue that
most "components" within a system, even within a traditional system like a stereo, are actually
systems themselves. For example, a CD player can be considered a system because it is made
up of components such as a motor, laser, and digital-to-audio-converter (DAC). Components of
a traditional system that are composed themselves of subcomponents that interact with each
other, are referred to as subsystems. Yet, what distinguishes a system of subsystems, from a
system of systems?
There are a number of key system of systems properties that have been identified in the
literature (Boardman & Sauser, 2006; Eisner, Marciniak, & McMillan, 1991; Ellison, Fisher,
Linger, Lipson, & Longstaff, 1997; Ellison & Woody, 2007; Maier, 1998) which distinguish
systems of systems from traditional systems. They are:
Operational Independence of the Elements. A system of systems is composed of constituent
systems, which can independent and useful in their own right. They can exist and provide some
value to stakeholders outside the SoS. In a traditional systems, components are not likely to be
valuable by themselves or be able to operate outside of the system.
Managerial Independence of the Elements. The constituent systems have the ability to decide
their own actions and behavior.
Evolutionary Development. A system of systems goes through evolutionary development
where components and constituent systems are added, removed, and modified in response to
changes in context.
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Emergent Behavior. The DoD (2008b) defines emergent behavior as "behavior which is
unexpected or cannot be predicted from knowledge of the system's constituent parts", even
though it acknowledges that there is no single, universally accepted definition of emergence.
Regardless, the reason why system architects construct a system of systems in the first place, is
so that the SoS can perform higher-level functions that are not possible by any single
constituent system.
Geographic Distribution. The span of the geographic distance between the component systems
is so large, that they are usually only exchanging information and not useful quantities of mass
and energy.
Connections. Constituent systems tend not to be totally independent or totally dependent
when interacting within a SoS. Rather, they are inter-dependent and loosely coupled. In
traditional systems, there tends to be tight coupling and strong inter-operations between
components.
Multi-Functionality. The constituent systems within a system of systems tend to be able to
perform multiple functions and roles within the SoS. Components within a traditional system
tend to be uni-functional.
Contextual Diversity. Due to the increased geographical separation, constituent systems tend
to have more contextual diversity in a SoS than components in a traditional system.
Unbounded. Systems of systems are often unbounded, meaning that components can be
added, modified and removed independently of some central administrative control.
Furthermore, the decision to add, remove or modify components is often done by stakeholders
with a limited understanding of the entire SoS. Traditional systems tend to be bounded, where
decisions about the addition, modification and removal of components are done by a central
authority with complete knowledge of the system.
3.2.1 TYPES OF SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
Maier (1998) classified three major types of systems of systems, based on the task-sharing
relationship between the constituent systems:
Directed. A directed system of systems is one that has a SoS management that sets a purpose
for the SoS and manages the participation of the individual constituent systems. The
constituent systems still retain some independence in their individual action, but must follow
the overall SoS concept of operations and are considered subordinates to the SoS management.
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Collaborative. In a collaborative SoS, there may not be a SoS management, but the constituent
systems participate willingly and cooperatively to achieve common objectives. An example of a
collaborative system of systems is would be the ad-hoc SoS that emerges when different
emergency response agencies such as fire, police and ambulance respond to a major accident
and work together to save lives and mitigate property damage.
Virtual. In a virtual system of systems, there is no central management or overall objectives.
The constituent systems interact with each other independently, perhaps not even being fully
aware of the overall ad-hoc SoS that they are part of. The Internet itself is a classic example of
a virtual SoS.
Expanding on Maier's classification to include the types of systems of systems most often found
in military organizations, Dahmann (2008) introduced another type of SoS, the acknowledged
SoS.
Acknowledged. An acknowledged SoS is one where there is a central authority at the SoS level
that sets policy and dictates an overall concept of operations, but the constituent systems have
their own management, objectives and needs in parallel.
3.2.2 SYSTEM CONTINUUM
Mekdeci et al. (2011b) notes having one or more of the properties that characterize a system of
systems, does not necessarily make a system a SoS. Similarly, most systems of systems do not
necessarily exhibit every SoS characteristic that has been identified. Rather, complex systems,
and systems of systems, fall somewhere along a system continuum (Figure 3-2) that ranges
from traditional systems such as stereos and calculators, to complex system of systems such as
Joint Task Forces and the Internet itself. Therefore, this dissertation will use caution when
making claims about systems of systems in general, and instead use conservative language, i.e.
"systems of systems tend to (be, have) ..." rather than "systems of systems (are, have) ... "
where appropriate.
Traditional System System of Systems
FIGURE 3-2: SYSTEM CONTINUUM
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3.2.3 GLOBAL AND LOCAL CONTEXT
Not everything within a context is relevant to the system. Certain contextual factors are only
relevant to certain systems. The market price of gasoline, for example, is probably relevant to a
car, but not to a radio station. Relevancy of contextual factors is also due to differences
between local contexts. For example, while the weather is relevant to an automobile, only the
local weather is relevant, not what is happening on the other side of the Earth. Similarly,
context can be relevant based on the roles and responsibilities a system assumes within a larger
collection of systems. For example, while the presence of enemy troops are a concern to any
unit in a Joint Task Force (including the MarSec), the location of an enemy submarine is more
likely to more relevant to a naval ship than a foot soldier.
To distinguish between the overall context that exists, and the context that is relevant to a
particular system, we define the global conditions, 0, as everything that describes the state of
the world at that particular moment, and the system context, Px, as everything that is relevant
to a particular system X. For example, the global context includes the weather at every location
on Earth, but a power plant in Boston is only concerned about the weather in its area.
Therefore, if we let aA denote a particular attribute of system A, and pA as the context that
system A experiences, then we can say that
aA =f(A, VA) (5)
3.3 CONTEXTUAL CHANGES
In section 3.1.4, the concepts of epochs and eras were introduced, and it was stated that it is
normal for systems to operate over a small range of contextual deviations within an epoch.
Stakeholders should expect that minor fluctuations, such as the daily temperature rising and
falling, will not cause the engineered systems operating in that context to fail. However, there
may be certain events that can cause a rapid or significant change in context, which may reduce
the value delivery of the system below stakeholder expectations. If these events are possible,
then the system is vulnerable to them, and decision makers should implement strategies to
reduce such vulnerability, where possible.
3.3.1 SIGNIFICANT AND INSIGNIFICANT CONTEXTUAL CHANGES
Whether a change is insignificant (i.e. something that does not cause a context shift), or
significant, is subjective. To illustrate the difference, consider a truck that delivers goods year-
round, all over North America. From the perspective of the truck stakeholders, there are two
epochs: winter and non-winter. In response to an epoch shift, the stakeholders either winterize
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or de-winterize the truck. Winterization of the truck includes using special tires and anti-freeze
windshield washer fluid. In this framing, each epoch has two distinct sub-contexts, whether it
precipitates (snow/rain) or not. The "normal" subcontexts would be where there is no
precipitation, in both the winter and non-winter epochs. The precipitation sub-contexts can be
considered to be disturbances, since they are short, finite duration contextual changes that are
significant enough to threaten the value delivery of the system (Figure 3-3). These changes are
significant because there is a significantly higher chance of an accident during a precipitation
sub-context, unless the truck changes delivery operations (i.e. slows down). Minor fluctuations,
such as the daily temperature, can affect value delivery, but are usually not considered
significant enough to describe as an epoch change. Note that even though only two epochs are
shown in Figure 3-3, in the case of a truck, an era will often consist of many cycles of winter and
non-winter epochs, and rain/snow disturbances that span the truck's lifetime.
ERA
TIME ---
LEGEND
Context A: Epoch: Non-winter, Sub-Context: No Rain * Context C: Epoch: winter, Sub-Context: No Snow
Context B: Epoch: Non-winter, Sub-Context: Rain 0 Context D: Epoch: winter, Sub-Context: Snow
FIGURE 3-3: EXAMPLE OF AN ERA CONSISTING OF WINTER AND NON-WINTER EPOCHS
Suppose a crisis in the Middle East drives gasoline prices high enough that the owner can no
longer afford to drive the truck as much as she wants. Does this change in gasoline prices mark
the beginning of a new epoch? The answer is subjective, and largely depends on whether or
not the gasoline prices return to an acceptable level within a "short time" or not. If the prices
fall back down soon after they were raised, then that period of high gasoline prices can be
considered a disturbance during an epoch of affordable gas prices. If the high gasoline prices
remain for a long period of time, however, then the question of whether the prices will return
to "normal" has to be asked. There are often cues that suggest whether a change will be short
term, long term or even permanent. A rise in gasoline prices due to an unusually hot July will
almost surely be a disturbance. A rise in prices due to a change in environmental law passed by
Congress is more likely to be an epoch shift. In some cases, On the other hand, the contextual
changes may be so significant that they may mark the beginning of a new era. For example, the
owner may decide that it is no longer worth it to actually drive the truck around making
deliveries, but instead decides to convert the truck into a mobile home.
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3.3.2 PERTURBATIONS
There are many different terms in the technical literature for events that cause rapid or
significant changes in context that threaten the value delivery of systems. Richards (2009)
defines a "disturbance" as something which may asymmetrically degrade performance of a
system. A sudden rise in gasoline prices that threatens the value delivery of the system would
be an example of a disturbance. Jackson (2010) refers to external disturbances as "disruptions
of input" and internal disturbances as "systemic failures". Mekdeci et al. (2012) refers to both
disruptions and disturbances as perturbations, which is defined as an "imposed state change in
a system's form, operations, or context which could jeopardize value delivery". In addition to
system and contextual changes, Beesemeyer (2012) also includes imposed changes on
stakeholder needs as a perturbations as well.
The duration of a contextual change is important. A lightning strike, for example, is an
instantaneous event, whereas a thunderstorm has a finite duration. The key difference is that a
system may have time to react to a finite-duration contextual change such as re-routing during
a thunderstorm. From this perspective, Mekdeci et al. (2012) defines disturbances to be finite
duration, continuous state changes, and disruptions as instant, discontinuous state changes.
Beesemyer (2012) refers to a permanent, or very long (e.g. unlikely to revert), change in
context or needs as an epoch shift. For the remainder of this dissertation, these definitions of
disturbances, disruptions and perturbations will be used.
In addition to events which have already impacted the system, it is important to discuss events
that merely threaten to impact the system. NIST (2009) defines a "threat" to be:
"Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or
individuals through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction,
disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service."
The literature is somewhat confusing in the definition and classification of threats. If the NIST
definition is used, a threat is always malicious. The International Standards Organization (ISO)
defines threat more broadly as a "potential cause of an incident, that may result in harm of
systems and organization" (International Standards Organization, 2011). The National Institute
of Building Science (2011) and the Department of Homeland Security (Department of Homeland
Security, 2012) distinguish between three types of threats; (1) natural events, (2) accidents,
and (3) intentional acts to cause harm. Natural events are those that result strictly from natural
forces, such as tornados, earthquakes and hurricanes. Accidents are those that result from
unintentional human involvement, such as chemical spills and most fires. Intentional acts to
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cause harm include both common criminal activity such as arson, and more serious attacks that
would be considered terrorism. In her book Safeware, Leveson (1995) does not explicitly define
a threat, but instead defines "hazards" to be a set of conditions inside a system that could
negatively impact it. Construction engineering typically considers hazards to be both internal
and external to the system, and either "dormant", such as poor soil conditions before
construction has even started, or "armed", such as poor quality soil conditions upon which a
building has been erected (MacCollum, 2007). For the purpose of clarity, this dissertation uses
danger to mean a "set of conditions that have the potential to cause a perturbation, but have
not yet impacted value delivery." Threats will mean dangers that exist outside the system, and
hazards will mean dangers that exist inside the system.
Accidents, or "anthropogenic non-intentional events" according to FMEA, are a large concern
for many sociotechnical systems. Humans play a large role in many complex systems. Even the
unmanned vehicles used for maritime security have a significant human component. Although
the word "unmanned" might give the impression that there are no humans involved, human
operators perform command and control. Even in systems with a very high level of
automation, humans have final decision-making authority. Since many stakeholders want to
use unmanned technology as a force multiplier, the goal is to reduce the human-to-vehicle ratio
as much as possible. However, Kilgore et al. (2007) points out that humans will still be required
to perform contingency intervention, and will always be critical component of any "unmanned"
systems in the foreseeable future. Ignoring the human aspect of these sociotechnical systems
would be dangerous; some of the largest system accidents ever have been attributed, at least
partially, to human error including Three Mile Island, the Challenger disaster, the Bhopal
chemical spill, the Exxon Valdez spill, and Chernobyl (Woods, Johannesen, Cook, & Sarter,
1994). Even for unmanned aerial systems, it has been estimated that human operator error is
at least partially responsible for between 60% and 80% of accidents (Leduc, Rash, & Manning,
2006). Many human factor researchers classifies system failures attributed to human errors
using the Human Factors Accident Classification (HFAC) analysis (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001).
At the heart of this classification, is the human error itself, referred to as an "unsafe act". These
acts are classified as being involuntary 'errors" (further decomposed into decision, skill-based
or perceptual errors) and voluntary "violations" (either routine or exceptional). The errors
themselves are often the result of "preconditions", the most common of which include the
mental condition of the operators, procedural problems, supervisory problems and resource
failures (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2002). Table 3-5 gives the result of a study, which classified
the types of human errors and their causes for incidents involving the United States Marine
Corps (USMC) and the United States Navy (USN) between 1991 and 1999.
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TABLE 3-5: MISHAPS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH HFACS CAUSAL CATEGORY (FY 91-99)
(SHAPPELL & WIEGMANN, 2002).
3.4 II-ILITIES" FOR MAINTAINING VALUE
If we assume that complex systems, particularly systems of systems, operate in dynamic
environments and have long lifespans, then we can also assume that they will encounter
perturbations that threaten their value delivery. There are numerous non-functional
requirements that may help systems maintain value delivery, in spite of contextual changes,
over its lifetime including reliability (Downer, 2009), security (Furlani, 2009), safety (Leveson,
2002), survivability (Richards, Hastings, Rhodes, & Weigel, 2007), resilience (Hollnagel, Woods,
& Leveson, 2006; Jackson, 2010; Westrum, 2006) and robustness (Smart, Amaral, & Ottino,
2008). Some of these qualities, such as resilience and robustness, are synonymous in the
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English language, but researchers have defined them in the systems literature to describe
distinct system properties. Furthermore, researchers have given different definitions to the
same terms, such as resilience, creating inconsistency in the literature. In order for
stakeholders to express what they need the systems to do, and for system architects to design
systems that meet those needs, decision makers need to carefully choose which qualities they
desire. Can a system be survivable in general or is survivability specific to a particular event or
context? Should system architects design for survivability or robustness, and does it matter?
Can a system be robust but not resilient? Is reliability necessary to achieve resilience? These
types of issues will be explored in this section.
3.4.1 RESILIENCE
Of all the "-ilities" relating to value sustainment, the term "resilience" is perhaps the most
common. Sheard & Mostashari (2008) listed 35 different definitions of resilience, highlighting
the fact that the definitions differ in the criteria they describe. Specifically, there are five
criteria that may or may not be mentioned in the definition of resilience Figure 3-4. They are
explained in more detail below:
System. Some definitions of resilience specify the type of system that the definition applies to.
For example, Gunderson (2000) describes ecological resilience as the amount of disturbance
that an ecosystem could withstand without changing self-organized processes and structures /
without changing state. Whether or not that definition of resilience extends to other systems,
depends upon how similar the other systems are to the ecosystem that Gunderson is referring
to.
During Time periods """"*""""""""""""'"
Is beset by Events
System To Preserve
must perform Actions system
FIGURE 3-4: CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING RESILIENCE
(SHEARD & MOSTASHARI, 2008)
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Events. The definition of resilience may be specified to include only certain types of events
such as whether they are endogenous or exogenous.
Actions. Certain definitions of resilience include specific actions that the system must take in
order for it to be considered resilient. For example, the ability to change or adapt has been
mentioned as a requisite for a system to be resilient (Holinagel, et al., 2006).
Quality Preservation. According to some researchers, certain system properties or qualities
must be preserved for a system to be considered resilient. For example, Allenby and Fink
(2005) state that systems must retain their the capability of a system to maintain its functions
and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it
must.
Time Periods. The timing of the events, or the resilience to them, is often important to the
definition of resilience. Some definitions of resilience specify a time period over which the
resilience occurs, i.e. before, during, or after some event. Other definitions state the resilience
is a time period itself. Gunderson (2000) defines resilience as "the time required for a system
to return to an equilibrium or steady-state following a perturbation".
Sheard & Mostashari (2008) has shown that there is no consensus on the definition of
resilience. In fact, certain definitions conflict with each other in that one might require a
system to change to be resilient, while another forbids it. This means that it is not enough for a
stakeholder to ask a system architect for a "resilient" system, since the meaning of resiliency is
ambiguous at best.
3.4.2 SURVIVABILITY
Eillison et al. (1997) has defined survivability as the capability of the system to achieve its
requirements or goals, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures or accidents.
Although this definition is intuitive, it is not very useful to measure or assess survivability.
Richards (2009) has defined survivability as the ability of systems to minimize the impact of
finite-duration, contextual changes on value delivery, and introduced two new survivability
metrics; (1) time-weighted average utility loss, and (2) threshold availability. Typically, there
are three ways systems can achieve survivability (Westrum, 2006): (1) reducing the probability
that a disturbance will impact the system, known as a system susceptibility; (2) reducing the
amount of value lost directly as a result of a disturbance occurring, known as a system
vulnerability; and (3) increasing the system's ability to make a timely recovery from a
disturbance, known as system resilience. The three phases are also known as Type 1, Type Il
and Type Ill survivability (Richards, et al., 2007) (Figure 3-5). Jackson (2010) refers to the same
concepts as Richards, but instead refers to survivability as resilience and denotes the three
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phases as (1) avoidance, (2) survival, and (3) recovery. However, the Oxford dictionary (2012b)
defines resilience as "the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties" and "the ability of a
substance or object to spring back into shape" which is more similar to Richard's definition than
to Jackson's. To reduce confusion with the Oxford English definition, for the rest of this
dissertation, resilience will refer to Richard's interpretation, i.e. the ability of a system to
recover from a disturbance.
FIGURE 3-5: SURVIVABILITY DEFINED
(RICHARDS, 2009)
3.4.3 SURVIVABILITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES
To give system architects and other decision makers tools to enable survivability in complex
systems, researchers have identified and compiled lists of survivability design principles for
systems. The design principles are listed in Table 3-6, and will be discussed more, along with
the nuanced definition of what constitutes a "design principle" in Section 5.1.1.
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TABLE 3-6: DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR SURVIVABILITY
(Jackson, 2012) Authority over recovery operations would escalate in proportion tothe severity of the threat
Automated Anytime there is a choice between having a machine perform 
a
untomad (Jackson, 2012) function or having a human perform it, the human is the preferableFunction 
solution
Automated System (Jackson, 2012) The human should understand the intent of the automated system's
Monitoring action
Avoid Hidden (ak 2012) Efforts should be made to assure that potentially harmful
Interactions (Jackson, 2 interactions between nodes of the system should be avoided
Avoidance (Richards, Maneuverability away from a disturbance.2009)
Complexity (Jackson, 2012) Systems should not be more complex than necessary.
Avoidance
Concealment (Richards, Reduction of the visibility of a system from an external change agent2009)
(Jackson, 2012;
Containment Richards, Isolation or minimization of the propagation of failure
2009)
System shall be designed for both the maximum design level and theContext Spanning (Jackson, 2012) most likely disruption level.
Deterrence (Richards, Dissuasion of a rational external change agent from committing a2009) disturbance.
(Jackson, 2012;
Distribution Richards, Separation of critical system elements to mitigate local disturbances
2009)
If a system is drifting towards the boundary of survivability and
Drift Correction (Jackson, 2012) there is evidence that a failure is approaching, then measures can be
made either to avoid the threat or it can be diminished through
corrective action.
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Authority
Escalation
DESIGN PRINCIPLE SOURCE DESCRIPTION
DESIGN PRINCIPLE SOURCE DESCRIPTION
Evolution
/Reorganization
(Jackson, 2012;
Richards,
2009)
Alteration of system elements to reduce disturbance effectiveness
Fail-safe (Richards, Prevention or delay of degradation via physics of incipient failure2009)
Failure mode (Richards, Elimination of system hazards through intrinsic design:
reduction 2009) substitution, simplification, decoupling, and reduction of hazardous
materials
(Jackson, 2012;
Hardness Richards, Resistance to a deformation
2009)
(Jackson, 2012;
Heterogeneity Richards, Variation in system elements to mitigate homogeneous disturbances
2009)
Systems should not have the final decision making authority in
Human in the Loop (Jackson, 2012) critical situations unless the pressure of time demands a quick
decision
Human Monitoring (Jackson, 2012) -An automated system should understand the intent of the human's
action.
Independent (Jackson, 2012) Conduct an independent review to find latent faults in the systems
Review that result in perturbations at a later time.
Informed Operator (Jackson, 2012) Humans should be informed regarding all aspects of the automated
system.
Inter-node (Jackson, 2012) All impediments to communication, cooperation and collaboration
impediment among nodes in the system should be removed
Every node, or element, of a system should be capable ofInter-node (Jackson, 2012) communicating, cooperating, and collaborating with every otherinteraction 
node.
Knowledge (Jackson, 2012) All nodes of the system should be aware of what all the other nodes
Between the Nodes are doing.
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DESIGN PRINCIPLE SRDSCRIPTION
Layered Defense (Jackson, 2012)
System with two or more independent principles that address a
single system point of vulnerability will be more survivable than a
single principle
System should have the capability to limit the ability of fail-ures to
Loose Coupling (Jackson, 2012) propagate from one component to the next in a system of many
components.
(Jackson, 2012;
Margin Richards, Allowance of extra capability for maintaining value delivery despite
2009) losses
Mobility (Richards, Relocation to avoid detection by an external change agent.2009)
States that human operators or other human agents delay taking
Neutral state (Jackson, 2012) action when there is an opportunity to survey the situation and
make a more reasoned judgment about what the correct action
might be
Preemptive Strike (Richards, Suppression of an imminent disturbance2009)
Prevention (Richards, Suppression of a future or potential future disturbance.2009)
(Jackson, 2012;
Redundancy Richards, Duplication of critical system functions to increase reliability
2009)
(Jackson, 2012;
Repair Richards, Restoration of system to improve value delivery
2009)
Replacement (Richards, Substitution of system elements to improve value delivery2009)1
3.4.4 ROBUSTNESS AND VALUE SUSTAINMENT
Robustness is another quality that is closely related to survivability. The Oxford dictionary
(2012c) defines robustness of a system or organization, as being able to withstand or overcome
adverse conditions, but like the term "resilience", there are numerous, different definitions in
the technical literature. The "Taguchi" method, popular in industrial engineering for increasing
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product quality, defines a robust design as one which delivers a strong "signal" regardless of
external "noise" and with a minimum of internal "noise" (Taguchi & Cariapa, 1993). The
concept of "signal" and "noise" relates to what the design is trying to do (the "signal") and
external and internal disturbances that interfere with that ("noise"). During a workshop on
systems engineering, Ross, Rhodes and Hastings (2008) noted that Dr. Marvin Sambur, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, defined "robustness" as:
- Capable of adapting to changes in mission and requirements;
" Expandable/scalable, and designed to accommodate growth in capability;
" Able to reliably function given changes in threats and environment;
" Effectively/affordably sustainable over their lifecycle;
" Developed using products designed for use in various platforms/systems; and
" Easily modified to leverage new technologies.
According to this definition, a robust system also needs to be adaptable, scalable, reliable,
sustainable, and modifiable. That definition is not only ambitious, but also somewhat
ambiguous. For example, what does "easily modified" mean? Is it "easy" because it takes a
small amount of time, or is it easy because it does not require much effort? Are changes that
have to be made by external entities still considered "easy"? For this reason, Ross and Rhodes
(2008a) defines value robustness as "the ability of a system to continue to deliver stakeholder
value in the face of changing contexts and needs", which may be achieved through various sub-
"ilities" such as modifiability, reliability, scalability, etc.
Beesemeyer (2012) examined the issue of value sustainment in his Master of Science
dissertation at MIT, where he clarified the definition of robustness, while distinguishing it from
similarly defined "-ilities" (Figure 3-6). According to Beesemeyer, a system is something, and
does something, which can be described by a set of system parameters and outcome
parameters, respectively. For example, a car can be described by a set of system parameters,
such as the fact that it has a V8 engine, and output parameters, such as the fact that it can
reach 150 mph. Robustness can be defined as a systems ability to maintain its output,
regardless of change in the system or context. Suppose the car is designed to be able to reach
150 mph along a flat road. If the road becomes bumpy, and the car can still reach 150 mph,
then it is robust. If one of the tires is replaced with a spare, and the car can still reach 150 mph,
then it is also robust. Robustness makes no claim about value delivery, and the distinction
between output and value is important. If the car owner suddenly decides that he/she needs
to drive at 200 mph and the car cannot do this, one would not say it is because the car is not
robust because the car can still maintain its output parameter, even though the stakeholders
needs have changed. This distinction separates robustness from value robustness.
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Beesemeyer (2012) defines "value sustainment" as the ability to maintain value delivery in spite
of epoch shifts or disturbances.
3.4.5 CHANGEABILITY AND VERSATILITY
If stakeholders require that a system does something it was not designed to do, either because
the context has changed or because their needs have changed, then the system will need to be
either versatile or changeable to be value robust. A system is said to be versatile if it can
provide an output that it was not designed to provide, without changing its system parameters.
For example, even with a static hardware configuration, most personal computers can be
programmed to provide additional, high-level functionality through software. A system is said
to be changeable, if its system parameters can be altered to achieve new output parameters.
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FIGURE 3-6: THREE-DIMENSIONAL PERTURBATION-SYSTEM PARAMETER-OUTCOME PARAMETER SPACE
(BEESEMYER, 2012)
3.4.6 ROBUSTNESS AND SURVIVABILITY
Both robustness and survivability describe a system's ability to prevent, mitigate and recover
from harmful changes, but Richards (2009) explains that they differ only in the duration of the
change. If the system maintains value delivery in spite of a perturbation of short duration, then
it has exhibited survivability. If, on the other hand, the system avoids, mitigates or recovers
from a long period between epoch shifts, then the system is robust. A system is considered
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robust if it is effectively insensitive to changes in context, and survivable if it is effectively
insensitive to disturbances and disruptions. The key difference between these two centers
around the ambiguous difference between context change vs. disturbance or disruption. Of
course, if the original context never resumes after the perturbation has occurred, then the
system would be robust if it continues to provide acceptable value while it mitigates the effect
of the "permanent" perturbation (Figure 3-7).
Robust
Accommodating a permanent change in context
Survivable
uc l Recovers from a finite change in context
epochl zot1 I ol
FIGURE 3-7: ROBUSTNESS VS. SURVIVABILITY
(ADAPTED FROM RICHARDS, 2009)
In his doctoral dissertation, Richards (2009) showed that survivability can be considered a
special case of robustness, by demonstrating that if enough perturbations of short duration
repeatedly occur, then the sum of these perturbations can be considered a new context itself,
even if the context between perturbations temporarily resumes back to the original (Figure
3-8).
FIGURE 3-8: CONTINUUM BETWEEN SURVIVABILITY AND ROBUSTNESS
(RICHARDS, 2009).
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While Richard's definitions are logically consistent, one could also argue that the argument is
symmetric, that is, robustness is a special case of survivability. Suppose there is a perturbation
of some duration T. If T is a context shift, (i.e. a change in context that is not temporary
(Beesemyer, 2012)), then the system has exhibited robustness. However, there must exist
some period T, where T < T, such that T is considered "short". Then, in order for the system to
be robust during T, it must have first survived the context change that occurred during period T
(Figure 3-9). If the system did not survive the period T, then it would not exist and be able to
provide acceptable value to stakeholders during the period T - T in order for it to be robust over
period T. The corollary is not true however. A system does not need to be robust to some
perturbation X, in order for it to be survivable to X. A system that can only withstand short
duration perturbations can be survivable without being robust, as long as the perturbations are
not frequent enough that they could be considered together as a new context with fluctuating
conditions.
Robustness
T
OrNewmContext
+T
Survivability
FIGURE 3-9: CONTINUUM BETWEEN SURVIVABILITY AND ROBUSTNESS
To illustrate this concept, consider the perturbation of a rise in the price of gasoline that
threatens the value delivery of a system by increasing its operational cost. The rise in gasoline
prices may be temporary or long lasting, depending on whether or not the prices eventually fall
again, and this determines whether or not the system is considered to be robust to changes in
gasoline prices or not. Regardless, while the price is high, the system has to survive that
particular disturbance, i.e. the system must not fall below some minimum acceptable value
delivery threshold. If such a system fails to survive the disturbance, it does not matter if the
context returns or not. In fact, any discontinuous change in context, such as when a discrete-
event occurs, or any continuous contextual change that crosses a critical threshold can be
considered a disruption that the system must survive. Survivability to disruptions is important
since even if the system is able to provide value in a new, long duration context (thereby being
robust), it may not be able survive the transition (Figure 3-10). An example would be a 911
emergency response system that operates under a context where it gets positional information
about its calls through the landline telephone system. As cell phones become more popular,
the stakeholders demand that the system track the location of the mobile calls as well. This
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requires the emergency response network to integrate with the cell phone carrier's GPS, which
requires a fundamental change in networking components. This new demand may be a new
context that requires a change in some of the networking technology. To make the transition
to include mobile phone tracking, the entire system may have to go offline for several hours,
possibly several days, while the underlying technology is upgraded. This is a temporary
disturbance, but it may be unacceptable if the system cannot survive it. Thus, even though the
system could have provided value under the new context and thereby be robust, it cannot
survive the transition to that new context, and thus will never get the opportunity to provide
value.
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FIGURE 3-10: SYSTEM NOT SURVIVING TRANSITION BETWEEN TWO CONTEXTS
3.4.7 SURVIVABILITY TO PERTURBATIONS
Complex systems that exist over long periods are eventually going to encounter disturbances or
disruptions that may threaten their delivery of value to stakeholders. For a maritime security
system of systems, perturbations will likely include large increases in ships passing through the
AOI, bad weather and labor shortages. Less likely, but perhaps more dangerous would be
hostile attacks from criminals, terrorists or other hostile nations. To ensure that the systems
continue to provide value to the stakeholders, the system architects need to make their
systems avoid, mitigate or recover from these perturbations. Ideally, stakeholders want system
architects to design a system that provides acceptable value during and after any perturbation
it may encounter. Unfortunately, this is impossible. There is no such thing as a system that is
survivable in general, since there is no way of knowing that a system will be able to provide
value no matter what. According to a FEMA report, aircraft strikes were taken into
consideration during the design of the World Trade Center, but reliably designing a system to
survive an aircraft strike of the largest planes now or in the future, may be impossible
(McAllister & Corley, 2002). At best, a system architect can state that a system will survive X,
where X is some list of perturbations that are known in type and intensity. However,
stakeholders and/or system architects must generate this list of X perturbations and accept the
risks of not being survivable to any perturbation not included in X. Once the stakeholders
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construct the list of X perturbation, system architects have the responsibility to implement and
test appropriate survivability design principles and strategies and verify whether the system is
survivable to all of the perturbations in X or not. Unfortunately, as X grows, various constraints
will make it impossible to implement survivability strategies for every perturbation, so system
architects and stakeholders must be willing to make tradeoffs and accept risks. However, the
causes and effects of perturbations are typically not unique, and a strategy to survive
perturbation X, may also help the system survive similar perturbations Y, Z. For this reason,
research has looked at developing taxonomies of perturbations (Beesemyer, 2012; Mekdeci, et
al., 2012).
3.4.8 RELIABILITY
The IEEE (1990) defines "reliability" as the ability of a system or component to perform its
required functions under stated conditions (i.e. context and needs) for a specified period of
time. Note that this definition does not mention changing conditions, only that the conditions
are stated. A car would be reliable, for example, if it starts every morning and is able to drive
from point A to point B for 10 years with only regular maintenance performed. If after only a
year of driving the car fails to start, then the owner would probably consider the car unreliable.
However, if the car fails to start because it suffered damage in a serious accident, then it would
not be unreliable. Instead, the owner might say that the car did not survive the accident, and
hence, the car was not survivable.
3.4.9 VIABILITY
The Oxford dictionary contains several definitions for "viability". It defines "viability" generally
as capable of working successfully; feasible, and also defines viability relative to the following
three Ilife sciences disciplines:
Botany: (of a seed or spore) able to germinate.
Biology: (of a plant, animal, or cell) capable of surviving or living successfully, especially
under particular environmental conditions.
Medicine (of a fetus or unborn child): able to live after birth.
All of these definitions of viability are slightly different. Germination is the process of sprouting
from a seed, which implies that the botanical definition of viability requires that the viable
entity have the ability to change. The biological definition mentions that viability is "especially"
relative to a particular context. The medical definition of viability implies that some level of
autonomy is required, since after birth, the fetus is no longer a part of its mother's body.
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3.4.9.1 VIABLE SYSTEMS IN MANAGEMENT CYBERNETICS
The term "viability" has been described in the management cybernetics literature for
organizations as "the survival or preservation of identity in a changing environment" (Dijkstra,
2007). Beer (1984) developed the Viable System Model (VSM), which describes how an
organization can exist and maintain its identify in a dynamic environment.
The basis behind the VSM is that a viable organization must satisfy Ashby's Law of Requisite
Variety (Ashby, 1962), by maintaining adequate control mechanisms to cope with uncertainty in
the environment. Beer defines several criteria for viability, two of which are that a viable
system is independent (i.e. autonomous) and has the ability to change (Yolles, 2000). The VSM
applies to organizations, organisms and other entities that need to be self-sufficient, and whose
stakeholders are part of the system itself. In an organism, for example, there is no distinction
between the life of the "stakeholders" and the life of the organism itself, since they are one and
the same thing. This is in contrast to an engineered system, which is built to provide value to
stakeholders who are often external to the system. In the next chapter, the criteria of
independence and the ability to change are examined to see if they are necessary for
engineered systems to be considered viable as well.
3.5 SUMMARY
This chapter began by defining some basic terms such as system, value and context, which form
the foundation of many of the concepts in this dissertation. The usage of the term viability in
the life sciences and management cybernetics disciplines was presented, and some related '-
ilities" from the literature, such as survivability, reliability and resilience, were discussed.
However, it was shown that there is a considerable amount of inconsistency in the literature as
to precise definitions of some of these "-ilities". The concept of survivability was discussed in
detail, since any system that is expected to encounter perturbations in its lifetime, will likely
need to be able to survive to be viable. Since the eventual goal is to assist system architects
make systems that provide acceptable value to stakeholders, existing survivability design
principles from the literature were presented as well. In the next chapter, viability for
engineered systems will be defined and compared with the related "-ilities" discussed in this
chapter.
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4 ENGINEERING FOR VIABILITY
In the previous section, the fundamental concepts of value delivery in systems and systems of
systems was defined and explored, along with various system qualities, also known as "-ilities",
for maintaining value delivery. Amongst the "-ilities" discussed, was "viability", which was
defined for biological systems and organizations. In this chapter, the concept of "viability" is
defined for engineered systems and compared with related "-ilities" already defined in the
technical literature.
4.1 DEFINING VIABILITY FOR ENGINEERED SYSTEMS
The problem that needs to be solved, as described in Chapter 1, is that stakeholders need to
design systems, particularly systems of systems, which will continue to provide acceptable
value, for their intended life. While many of the "-ilities" described in the previous chapter may
help the system achieve the goal of "staying alive", they all introduce a condition that may be
unnecessary for certain systems and contexts. The closest "-ility" that would describe the
quality that system architects are looking for would be value sustainment, which is the ability of
a system to continue to provide acceptable value to stakeholders in spite of disturbances or
epoch shifts. However, a simple engineered system, such as a stereo, that is not expected to
experience changes in context or stakeholder expectations does not need to be value
sustainable to provide acceptable value to its stakeholders, if those stakeholders are not
concerned with perturbations or context shifts. Therefore, to provide value over a lifetime, a
system must be value sustainable if it is operating within a dynamic context, or it does not have
to be if the context remains fixed (either naturally or through some influence by other
stakeholders). Furthermore, unlike other '-ilities" such as scalability, determining if a system
will provide value in the future involves uncertainty. A system architect can prove that a design
is scalable, for example, but for most systems, it is very difficult to be 100% certain that a
particular design will provide adequate value over its entire lifetime, especially when the
system is a SoS operating under dynamic contexts and diverse stakeholders. To address these
gaps, viability for engineered systems is defined as the likelihood that an engineered system will
provide acceptable value to its stakeholders, over its life era. The life era is both the expected
time the system needs to last, as well as a sequence of epochs that it is expected to encounter
(known as the "system era"). With this definition, we can say that an engineered system is
viable if it is expected to provide acceptable value to its stakeholders, over its life era, and not
viable otherwise.
There are several important concepts included in this definition of viability, which are
important. They are:
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Viability is Applicable to All Engineered systems. The concept of viability introduced in this
chapter is applicable to all engineered systems, whether they are traditional, monolithic
systems, or large systems of systems. However, this concept of viability is not intended for
other systems, such as natural systems.
Viability is Subjective. Whether a system is viable or not, is determined by how well the
outputs of the system are likely to satisfy stakeholder needs. Different stakeholders have
different preferences, so the same system could be viable in the same context for one
stakeholder, but unviable for another simply because the stakeholder needs are different.
Viability Is Dynamic. Viability is a prediction about whether the system will provide acceptable
value to its stakeholders over its life era. What constitutes the life era is a prediction made by
the stakeholders at the time viability is assessed. At the design stage, the life era may be
determined to be a particular set of epochs, but as the system is implemented and exists, its life
era (or what is left of it) may start to change, as the context and/or stakeholder needs change.
Viability is Relative. Although this research does not attempt to define metrics for viability, a
system can be more or less viable than another system, or to itself if something changes, since
viability is a likelihood. The more likely that a system will provide acceptable value to its
stakeholders over its life era, the more viable it is. Viability can be enabled by something, if that
something increases the likelihood that a system will provide value to its stakeholders over its
life era. The objective of viability strategies, introduced in Chapter 5, is to enable viability.
Viability does not mean Existence. It is possible for an engineered system to exist, for a finite
period of time, without being viable. This is because the system was viable at some point and
implemented, but became unviable as time progressed. Meanwhile, the system might be
producing value, perhaps even acceptable value, and therefore it "exists", but it is expected to
fail before its life era ends, and is no longer considered viable accordingly. An example of the
difference between existence and viability would be an SoS whose viability depends on a
constituent system providing a critical service. The SoS could be viable and running successfully
for years when one day the constituent system announces that it is planning to withdraw from
the SoS in six months' time. Without a suitable replacement, this announcement means that
the SoS will not be able to provide value after the constituent system leaves, and will effectively
"die" as a consequence. In other words, the system became unviable when the announcement
was made, even though it could exist and provide value for the next six months until the
constituent system leaves.
Viability is a Prediction. Viability is a prediction about whether the system will continue to
provide value to its stakeholders over its life era, which may involve a considerable amount of
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uncertainty and risk. If the system is complex, there may be some uncertainty about its
outputs. Similarly, there may be additional uncertainty about the context and needs of an
engineered system that is expected to operate in a dynamic environment over a long period.
When both of these sources of uncertainty are taken together, it can make assessing viability
very difficult.
Viability is not Invulnerability. A system can be viable, even in a context where there are
threats and perturbations that it may not be able to survive, as long as the stakeholders are
willing to accept the risk. For example, a car can be considered viable if it has enough safety
features that allow it to avoid and survive certain car accidents and weather disturbances, but
that does not mean that cars have to be completely invulnerable to any and all possible
problems. A car owner assumes that there is a certain level of risk in operating a car, and the
manufacturers also assume a certain level of risk as well, and cars are designed, built, bought
and operated with those risks being accepted. The Ford Pinto fuel tank controversy (Lee,
1998), is an infamous case where Ford executives were accused of knowing about and
accepting a particular vulnerability in the design of one of its vehicles, by performing a cost-
benefit analysis that included the risk of lawsuits resulting from deaths caused by the design
flaw. This type of risk-taking may also highlight the fact that viability of a mass-produced
system such as a car or cell phone, is likely to be different that the viability of a massive, unique
SoS like Facebook or a MarSec. In mass-produced systems, stakeholders can spread the risk of
fatal problems over many units.
Viability does not Require Independence. According to the Viable System Model (VSM), a
system must retain its independent existence in order for it to be viable (Hildbrand &
Bodhanya, 2011). However, independence is subject to interpretation. Most, if not all,
systems require certain contextual conditions to exist and some of these conditions include the
presence of, and actions by, certain entities. For example, businesses without clients or
customers would not be able to exist, and therefore would not be viable. The VSM handles this
by including assuming that adequate resources and services are part of the environment, at
least to some extent. A viable system, according to cybernetic management, can handle
perturbations in the environment, such as a reduction in available resources, but it cannot be
viable if critical resources disappear entirely. If some of these critical resources are in fact other
systems, then are the organizations described by the VSM independent? It depends on how
independence is defined. In terms of engineered systems, there are ten levels of automation,
ranging from a "dumb" Level 1 system where the human does all the decisions and actions, to a
fully automated Level 10 system that has no human in the loop whatsoever (Parasuraman,
Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). The fact that Level 1 engineered systems exist and provide
acceptable value to stakeholders, show that engineered systems can be viable without being
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independent. For this reason, independence of components will not be a requirement for
viability of an engineered system.
Viability does not Require the Ability to Change. Another requirement for a system to be
viable, according to the VSM, is that it has the ability to change, or adapt, in response to
changes in the environment. Like "independence", the exact definition of what constitutes a
change or adaptation is not clear. If an owner replaces a working engine in a car with a more
powerful version, did the car change? Yes. What if the working engine was replaced with
another working engine of the exact same type and mileage, did the car change? That depends
on how change is defined and who the stakeholder is. To the car manufacturer who provides a
warranty on the car, then the car did change since the engine is not the original one that was
manufactured with the rest of the car. To the driver, the car did not change, since the car will
operate exactly the same way. While physical changes might be more obvious, changes in
behavior are not. Suppose the car could switch between Front Wheel Drive (FWD) and All
Wheel Drive (AWD), with FWD being more fuel efficient and AWD being safer when the roads
are slippery. Is the ability to switch from AWD to FWD and vice versa depending on road
conditions, count as change? Is this adaptation? According to the VSM, yes, because the
system is altering its behavior is response to changes in the environment, in accordance with
Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety. However, the VSM model assumes that there is variety in the
context, for which the ability in the system is necessary. For a large SoS like Facebook, it's hard
to imagine it being considered viable without the ability to adapt in some way to meet
emerging technological and social changes. However, for simpler systems such as a stereo, it is
not unreasonable to expect the context to remain fairly static and thus the requirement for
change or adaption is not necessary for viability of engineered systems.
With viability defined this broadly, every system should be designed to be viable, but how do
systems achieve viability? Does viability require robustness? How does this definition of
viability relate to other definitions of similar properties such as robustness, survivability and
reliability?
4.2 VIABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY
As mentioned in Section 3.4.9, the biological definition of viability, according to the Oxford
Dictionary is capable of surviving or living successfully, especially under particular
environmental conditions. This definition suggests that a viable system is one that is survivable.
This section looks deeper into the concept of survivability for engineered systems and defines
its relation to viability.
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4.2.1 GENERAL SURVIVABILITY
The Oxford dictionary (2012d) defines survivable as being able to be survived; not fatal. An
important distinction, however, that separates survivability from other "-ilities", is that the
adjective "survivable" is defined relative to an "accident or ordeal", and not to an entity. In the
English language, a car would not be considered survivable, however a car accident may be.
This is in contrast to other, similar adjectives such as robustness. In the English language, one
would say that a car is robust, not that the car accident is robust. For engineered systems,
survivability has been defined as a system property, but it is relative to a particular disturbance
or context. One can say, therefore that an engineered system, such as a car, is survivable, but
only to some disturbance (or disturbances) in particular.
4.2.1.1 SURVIVABILITY AND THE DISTURBANCE LIFECYCLE
According to (Richards, 2009), survivability of an engineered system is defined relative to a
disturbance lifecycle that consists of three stages. The first stage of the disturbance lifecycle is
before the disturbance impacts the system, where survivability strategies are applied to reduce
susceptibility to the disturbance. The second stage is when the disturbance has impacted the
system, and the system is surviving by mitigating its effects. The final stage is after the
disturbance has ended, where the system is surviving by recovering from the impact. Richards
(2009) classifies survivability strategies according to the phase of the disturbance at which they
are applied. Type I strategies are used to reduce susceptibility to the perturbation, Type I
strategies are used to mitigate the perturbation, and Type Ill strategies are used to recover. At
first glance, it might seem that classifying survivability design principles as Type 1, 11 or III is
somewhat arbitrary. Suppose there is a thunderstorm that is between a plane's current
location and its final destination. If the plane continues on its original flight path, it will
encounter the thunderstorm and possibly crash as a result (i.e. not survive). Not wanting to risk
the crash, the pilots decide to fly around the thunderstorm. At first, this seems to be a
textbook example of the avoidance survivability design principle as proposed by Richards.
However, suppose that flying around the thunderstorm added an additional hour to the flight
time, which reduced the value the plane delivered to its stakeholders. One could argue that
the thunderstorm has already impacted the system, and thus flying around is simply mitigating
the value loss, making this a Type 11 strategy. There seems to be ambiguity as to how and when
the strategy is enabling survivability.
4.2.1.2 NON-SURVIVABLE EVENTS AND TERMINAL CONDITIONS
In the way survivability is currently defined in the literature, Type I survivability design
principles also pose an interesting question. Type I survivability principles are designed to
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reduce susceptibility to a particular disturbance. Some strategies, such as prevention, try to
ensure that the disturbance never occurs at all. In some ways, it seems counter-intuitive that a
system could survive something that has not happened. For example, if a country practices
deterrence to a nuclear attack by stockpiling their own arsenal of nuclear weapons, can that
country claim that they are "surviving" nuclear attacks? What if nuclear attacks are non-
survivable? How does one survive something that cannot be survived? For any engineered
system, there are non-survivable events. A non-survivable event is an event that marks the
death of the system, i.e. the point at which the system has failed to deliver adequate value to
its stakeholders and recovery is not possible. For example, direct rocket hit is often a non-
survivable event for a small UAV since it will likely explode and not be recoverable. Similarly, a
major terrorist bomb detonating inside of a plane is typically a non-survivable event for an
airport security system. Richards implicitly described some non-survivable events when he
introduced the concept of minimum value delivery thresholds. If a minimum value delivery
threshold is reached, a non-survivable condition has been reached since the system has failed
to meet stakeholder expectations.
A condition can be considered terminal if the system cannot survive the moment that condition
is reached (called terminal events). The system may still technically exist in some form or
another and even provide some value for a relatively short period of time, but because of the
terminal event occurring, there is no hope of survival beyond a certain period of time. This
means that terminal conditions cannot be mitigated or recovered from and instead, systems
must try to prevent them from occurring.
As with value delivery in general, what constitutes a terminal condition for a system is
subjective and determined by the stakeholders. For example, taking the entire system offline
for repairs may be acceptable for cable company call centers, but it is likely a terminal event for
911 emergency call centers.
4.2.2 INEVITABLE EVENTS
While some events cannot be survived, others cannot be avoided. The impacts of certain
events are inevitable and these are called inevitable events. For example, no matter what a
system or its stakeholders do, the day will turn into night, and the night will turn into day.
Although the events themselves may be unavoidable, the system can still avoid its effects.
Earthquakes are unavoidable for stationary buildings, but implementing certain survivability
techniques can make buildings avoid their potentially terminal effects for all but the most
severe cases.
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4.2.3 THE SINGLE PERTURBATION FALLACY
A system cannot survive a non-survivable event. However, systems may be able to implement
Type I survivability strategies to prevent these events from occurring, or avoid them all
together. This may seem confusing, however, since someone may assume that by
implementing a Type I survivability strategy to avoid a non-survivable event, the system is
surviving it. The ambiguity lies with the fact that there is more than one disturbance affecting,
or threatening the system and what the system is surviving is not the same disturbance as the
one that it is preventing or avoiding.
Suppose a small UAV is flying over hostile territory. Due to its small size, being struck by an
anti-aircraft missile is a terminal event. To compensate, the UAV operator flies the UAV at a
high altitude, outside the range of the anti-aircraft system. The UAV successfully performs its
mission over hostile territory without any incident. The UAV commander can confidently say
the UAV survived and its survivability was (likely) due to the implementation of the avoidance
design principle. The UAV did not survive an event that never happened, that is, it did not
survive being struck by an anti-aircraft missile. Rather, the UAV survived flying a mission over
hostile territory (disturbance X) due in part to the fact that being struck by a missile (disruption
A) never happened. Flying a mission over hostile territory and being struck by a missile are
related in that A is a possible effect of X, and X is a possible cause of Y, but they are not the
same perturbation.
The example of a UAV flying a mission over hostile territory and avoiding being struck by a
missile highlights a major source of confusion with the current definition of survivability and its
related design principles. The current definition of survivability assumes a single disturbance
that has a lifecycle as shown in (Figure 3-5). In reality, perturbations rarely occur in isolation.
Instead, perturbations are caused by previous events and they themselves often lead to further
perturbations (the effects). In general, survivability to perturbation X, is not about reducing
susceptibility to X, it is about continuing to provide acceptable value once X occurs. Since a
terminal event is defined by reaching a non-survivable set of conditions, one can say that
surviving perturbation X is really about preventing all the possible terminal events that are
possible effects of perturbation X. Perturbation X itself cannot be a terminal event, otherwise
the system would not be able to survive it.
4.2.4 MULTIPLE CAUSES AND EFFECTS
To illustrate an example of how a perturbation can have multiple causes and effects, Figure 4-1,
shows some possible causes for why a perturbation might disconnect a server from the
Internet, and some of the immediate effects that follow. Qualitatively, it would seem that as
the number of causes and effects grows, so too does the likelihood and impact of that
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perturbation, respectively. Perturbations often do not occur in isolation, and the effects of
many perturbations are often the cause of others.
Causes Perturbation Effects
Internet Service Provider Failure
Random Hardware Failure Server Downloads InterruptedHacker Attack
Fire / Flood / Building Collapse Disconnected sales Interrupted
Theft -- Failed Transactions
Cable Chewed By Rodent Client Software Crash
Bad Software Update Internet Databse Backup Failure
IT Technician Error
FIGURE 4-1: MULTIPLE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF A SINGLE PERTURBATION
It is important to separate the immediate effects of a perturbation, from subsequent
perturbations and effects. For example, lightning itself does not burn down forests, but the
fires that the lightning starts, may. This distinction is important, because strategies to survive a
forest fire are separate from the cause (lightning strike). Strategies for surviving a forest fire,
such as using planes to fly overhead and drop fire extinguishing materials, will likely be effective
regardless of whether the fire was started by lighting or some other perturbations (such as
arson or careless camping). One strategy to avoid or survive a particular perturbation, may
also help avoid or survive other perturbations as well (i.e. extinguishing a fire may help a
system be viable towards both careless camping as well as lightning). However, system
architects must take care that they are not wasting resources considering perturbations that
are well outside the system boundary. A weak applicant pool may result in having incompetent
operators, for example, but the job market is likely outside the system architect's control.
Instead of trying to "avoid" an unfavorable job market, system architects should try to "survive"
its effects (incompetent operators) by, perhaps, increasing automation or requiring closer
supervision. Similarly, system architects should only consider perturbations whose effects are
directly the result of the actions (or inactions) of the system. There are several effects of
wasting fuel when UAVs are sent to the wrong location, for example. Some of them, such as
the cost and the fact that the UAVs will be unavailable to perform their required tasks during
that time, are of concern to the system architects because they affect the value the system
delivers. Other effects, such as releasing C02 into the atmosphere, are not of concern, unless
they affect the system's ability to deliver value (due to some environmental constraints,
perhaps).
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4.2.5 VIABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY
Suppose system architects are tasked with designing a security system for an airport. A bomb
brought aboard an aircraft is a terminal event, meaning that if it occurs, the security system will
have failed to provide acceptable value to the stakeholders and will likely need to be replaced.
Since a bomb brought aboard an aircraft is a terminal event, the system architects decide to
prevent it from occurring by implementing various security measures such as having uniformed
officers patrol the airport as a deterrence. To say that the airport is "survivable" because it has
certain mechanisms to reduce susceptibility to an airport bombing is confusing. Obviously, a
bomb has never been brought aboard, otherwise the system would not exist in its current form.
However, it would be acceptable to say that the airport security system is viable since it has the
necessary mechanisms to prevent this terminal event from occurring, and thus provides
acceptable value to its stakeholders.
Viability is related to, but distinct from survivability. Survivability is about maintaining value
delivery when the system experiences a disturbance, that is, a distinct change in context over a
finite period. Viability is the likelihood of maintaining value delivery over a system lifetime,
which typically includes multiple contexts and perturbations. If a system architect wishes to
design a system that provides value over its entire lifetime, in spite of perturbations that may
arise, then it will need to satisfy two criteria. First, the system must survive any inevitable
events that threaten the value delivery of the system. Second, the system must prevent any
terminal events from occurring. If the system fails to satisfy either criteria, then it can be
considered unviable.
More often than not, a viable system will need to be survivable to perturbations that arise
during its lifetime. However, it is possible that a system may be not to be survivable to any
perturbations and still be viable, if those perturbations do not occur. A system is fragile to a
particular context if its viability is dependent on the context remaining static. A fragile system
does not need to be survivable or value robust, since those properties are defined by the ability
to maintain value in spite of change. Shielding the system from contextual changes is a strategy
for achieving viability, much in the same way a mother shields a newborn from perturbations it
cannot survive on its own. This idea was first introduced by Ross (Ross, 2006), and will be
expanded upon in more depth to produce new viability strategies in Chapter 7.
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4.2.6 VIABILITY AND OTHER VALUE SUSTAINMENT "-ILITIES"
4.2.6.1 VIABILITY AND VALUE ROBUSTNESS
Value robustness and survivability are very similar, and likewise, if the system can avoid
contextual variations, then viability does not require robustness.
4.2.6.2 VIABILITY AND RELIABILITY
Viable systems do not need to be survivable to a particular event, if they can avoid that event
all together. However, do viable systems have to be reliable? The answer is yes, viability
requires reliability. If a system is expected to provide value over its lifetime, then it need to
work as intended over that period, meaning that it needs to be reliable.
4.2.6.3 VIABILITY, CHANGEABILITY AND VERSATILITY
Changeability and versatility are properties that allow a system the ability to meet new output
expectations, should they be necessary. Neither property is required for obtaining viability
during the design stage; however, both qualities may help systems remain viable if the context
and/or stakeholder needs change. However, as Chapter 8 will show, care must be taken when
designing a system that is changeable, since certain changes, even if made with good
intentions, can cause a system to become unviable, particularly if the complexities of the
component interactions are not well understood.
4.3 VIABILITY OF THE MARSEC
In this section, the concept of viability is applied to the MarSec to demonstrate how viability
can be assessed for a system of systems and to set up a case study by which viability strategies
can be examined and developed in later chapters.
4.3.1 DESIGN ALTERNATIVES
When designing the MarSec, system architects will likely develop different design alternatives,
some of which may include certain strategies for viability, and present them to the stakeholders
for evaluation. Suppose there are four designs being considered:
Designs:
e Design I
o 4 UAVs
o 4 Patrol Boats
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e Design II
o 8 UAVs
o 4 Patrol Boats
e Design III
o 8 UAVs
o 8 Patrol Boats
e Design IV
o 12 UAVs
o 8 Patrol Boats
4.3.2 LIFE ERA DETERMINATION
The first step is assessing the viability of a particular engineered system, is to define the
contexts that will form part of the expected life era of the system. This means defining
"normal" operating conditions, if they exist, as well as contexts where there are perturbations
that could jeopardize the value delivery of the system. Not every contextual factor is relevant,
but those that may impact the attributes of the system should be specified. For the MarSec,
there are numerous relevant contextual factors that will affect the attributes of the system,
such as how many boats arrive in the AOl per unit time. There are also certain contextual
perturbations that may arise, such as bad weather, which may jeopardize the value delivery of
the system. It is not practical to consider every possible perturbation that may arise, so the
stakeholders have to assume some risk by only considering certain perturbations within the life
era. The choice of which perturbations should be considered is subjective and partially
determined by the stakeholder's risk tolerance. By not including perturbations for
consideration, stakeholders run the risk of approving a system that will not provide acceptable
value when confronted or impacted by those perturbations. Similarly, by including
perturbations that have a low probability of occurring, and are difficult to survive, stakeholders
run the risk of rejecting systems that will provide acceptable value, and/or implementing
unnecessary, but costly survivability strategies. Therefore, the consideration of which
perturbations should be included is important, but beyond the scope of this research.
For the purpose of demonstrating the concept of viability, suppose that there are three
stakeholders of the MarSec, named Sandy, Pat, and Carol. Also, suppose that there is a normal
context that consists of boats arriving in the AOl every 640 seconds, on average. The
stakeholders of the MarSec wish to consider the possibly of an epoch shift if a particular piece
of maritime legislation is passed, which will double the traffic of ships through the AOL. In
addition, Sandy and John wish to consider perturbations of political unrest, which may generate
a terrorist attack that would threaten the value delivery of the system. Pat does not think that
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political unrest will occur during the MarSec's life era.
the two epochs, yields the following four contexts:
Enumerating the perturbations amongst
e Context A ("Normal" conditions)
o Mean boat inter-arrival period - 640 s
o No political unrest
* Context B (High traffic)
o Mean boat inter-arrival period - 320 s
o No political unrest
e Context C (Political unrest)
o Mean boat inter-arrival period - 640 s
o Political unrest
e Context D (High traffic and political unrest)
o Mean boat arrival period - 320 s
o Political unrest
The expected life eras for the stakeholders are shown in Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3.
Life Era
Time A..
SystemEpoch Transition
Time
FIGURE 4-2: EXPECTED LIFE ERA OF THE MARSEC ACCORDING TO SANDY & JOHN
Life Era
x
y
Epoch
H
System
Transition
FIGURE 4-3: EXPECTED LIFE ERA OF THE MARSEC ACCORDING TO PAT
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4.3.3 THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
In addition to providing value under the contexts listed above, the all designs will require a
network upgrade (system transition) in order to be able to provide value during contexts B and
D. This is an additional, endogenous perturbation that must be considered. With this in mind,
suppose that the stakeholders assign the following value thresholds to the four contexts
described above.
Value Thresholds (Sandy):
* Context A, C
o Identification rate 0.8
o Terrorist Disarm Rate = 1.0
e Context B, D
o Identification rate 0.7
o Terrorist Disarm Rate = 0.7
e System does not need to provide any value during system transition
Value Thresholds (John):
* Context A, C
o Identification rate 0.9 over 24 hour period.
o Terrorist Disarm Rate = 1.0
e Context B, D, System Transition
o Identification rate 0.8 over 24 hour period.
o Terrorist Disarm Rate = 1.0
Value Thresholds (Pat):
" Context A,
o Identification rate 0.8 over 24 hour period.
o Terrorist Disarm Rate = 1.0
e Context B
o Identification rate 0.7 over 24 hour period.
o Terrorist Disarm Rate = 1.0
e System does not need to provide any value during system transition
4.3.4 ASSESSING VIABILITY OVER THE LIFE ERA
In order for the MarSec to be viable, it must be expected to provide acceptable value to its
stakeholders over its life era. This involves not only being able to provide acceptable value
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during each context (i.e. be survivable/robust for contexts A,B,C,D) but also being able to
continuously provide value from one context to another including the system transition. This is
one aspect where viability is distinct from survivability and robustness.
Suppose the performances of the three designs are assessed and are shown in Table 4-1.
TABLE 4-1: ASSESSMENT OF IDENTIFICATION RATE AND TERRORIST DISARMAMENT DURING EPOCHS
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Viability of Design 1. Design I is only viable to Sandy because of her relatively low thresholds.
The system is not viable to the other stakeholders, highlighting the fact that designs have
different appeal to stakeholders based on their preferences, and because of this, the viability of
a system is not the same across stakeholders either.
Viability of Design 11. Design I is not viable to Sandy and Pat, because it cannot provide
adequate value during contexts C and D. However, Design 11 is viable to Pat because the
expected life era for Pat does not include contexts C and D. This highlights the fact that the
determination of life era can be stakeholder dependent, and distinct from value preferences.
Viability of Design Ill. Design Ill will provide acceptable value to all stakeholders in all contexts
considered, and is therefore value sustainable to all stakeholders. However, according to
John's preferences, Design Ill cannot survive the required system transition, during the epoch
shift from A to B, and therefore is not viable. This distinction highlights one of the differences
between being viable and being value sustainable.
Viability of Design IV. Design IV is viable according to all stakeholders.
4.4 SUMMARY
This chapter defined viability for engineered systems and described some unique characteristics
that distinguish it from other "-ilities" already defined in the engineered systems literature and
elsewhere. Although viable systems are often value sustainable, they can also be fragile,
where they only provide acceptable value in contexts that remains fixed. The concept of
"fragility" will be useful in Chapter 7, where new strategies for enabling viability will be
developed. This chapter ended with an illustration of how viability can be assessed, and
highlighted the difficulties associated with systems being able to provide acceptable value to
multiple stakeholders and under multiple contexts. However, all systems should be designed to
be viable and the focus of the next section will be to examine existing strategies in the
engineered systems literature that may help enable viability for systems, and systems of
systems in particular.
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5 VIABILITY-RELATED STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEMS
Stakeholders want systems that are viable, that is, they will provide acceptable value over the
system's lifetime. Since complex systems tend to have very dynamic environments, strategies
for enabling viability of engineered systems will require that the systems survive certain
perturbations and avoid others. Section 3.4.3 highlighted existing design principles that system
architects can use to increase a system's survivability to perturbations that cannot be avoided,
and reduce susceptibility to those that can. This chapter tries to explain why the literature is
confusing as to what a design principle is, and resolves the issue by adapting the existing design
principles into more useable design patterns and heuristics for enabling viability.
5.1 PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING VIABILITY-RELATED DESIGN
PRINCIPLES
Systems that can expect to encounter perturbations, have to be survivable in order to be viable.
In 2009, Richards developed a list of 17 design principles for survivability, which was followed
by a list of "resilience" heuristics that Jackson compiled in his 2010 book Architecting Resilient
Systems. Recently, Jackson transformed his list of heuristics into a hierarchy of about a dozen
major survivability design principles and numerous sub-principles (Jackson, 2012). Since both
Richards' and Jackson's design principles attempt to increase a system's ability to avoid,
mitigate and recover from perturbations, they may help enable viability for systems that must
encounter perturbations. Although there are a few design principles that overlap, the lists of
design principles compiled by Jackson and Richards differ significantly (Table 5-1). The
discrepancies between these lists show that there is confusion, or at least disagreement, in the
literature as to what a design principle is, or which principles actually enable viability.
5.1.1 DEFINING DESIGN PRINCIPLE
There is not much consensus in the technical literature as to what exactly a "design principle"
is. Fulcoly (2012) states that "a design principle is a principle that guides the design of a system
or architecture in order to promote some quality (e.g. evolvability)". Wasson (2006) states that
a principle is "a guiding thought based on empirical deduction of observed behavior or practices
that proves to be true under most conditions over time". Richards (2009) refers to design
principles as "concept-neutral strategies of architectural choice". Jackson (2012) uses the term
"design principle" to refer to a broad range of abstract rules that when followed, produce
concrete solutions which improve the system. Jackson quotes Lonergan (1992) who says that
principles, like laws, are "invariant". Jackson further notes that design principles range in rigor
from those that are mathematically provable to those that are just guidelines. Mathematically
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provable design principles are relatively rare, and typically cover very specific types of
perturbations. An example of a mathematically rigorous viability design principle would be the
principle of redundancy. If only one operational component is necessary, then as the number
of redundant components n increases, the probability of system failure, p,, is related to the
probability of each particular component failing, p,, by
n
Ps =Pi
i=1
(6)
TABLE 5-1: OVERLAP OF VIABILITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES IN THE LITERATURE
Hardening Hardness
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AoiMargin Margin
Not RepresentedContext Spanning
Physical Redundancy Redundancy
Functional Redundancy Heterogeneity
Localized Capacity Distribution| Loose Coupling Not Represented
Loose Coupling Containment Containment
Repairability Repair
Restructure Evolution
Reorganization Regroup Not Represented
Authority Escalation Not Represented
Layered Defense Not Represented
Avoid Human Error Not Represented
Human in Control Automated Function Not Represented
Human in the Loop Not Represented
Complexity Avoidance Not Represented
Drift Correction Not Represented
Drift Correction Independent Review Not Represented
Neutral State Not Represented
Inter-Node Interaction Not Represented
Inter-Node Impediment Not Represented
Inter-Node Interaction
Informed Operator Not Represented
Knowledge Between Not Represented
Nodes
JACKSON (2012) RICHARDS (2009)
DESIGN PRINCIPLES SUB-PRINCIPLES DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Absorption
JACKSON (2012) RICHARDS (2009)
DESIGN PRINCIPLES SUB-PRINCIPLES DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Human Monitoring Not Represented
Informed Operator Not Represented
Knowledge Between Not RepresentedNodes
Human Monitoring Not Represented
Automated System Not RepresentedMonitoring
Avoid Hidden Interactions Not Represented
Not Represented Prevention
Not Represented Maintenance
Not Represented Preemption
Not Represented Failure Mode Reduction
Not Represented Mobility
Not Represented Concealment
Not Represented Avoidance
Not Represented Fail-safe
Not Represented Replacement
When system architects actually implement a design that has redundancy of components, it will
work as intended, if the perturbation materializes. An example of a heuristic or a "rule of
thumb" would be the principle of complexity avoidance, which states that a system can be
made more viable if internal complexities are kept to a minimum.
The Oxford Dictionary (2012a) definition of principle is a "fundamental truth or proposition that
serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning". A
fundamental truth should be invariant. If the principle is not invariant, and the contextual
condition is not explicitly stated in the principle itself, then there are two problems that arise.
First, the number of possible "design principles" for a particular discipline can become quite
large, as just about any solution to a problem can be formulated into a "design principle", no
matter how specific it is to a particular system, context and perturbation. Second,
practitioners may either implement the design principle incorrectly (i.e. under the wrong
context) or wonder what additional caveats exist in order for the design principle to hold,
thereby reducing confidence in the principle and limiting the chances of it being implemented.
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5.1.2 DESIGN PRINCIPLE INVARIANCE
The invariance of some of the current survivability design principles is questionable. If a design
principle is invariant, it should be always be followed. If system architects need to be
concerned with whether the design principle will help or not, then the principle is merely advice
and not a rule. Many of the design principles suggested in the literature are very context-
dependent. The principle of mobility, for example, states that viability can be increased by
relocating the system to avoid detection by external change agents. The effectiveness of this
strategy requires several contextual parameters to be true, including the fact that there is an
external change agent who can and does wish to disturb the system, and the fact that the
detection of the system by such an agent is location based. Furthermore, some of the design
principles, if implemented, may actually reduce viability by making certain perturbations more
likely to occur, or by reducing the system's ability to survive them. For example, the principle of
concealment states that architects can enable viability of their system by reducing its visibility
from external change agents. While following this principle may enable viability when
considering perturbations that involve hostile external agents that are looking for the system, it
may also hinder its viability in other ways. For example, painting a commercial aircraft black
and having no lights would follow the concealment principle, but it would likely make the
aircraft more susceptible to collisions with other friendly aircraft.
5.2 TRANSFORMING SURVIVABILITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES INTO
DESIGN PATTERNS AND HEURISTICS
All of the design principles for survivability mentioned in the literature are strategies for
enabling system viability, but they are different in their approach and applicability. Broadly
speaking, there are two types of strategies suggested in the literature for enabling viability in
systems. The first type of strategy is a direct solution to specific types of perturbations. For
example, the strategy of mobility suggests that a solution to location-based disturbances is to
move the system away and avoid them altogether. The second type of viability strategy is a
general approach that indirectly improves viability in certain ways. For example, the strategy of
independent review that states that outside experts who did not design the system and are not
stakeholders should review the design of the system to determine its viability. In an attempt to
reconcile the literature, this research will propose that most of the survivability strategies
proposed by Richards, Jackson and others as "design principles", can be re-classified as design
patterns and design heuristics.
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5.3 DESIGN PATTERNS FOR VIABILITY
Design patterns are general solutions to common problems that architects and engineers have
used to improve their designs (Beck et al., 1996). Researchers have developed numerous
design patterns in areas such as architecture (Alexander, Ishikawa, & Silverstein, 1977),
software engineering (Wolfgang, 1994), security (Schumacher, Fernandez-Buglioni, Hybertson,
Buschmann, & Sommerlad, 2006), and systems engineering (Cloutier & Verma, 2007) In the
seminal book A Pattern Language, Christopher Alexander (1977) defines a design pattern as
follows:
Each pattern describes a problem, which occurs over and over again in our environment,
and then describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such a way that you can
use the same solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same way twice.
Design patterns are specified in such a way that they can be used to solve a particular design
problem. At a minimum, the users of a design pattern require a description of the problem that
is solved by the pattern, a description of the solution, and a list of related design patterns. In
addition to this core, researchers have often included additional useful information in the
description of design patterns. For example, the software design patterns described in the
highly-cited book Design Patterns for Object-Oriented Software Development (Wolfgang, 1994),
include sample code so that software developers can more easily adapt the patterns to their
own particular design.
Perhaps the most useful aspect of a list of design patterns is how they all relate to each other.
Jackson developed a hierarchy of strategies where some strategies are more specific versions of
larger, more general approaches. For example, while Richards lists both margin and hardness
as separate viability strategies, Jackson lists them both as sub-strategies of a larger, overall
absorption strategy. By recognizing that there may be more than one way to solve a particular
problem, developing a mapping of viability solutions empowers designers with alternatives to
consider. Furthermore, certain strategies enable, or depend on other strategies. Jackson refers
to this as "interdependency" and lists numerous dependencies between his strategies. An
example of an interdependency is the Human in Control strategy, which states that humans
should have final decision making authority in critical situations. However, since humans can
also make mistakes, the effectiveness of this strategy is also dependent on the successful
implementation of the Avoid Human Error principle. Not all dependencies are as simple as that,
however. For example, the Inter-Node Interaction Principle Interdependency involves no less
than six different strategies (Figure 5-1).
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Absorption
OR Functional Redundancy
Physical Redundancy
Inter-node Interaction AN
-+Inter-node impedimn
Human in Control
FIGURE 5-1: INTER-NODE INTERACTION DEPENDENCY DIAGRAM
(JACKSON, 2012)
More importantly, and of specific interest to viability design patterns, is that certain solutions
may conflict with each other. By following the link of related solutions, an architect may
become aware that implementing a particular solution may actually decrease viability to
different types of perturbations. In this sense, the mapping of design patterns allows designers
to be selective amongst the alternatives and avoid unintended consequences of certain design
implementations.
5.3.1 STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
Design patterns for viability can be broken down into structural patterns and operational
patterns. The implementation of structural design patterns result in specific structural
properties, such as twin engines on an aircraft. Most passive viability strategies can be
implemented solely through a structural design pattern. For example, the hardness viability
strategy can be implemented by including armor, a structural feature that does not require an
associated operational strategy.
The implementation of operational patterns involves the execution of a particular strategy for
avoiding, mitigating or recovering from a perturbation. Mobility is an operational strategy
because it involves relocating the system to avoid a disturbance. Operational patterns execute
the active viability strategies, but they typically require structural features to be present. For
example, for a system to relocate itself away from a disturbance (i.e. execute the strategy of
mobility), it would first have to have suitable features to do so (e.g. wings, wheels, an engine,
navigation system, etc.) However, not all operational patterns will be executed by the system
and thus may be implemented without associated structural features. The strategy of
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deterrence, for example, is often executed by entities outside the system and not the system
itself. Laws, enforced by police or the military, deter many hostile actions that could be taken
against systems. Many systems rely on the deterrence provided by outside entities as part of
their own viability, without explicitly including structural or operational capabilities to enable it.
5.3.2 ELEMENTS OF A DESIGN PATTERN
There is no single template for a design pattern that crosses all disciplines, since problems and
their solutions tend to have unique characteristics. For example, in software engineering,
design patterns typically include source code where the pattern in actually implemented. A
software engineer can actually implement the solution by simply cutting-and-pasting the source
code from the design pattern documentation and making a few minor adjustments to link the
code with the rest of the software system. This is not possible with an architectural design
pattern like "the door", for example, and those described by Alexander (1977). However, there
are several key elements that should be included in a design pattern documentation for
systems, which make the pattern useful for system architects. They are:
Name. The name of the pattern. The name should be unique and should clearly and concisely
identify the solution.
Also Known As. Other names for this pattern. This typically occurs when more than one
researcher develop the same solution to a specific type of problem.
Problem. The problem that the pattern is attempting to solve.
Solution. A description of how the pattern solves the problem.
Context. Contextual factors that are relevant.
Unintended Consequences. A description of potential side-effects and tradeoffs that may need
to be considered.
Examples. Real-world examples of the pattern solving a particular problem.
Related Patterns. Before implementing a particular pattern, system architects should consult
these patterns as well to ensure that a better solution does not already exist, or that the
particular pattern does not interfere with other solutions already implemented or planned.
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5.3.3 EXAMPLE OF A DESIGN PATTERN
An example design pattern for margin is shown in Table 5-2. Other design patterns for viability
can be found in Appendix B.
TABLE 5-2: EXAMPLE DESIGN PATTERN
Operational
Margin (Jackson, 2012; Richards, 2009)
Capability is not being provided adequately.
Perturbation causes the output of system to be inadequate.
Have system be capable of producing more output than necessary.
May add require additional components, meaning unnecessary size (reducing the
strategy of miniaturization), and/or unnecessary weight (making the strategy to
mobilit difficult to achieve).
Extra-long wings on an A-10 aircraft, which generates enough lift in the event that
of the wins are destroed or damag ed.
Htrogeneity, Physical Redundancy
5.4 DESIGN HEURISTICS
Rechtin (1992) refers to heuristics as guidelines, or non-rigorous "rules of thumb". Some of the
viability strategies are not specific solutions to perturbations, but general approaches to design
that may result in systems that are more likely to be viable. Design Heuristics enable viability
through indirect means. For example, the strategy of Failure Mode Reduction states that the
designers should eliminate system hazards through intrinsic design. These design strategies do
lead to better, more viable designs in general since certain hazards may be eliminated that
would have jeopardized the systems viability. However, specific design features or operational
strategies that address specific perturbations (e.g. operator error) are not clear. An example of
a design heuristic is shown in Table 5-3.
TABLE 5-3: EXAMPLE OF A DESIGN HEURISTIC
Description: The system should not be more complex than necessary.
Example: The Rule of Simplicity used in the Unix Operating System
(Raymond, 2004).
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COMPLEXITY AvoIDANCE
(MADNI Et JACKSON, 2009)
5.4.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DESIGN PATTERNS AND HEURISTICS
System architects should use both design heuristics and design patterns to increase the viability
of their systems, as they are effective in different ways. For example, to solve specific
problems, system architects should first look to see if a design pattern addresses that
perturbation. However, to address unknown unknowns, the system architect may wish to
follow design heuristics which may strengthen the design overall. The differences between
design patterns and design heuristics are summarized in Table 5-4.
TABLE 5-4: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DESIGN PATTERNS AND DESIGN HEURISTICS FOR VIABILITY
DESIGN PATER DE I IN U ISTI
solve a specific perturbation be general
generate new features, strategies help select amongst alternatives
rigorous, verifiable lax, unverifiable
apply only to the design itself (and also apply to the design process
supporting enterprise)
directly enable viability indirectly enable viability
5.5 SUMMARY
This chapter examined existing survivability design principles that have been identified in the
literature and highlighted the fact that the principles do not exhibit invariance, and the lists of
principles compiled by different researchers, are substantially different. In this chapter, the
existing design principles are classified into heuristics and design patterns, in a prescriptive
manner that makes them more useful for practitioners to actually implement. In the next
chapter, these strategies will be tested to see if they are applicable to systems of systems as
well.
99
6 APPLYING VIABILITY STRATEGIES TO SYSTEMS OF
SYSTEMS
In the previous chapter, viability strategies for systems were identified in the literature and
divided into design patterns and heuristics. However, it is not clear that system engineering
techniques are also applicable to systems of systems as well, due to distinguishing
characteristics that separate the two. The goal of this chapter is to determine if the existing
strategies for viability can be applied at the SoS-level and how the viability of constituent
systems relates to the viability of the systems of systems to which they belong. At the end of
the chapter, a new strategy for enabling viability is derived from a historical case study of the
2003 North American Blackout is presented that demonstrates that there are other strategies
for viability that are not included in the current literature, and a new
6.1 STAKEHOLDER NEEDS
Value is a subjective measurement of how well the attributes of the system meet the needs and
expectations of the stakeholders. Let F be the stakeholders of system A. If VAIrA represents
the value that A delivers to FA, aA is the attributes of A, 'A is the system context of A, then
VAIFA = 9 (A,FA) (7)
However, since aA = f(A, VA) (Section 3.2.3), then
VAIFA = g(f(A,qJA,A) (8)
This means that value is a function of the system itself, the context relative to the system, and
the stakeholders of that system. For a traditional system, this may seem trivial, but for a
system of system, the relationship between the system's attributes, context, and stakeholder
needs is much more complex. However, it will be necessary to explore these issues in detail at
the SoS level, in order for viability of systems of systems, and system within systems of systems,
to be defined.
6.2 VIABILITY IN A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
When examining the impact of applying vitality strategies to systems of systems, it is important
to consider the following question. Can a SoS still be viable even if none of the systems within a
SoS are viable with respect to a particular set of contexts under consideration? To answer this
question, consider the fact that an engineered system is made up of components, which need
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to do something useful for the system, in order for the system to do something useful for its
stakeholders. For example, a hard drive may need to read and write data, a UAV may need to
detect targets in the water, and a Facebook user may need to log in every now and then and
interact with other users. If none of the components do something useful for the system, then
their outputs cannot be combined into something useful, and the overall system will not be
able to deliver adequate value to the stakeholders and will therefore be unviable. Therefore,
we can state the following:
Axiom of Component Viability: In order for a system to be viable, a necessary and sufficient
set of its components must be viable with respect to the system and contexts under
consideration.
6.2.1 SYSTEM VIABILITY WITHIN A SoS
The key phrase in the Axiom of Component Viability is that the component must be viable "with
respect to the system", not necessarily to itself. This is critical in a system of systems where a
constituent system may be viable to its own stakeholders and context, but not to the SoS. To
illustrate this concept, consider a MarSec that includes an UAV (system U), a ground control
station (system G), and a satellite that links the two (system S) (Figure 6-1). The UAV and GCS
are owned and operated by one set of stakeholders (Fm), who lease the services of the satellite
from a satellite communications provider (Fs). The satellite is part of the SoS that includes the
UAV and the GCS (SoS M), but the satellite stakeholders also lease bandwidth to cell phone
companies (Fc). Thus, the satellite is also part of cellular phone SoS as well (SoS C).
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FIGURE 6-1: EXAMPLE OF A SYSTEM BELONGING TO MULTIPLE SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
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Let Vsir1s be the value that the satellite delivers to its stakeholders (Fs). This value is different,
but related to the value of the satellite to the cell phone operators (Vsirc) and the value of the
satellite to the MarSec stakeholders (VsIrM). The viability of the satellite to its stakeholders
(V$sirs) is simply determined by whether or not Vsir-s exceeds some minimum threshold set by
its stakeholders (Tsirs). Vsirs will be some combination of the value the satellite bring to its
stakeholders by participating in the MarSec (VMjrs) and the cellular SoS (Vcirs).
6.2.2 EXAMPLE OF VIABLE SYSTEM, NON-VIABLE SOS
Suppose there is a component failure that makes the satellite communications noisy.
Unfortunately, because the satellite is already deployed, a repair is impractical. Since the
MarSec only uses the satellite for low bandwidth C2 communications, the noisy channel is not a
problem and the MarSec is still viable. However, if the customers of the cell phone company
are not willing to tolerate the noisy channel, then the cell phone SoS is no longer viable,
meaning that it will likely be shut down and not produce value to the satellite providers either
(i.e. Vcirs - 0). However, if the value to the satellite stakeholders generated by participating
in the MarSec exceeds the minimum threshold to the satellite stakeholders, i.e. if VMlrs Tsirs,
then the satellite is still viable overall
6.2.3 EXAMPLE OF NON-VIABLE SYSTEM, VIABLE SOS
Suppose instead that the noisy communications caused by the component failure in the
satellite was not acceptable to the MarSec. In this case, the satellite would no longer produce
acceptable value in either SoS and would therefore be unviable as a result. However, if the
MarSec is able to use a different satellite provider (i.e. replace the failed "component" with
another), then the MarSec can remain viable to the random component failure, even if the
satellite itself did not remain viable.
System viability strategies applied at the system level will help enable viability at the SoS level,
however viable constituent systems do not guarantee that the systems of systems they belong
to will also be viable are a result. Similarly, the systems of systems themselves may be viable,
even if (certain) constituent systems are not. Therefore, before viability strategies are applied
at the constituent system level, system architects should carefully examine how these
strategies will impact the viability of the SoS overall.
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6.3 APPLYING VIABILITY STRATEGIES AT THE SYSTEM LEVEL VS.
SoS LEVEL
Certain system viability strategies can be applied to systems of systems either at the system-
level (i.e. bottom-up) or at the SoS-level (i.e. top-down). To illustrate the difference, consider a
MarSec where UAVs are performing identification on targets that enter the AOl. The
identification process can be approximated as a queue, where the targets that need to be
identified arrive according to a random process specified by a mean arrival rate A. There are k
UAVs in the SoS, and each UAV identifies a target according to a random process with a mean
service time of p. As long as k >> A, then all the targets should get identified before they cross
the AOI. Roughly speaking, k, represents the capacity of the system to identify targets, and A
represent the demand. Suppose there is a perturbation where a sudden, large influx of targets
arrives in the AOl according to some new arrival rate X. For this disturbance, k. < A meaning
that all the UAVs will likely be busy for duration of the disturbance and some targets will leave
the AOl unidentified as a result. To make the SoS viable in this context, the principle of margin
(Richards, et al., 2009) can be applied to either the UAVs or the SoS itself. For example, if the
payloads on the UAVs were improved such that the number of targets identified per unit time
(i.e. p) increased to meet the required capacity, then the SoS would be viable in case that
perturbation arose. This is an example of applying the principle of margin at the system-level,
by increasing the technology level from low to high, and reaping the benefits at the SoS level.
To apply the principle of margin at the SoS level, a system architect could simply increase the
number of UAVs in the AOl (i.e. increase k) until there was enough capacity to satisfy the
demand created by the perturbation.
6.4 APPLYING THE STRATEGY OF MARGIN TO THE MARSEC
The MarSec DES can be used to demonstrate and assess how the strategy of margin can be
applied at both the system and SoS-level. Suppose that the stakeholders agree that in order for
a MarSec SoS to be viable, it must able to identify at least 90% of the ships that enter the AOl,
on average. A system is proposed, that has 14 vehicle assets (i.e. 8 UAVs and 4 manned patrol
boats) and the MarSec DES simulation is run under normal contextual conditions. Since the
context and system behavior is highly stochastic, the output of any particular trial is a random
variable and therefore multiple trials must be run to estimate the true mean of the probability
of ID. Since the simulation runs fairly quickly, a total of 10,000 runs are executed and the
results are shown in Figure 6-2.
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The mean of the probability of ID was estimated to be 0.941 with a very narrow confidence
interval, due to the large sample size. This system is viable, however it is important to note
that there are certain times when the system may not be able to meet its viability criteria, due
to some of the random effects of both the context and the system itself. This can be seen in
the left tail end of the distribution of values shown in Figure 6-2 that fall below the minimum
threshold of 0.9. Although this system can be expected to have a probability of ID > 0.9 under
normal conditions, there is a chance that the probability may fall below at times. This is part of
the stakeholder risk in assessing viability.
Now suppose that the traffic in the AOI is doubled, perhaps due to a temporary disturbance
such as an evacuation of a nearby country due to an earthquake, or a conflict that causes major
shipping lanes to be re-routed through the AOL. To see if the SoS remains viable, the MarSec
DES was run 10,000 times with the same SoS design but twice the ship traffic. As shown in
Figure 6-3, the mean probability of ID for the SoS under high traffic conditions was found to be
0.867, which is below stakeholder thresholds. Again, due to the stochastic canture of the
inputs and system response, there are certain cases where the SoS meets or exceeds the
threshold as shown by the right-tail of the distribution in Figure 6-3, but on average, the system
does not met the requirements and would therefore not be considered viable.
To be able to handle disturbances where the traffic through the AOI is doubled, the SoS can
implement the principle of margin at either the system or SoS-level to increase the throughput
of the system. At the system level, the designers can use better technology (e.g. more
advanced payloads) that reduce the amount of time it takes to identify a target by M. At the
SoS-level, designers can simply double the number of vehicles in the SoS. To assess the impact
of both of these changes, the MarSec SoS was run again 10,000 times for each strategy under
the heavy traffic conditions (see Appendix D). The system-level implementation of the margin
strategy (i.e. increasing the technology level of the payloads) exceeded the performance
threshold under heavy conditions (probability of ID = 0.960) and even surpassed the
performance of the original system under regular traffic conditions. However, the probability
of ID for the SoS that had double the number of vehicles (i.e. the SoS-level implementation of
the margin strategy) only reached 0.885, doubling the number of vehicles) and failed to meet
the viability threshold, although it did improve performance over the baseline SoS, slightly.
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FIGURE 6-2: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH BASELINE SOS EXPERIENCING REGULAR TRAFFIC
FIGURE 6-3: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH BASELINE SOS EXPERIENCING HIGH TRAFFIC
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The reason for the discrepancy between the system and SoS-level implementation of the
margin strategy was due to the fact that there was a single command center that delegated
tasks to the vehicles, and that command center operated similar to a single server queue. As
more vehicles were added, the command center did not have the resources to be able to
effectively communicate with the additional vehicles and communication queues formed.
These queues caused the vehicles to wait longer for instructions and as a result, reduced their
ability to perform their tasks in a timely manner. Thus, the additional capacity that should have
been realized by having additional vehicles was negated by the additional communication
overhead that did not scale accordingly. This example highlights the difficulties of making
change in one area, without really understanding how the changes will impact the overall
operation of the rest of the system (or SoS).
Margin is not the only viability strategy that can be implemented at the system or SoS-level and
it is not the only viability strategy that can have varying effectiveness a result. For example, the
strategy of redundancy can be applied at the SoS level by having multiple UAVs that perform
the same task. This strategy would reduce susceptibility to perturbations that reduce capacity
of the system by eliminating capability, such as when components fail, or are incapacitated by
hostile actions. Redundancy can be applied to the system level, for example, by having multiple
payloads onboard the same UAV. By performing a cause-effect mapping, described in Section
7.1, system architects can see that having redundant UAVs reduces susceptibility to more
perturbations than just redundant payloads. For example, while both solutions will be viable in
the event that a single payload fails, only the redundant UAV solution will be viable in
numerous events such as engine failure, an operator not showing up for work, UAV being shot
down, etc. Furthermore, redundant UAVs also provide margin, whereas in most cases having
multiple cameras of the same type onboard the same UAV will not improve capacity. The main
disadvantage to applying redundancy at the SoS level in this particular case, would be cost.
While redundancy may be more effective at the SoS level, the strategy of mobility, for example,
may be more applicable at the system level. Mobility provides viability in the presence of
location based disturbances. A classic example is that in systems of systems that tend to have
geographic distribution of their components, there is often not one SoS location. Rather, the
SoS is made up of components that each may have their own location, which may be affected
by local disturbances. For example, what is the location of the Internet? Can the Internet as a
whole physically move away from disturbances? Routers, personal computers and other
devices, which make up the Internet can move perhaps, but is the Internet itself mobile? As
location-based perturbations are local and do not apply to the entire SoS, similarly the solution
of mobility is local and applicable only to the specific constituent systems that may be affected.
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6.5 SUFFICIENCY OF EXISTING VIABILITY STRATEGIES
Research question 2b asks if there are additional strategies that enable viability in systems,
particularly systems of systems?. To answer that question, one of the largest SoS failures ever,
the Northeast Blackout of 2003, will be examined and scrutinized from the perspective of the
existing viability strategies.
6.5.1 NORTH AMERICAN POWER GRID
Many experts believe that the North American power grid is the largest and most complex
system of the technological age, with approximately 15,000 nodes (power stations), and 20,000
transmission lines (edges) (Albert, Albert, & Nakarado, 2004) (Figure 6-4). The primary
purpose of the power grid is to ensure that power is safely and effectively transferred from
generators to end users, in a complex network of interconnected nodes that span a large
geographical area and include many different independent power operators. The North
American power grid is divided in the Eastern, Western and Texas regions, which are tightly
coupled within each region, and loosely coupled between.
FIGURE 6-4: THE POWER GRID LIGHTS UP NORTH AMERICA AS VIEWED FROM SPACE
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The most obvious type of failure in such a system is when a node in the chain of transmission
between the generator and end user fails and the two end points become disconnected. In
accordance with the localized capacity heuristic, the topology of the power grid is such that a
single node failure will simply cause power loads to shift through different transmission paths
until it eventually reaches its intended destination. In fact, an analysis by Albert et al (2004),
showed that networks such as the North American power grid are fairly robust to multiple node
failures if they are random in nature, but quite vulnerable if a few high-load nodes fail. Failure
of 4% of the high-load nodes in a network similar to the North American power grid, results in
60% connectivity loss. If 8% of the highest-load nodes fail in order, which might be case if the
grid was under a directed attack, then complete connectivity loss can occur.
6.5.2 CHAIN REACTIONS AND CASCADING FAILURES
Disconnections affect the nodes that are no longer connected to the network in obvious ways.
However, in networks such as the North American power grid, disconnections also impact
nearby nodes that are still connected to the network. Since high amounts of electrical power is
not easily stored, the power grid must carefully balance the demand of electricity to its supply.
In power grids, failure of an edge transfers the load being carried by the edge to other edges in
the network. If those other edges have the additional capacity to carry the load (i.e. margin),
then there is not a problem. However, there are limits to how much load an edge can carry
and if those limits are approached, then the new edge may fail itself either involuntarily, or by
being shut down to prevent damage. When this new edge subsequently fails, then other edges
must take both its load as well as the load of the original failing edge as well. This can cause a
chain reaction, where failures lead to further failures that propagate throughout the system.
Cascading failures are a special type of chain reaction where the small failures eventually lead
to major events, e.g. a nuclear power operator spilling coffee on a command console causing a
chain reaction that ends in a Chernobyl-level. Preventing chain reactions and in particular,
cascading failures, should be a priority for system architects. Figure 6-5 illustrates how chain
reaction of small events can grew into the cascading failure that resulted in the US Northeast
Blackout of 2003. As stated in Chapter 3, the initial incident was an untrimmed tree in Ohio
that severed a power line. This link failure burdened other lines with an extra load, causing
some of them to fail as well. Each failing power line placed additional load on the remaining
lines until they succumbed as well, leading to a chain reaction of power line failures.
Eventually, enough power line failures caused entire power plant generators to shut down as a
precaution, in a cascading failure that eventually lead to a complete grid failure covering the
Northeastern United States and some parts of Canada. There were multiple incidents and
circumstances along the way that contributed to this unfortunate outcome. One such
perturbation was the failure to recognize and mitigate the failing power lines in Ohio, due to a
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software bug affecting the control rooms of one of the Ohio power plants (Zhivich &
Cunningham, 2009).
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FIGURE 6-5: CASCADING FAILURE LEADING TO NORTHEAST BLACKOUT OF 2003
Cascading failures are system failures that result from component failures that cause other
components to fail, which cause further components to fail, and so forth. Cascading failures
are a major concern for connected networks like a power grid, but also occur in other systems
as well. When the financial crisis of 2008 happened, certain banks were deemed Too Big To Fail
(TBTF) and bailed out to prevent cascading failures from crippling the entire economy. In his
address to the Independent Community of Bankers on March 20, 2010, the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve said that to avoid a collapse of the financial system, the government now only
has to bail out banks that are too big to fail, but those that are too interconnected to fail as well
(Bernanke, 2010).
6.5.3 NORTHEAST BLACKOUT OF 2003
On August 14, 2003 at approximately 4:10pm EDT, the second largest blackout ever affected
the large parts of the Northeastern United States and parts of Canada (Figure 6-6). The
following is a condensed timeline of the events that occurred on August 13, 2003 (Lerner,
2003; U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004):
* 13:31 (EST) - FirstEnergy shuts down a generating plant in Eastlake, Ohio.
e 14:02 (EST) - Overgrown trees in Ohio fail when it comes in contact with transmission
line
e 14:02 (EST) - Alarm in FirstEnergy fails due to computer bug
e 14:32 (EST) - More power lines in Ohio fail, due to power loads being placed on them.
FirstEnergy notices problem, but fails to inform other power operators in nearby states.
e 16:10 (EST) - Power lines in Michigan start to fail. Eastward flow of power cut off.
Demand surges and overloads power station causing them to go offline, starting the
blackout.
o Large metropolitan areas start separating from the grid
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o Blackout spreads in a cascading failure.
0 Last of the affected power stations separate from the grid and cascading failures stops.
By the end of the day, more than 508 generating units at 264 power plants shut down, after a
3.5 GW power surge affected the transmission grid. The blackout lasted between 7 and 16
hours, and resulted in a 20% increase in fatalities during that period (Al-Aufi, 2012). Although
many critical systems had backup generators, some critical systems failed because their
generators failed or they ran out of fuel, including certain telephone services, water supplies,
gas stations, border crossings, hospitals and television/radio stations
FIGURE 6-6: AREAS AFFECTED BY THE NORTHEAST BLACKOUT OF 2003
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6.5.4 SYSTEMS AFFECTING OTHER SYSTEMS WITHIN A SoS
One of the largest problems in a SoS is that the environment in which a constituent system
interacts often forms part of the context of one or more other constituent systems (Figure 6-7).
That is, the outputs of a constituent system, whether voluntary or involuntary, often become
the inputs of another system within the SoS. This is the case with the North American power
grid, which allowed the cascading failure to emerge. Certain power systems intentionally
shutdown to prevent damage to their own system, which caused the excess current to be sent
to adjacent systems. This meant that the actions of one system caused a perturbation in the
context of another.
Contm ontex Coni
System ContmtA System of Systems
FIGURE 6-7: CONTEXTUAL DIVERSITY WITHIN A SOS
In order for a SoS to be viable, strategies must be implemented where the constituent systems
ensure that their actions do not negatively impact the contexts of other constituent systems, if
those changes may not be survivable. In other words, they must not disrupt the context of
other systems, if those systems are fragile to those disruptions.
6.5.5 INTENSITY REGULATION
In the case of an intensity-based disturbance like that involving current, the intensity regulation
of the system's output is an example of a strategy that can help enable viability of systems, but
was not discussed by Richards or Jackson. Throttling is when a system intentionally reduces its
output, to increase its own survivability to a perturbation it is experiencing, or help other
constituent systems avoid future perturbations by not disrupting their context. In the case of
power grids, throttling is achieved in part through "shedding load", i.e. eliminating power to
some areas ("rolling blackouts") and/or reducing the voltage provided ("brownouts").
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There are other examples of intensity throttling used in both traditional systems and systems of
systems as well. In most modern laptop computers, the CPU and GPU produce the lion share of
the heat. Heat is an unintentional interaction effect that threatens the component within the
laptop. If the internal temperature of the laptop rises above a critical threshold, then certain
components, such as the RAM or hard drives, may fail as a result. To prevent this, CPUs and
GPUs in most modern laptops will down-clock themselves, i.e. operate at a lower speed and
produce less heat, for a period of time when the overall internal temperature is too high. On
the other end of the SoS spectrum, throttling is specifically implemented as part of the Transfer
Control Protocol (TCP) protocols that forms part of the operational backbone of the Internet
itself. Specifically, TCP contains rules for end-to-end flow control that prevents individual
senders from sending too much data to receivers and overstressing them to the point where
they cannot respond to everything in a timely manner. Sending more data to a receiver is
precisely the perturbation behind the infamous Distributed Denial Of Service (DDoS) attacks are
the leading cause of Internet websites to fail, due to exogenous "hacking". In a DDoS, multiple
senders are used (often because they are compromised via a malevolent computer program) to
send data to a single receiver, overflowing the receivers queues with bogus requests and
reducing its ability to effectively service legitimate clients.
6.6 SUMMARY
This chapter applied some of the existing viability strategies to systems of systems and showed
that they are still applicable, with several caveats. First, viability must be defined relative to the
SoS, not the system. Additionally, a system may be viable, even if the SoS is not viable, and a
SoS may be viable, even if one or more of its constituent systems are not. Thus, viability of
constituent systems and viability of systems of systems are not the same. Additionally, viability
strategies for systems of systems can be applied at the system level or SoS level, with different
results. It is for these reasons that care must be taken by decision makers when applying
viability strategies to systems of systems, since they are more complex than traditional systems,
and have more unintended consequences as a result. This chapter ended by providing a
historical case study that demonstrated the need for an additional viability strategy (intensity
regulation) that was not identified in the systems literature. In the next chapter, additional
viability strategies using the concept of system context and cause-effect mapping of
perturbations, will be developed.
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7 ADDITIONAL VIABILITY STRATEGIES
In the previous chapter, viability strategies applicable to systems, that were previously
identified in the literature were found to be applicable to systems of systems as well.
Additionally, a new viability strategy, intensity regulation, was discovered after examining the
Northeast Blackout of 2003 and how the North American power grid handles power
perturbations. In this chapter, additional viability strategies for engineered systems not
identified in the literature will be presented. This will be accomplished by first examining the
MarSec in detail using a cause-effect mapping to determine a set of perturbations that may
cause the SoS to lose its ability to provide value. Then, possible points of intervention by
system architects and operational decision makers will be highlighted. Finally using various
historical examples and examining the perturbations from a nested contextual viewpoint,
methods for avoiding and surviving these perturbations are identified and formulated into
general viability strategies. A selection of these new strategies was implemented and validated
through experiments in the MarSec DES, which is discussed at the end of this chapter.
7.1 CAUSAL DIAGRAMS OF CAUSE AND EFFECTS
To develop a list of perturbations of interest, and to determine possible points of intervention
where viability strategies can be applied, a cause-effect mapping is performed where the
multiple causes and effects of perturbations are linked from spontaneous events to terminal
conditions. Spontaneous events are those outside the system's control. In many cases,
spontaneous events are exogenous (i.e. outside the system boundary), such as changes in the
weather or the action of an outside entity. Spontaneous events can also be endogenous, such
as a random component failure or operator error. Spontaneity is not absolute, but rather it is
relative to the system. A chicken crossing the road would likely be a spontaneous event to a
car 2, but not to a farm. The chicken may be lured by the smell of a particular crop. Once the
chicken crosses the road, it may start to eat the crop on the other side, which is a disturbance
to the farm. Forcing the chicken to cross the road to get to a particular crop, may be a viability
strategy of the farm if the crop the chickens are eating is relatively worthless compared with
the crop on the other side of the road.
2 The traditional answer to the infamous joke "Why did the chicken cross the road" is "To get to the other side".
The punch line is anti-humorous because it highlights the fact that we really do not know the reason, even though
the listener imagines all sorts of wild causes.
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A cause-effect mapping begins with a terminal event (Figure 7-1). The causes of that event are
added to the map as perturbations of interest and a single arrow from each of the causes to
terminal event is drawn. If any of the causes of the terminal event are not spontaneous events,
then their causes, along with appropriate arrows, are added to the map as additional
perturbations of interest. Then each perturbation of interest is examined for additional causes
and effects. Arrows are drawn to any causes and effects already on the map and new
perturbations are added, as necessary. This process continues until each perturbation originally
started with a spontaneous event, and eventually results in a terminal event. If a perturbation
cannot eventually lead to a terminal event, then it is not worth considering and should be
removed from the cause-effect mapping.
KU'.rcpto
Spontaneous Perturbation Perturbation Terminal Event
Event e Effect of Increase e Effect of Operator e Effect of
Cause of Operator in Target Arrivals. Overworked Identification
Overworked * Cause of e Cause of Interception Error
Identification Error Failure.
FIGURE 7-1: SIMPLE cAUSE-EFFECT MAPPING
7.2 STRATEGIES AS INTERVENTION POINTS
The cause-effect mapping is useful for being able to highlight areas of intervention, where
strategies can be implemented to increase viability by mitigating or recovering from causes by
preventing their effects from happening. For example, in Figure 7-2, operators tend to perform
more errors when they are under a high workload (Wiener & Nagel, 1988). This perturbation
can lead to a terminal event (e.g. interception rate failure), so reducing the probability of
operators being overworked is one strategy for increasing the viability of the system overall.
This can be achieved, for example, by incorporating automation into the identification process
that double checks operator's actions for common mistakes. This type of solution implements
the avoid human error strategy as discussed by Jackson (see Section 3.4.3).
114
Strategy
Reduce chance of
operator error by
incorporating human
factors into design.
FIGURE 7-2: APPLYING A STRATEGY AS AN INTERVENTION
7.3 CAUSE-EFFECT MAPPING FOR MARSEC
A cause-effect mapping was performed for the MarSec (Figure 7-3). Not all perturbations are
shown in Figure 7-3, rather only a very small subset is shown to highlight where new strategies
for enhancing viability might be made. For example, a UAV may not be available due to a
random component failure. However, random component failures are not shown in Figure 7-3
because they can be addressed using the existing drift correction strategy. The details of the
cause and effect mapping are discussed in Table 7-1.
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FIGURE 7-3: CAUSE-EFFECT MAPPING FOR MARSEC
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TABLE 7-1. DESCRIPTION OF PERTURBATIONS IN CAUSE-EFFECT MAPPING OF MARSEC SOS
Tas eFailure
R ea ched
EVENT TYPE DESCRIPTIONI CUSES
Terminal
Event
Too many task
errors cause
performance to
drop below value
threshold.
Too many task failures. System no longerviable.
ms Terrorist Terrorist wasn't
eois Terminal successfully, intercepted before it System no longer
Event detonates bomb in viable.
L ~ in Atta harbor. detonated bomb.
Resource price increase,
Cost of system operational costs (e.g.
Termial excessive travel burns System no longer
Event e e s ct a fuel), capital costs (e.g. viable.Slimit UAV repairs after being
attacked)
Required task (e.g.
identify target) not Operator error, Task failure threshold
Task Failure --- performed, or not available UAV not in reached, successful
performed range, operator busy. terrorist attack.
% properly.
Operator not
Operator Not available to Operator busy, operator Task failure.
Available perform required shortage.
task.
UAV not available, UAV
UAV Not In UAV not in range of sent to wrong location, Task failure.
Range target to perform UAV not assigned to
task. task.
Too many targets in AOI,
Operator previous task failures Task failures,
Operator performing more that make additional . asie
Overworked tasks than he/she work and improperly improperly assigned
should for a given assigned UAVs that have UAVs.
period of time. to be re-assigned.
UAV Cost threshold
exceeded ifdamaged/destroyed by damaged/destroyed
UAV Not UAV is not rocket attack, UAV has to be
Available available. stakeholder controlling repaired/replaced, UAVUAV withdraws support, not in range to perform
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EVENT TYPE DESCRIPTION CAUSES EFFECTS
UAV Runs
Out of Fuel
UAV runs out of
fuel
Unnecessary travel due
to UAVs being sent to
the wrong locations.
UAV not available.
Cost threshold
UAV UAV sent to wrong UAV assignment rules exceeded if
Assignment - location, UAV not violated intentionally or unnecessary travel
Error tasked at all. unintentionally (e.g. to consumes too much
operator overworked). fuel, UAVs not being in
range or available.
Violation of Assignment rules Operators involuntarily
Assignment - (such as targets go assign UAVs when they UAV assignment error.
Rules to closets UAV) are should not, informationRule -Onot followed. attack.
Information Spontaneous Hostile entity takes Violation of assignment
Attack Event control of UAVs. rules.
Large Increase in Spontaneous Too many targets
Target Arrivals Event arrive in AOI over a Operator overworked.
L A specific period.
Stakeholder
Stakeholder Spontaneous withdraws it 
-- UAV not available.Withdrawal Event support from the
L_ SOS
Rocket Spontaneous Hostile entity
Attack Event attacks UAV with UAV not available.
rocket.
The causal diagram highlights several interesting dynamics associated with how perturbations
in this particular system propagate. System architects are constrained in how they can
intervene to solve some of the problems caused by the perturbations in Figure 7-4. There is a
limited amount of time, money and other resources to implement solutions to every
perturbation. There are also design constraints, such as size and weight, as well as boundary
constraints that limit the influence system architects have. For these reasons, system architects
must be selective in the strategies they chose to implement. A cause-effect mapping enables
system architects to visually identify possible points of intervention where the system or
supporting enterprise can do something to avoid, mitigate and recover from certain types of
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perturbations. In particular, system architects should try to intervene to avoid perturbations
that have multiple effects, known as common causes, and survive perturbations that have
multiple causes, known as common effects. It is particularly important to intervene against
perturbations that are part of a reinforcing loop, since they are both the sources of multiple
effects and multiple causes simultaneously, and lead to the often devastating cascading failures
seen in large-scale systems of systems. Cause-effect mappings also help system architects deal
with "unknown unknowns", or perturbations that no one thought of. Sometimes the solution
to a known problem is also the solution to unknown problem. Common causes and common
effects are probably more likely to be causes and effects of unknown perturbations as well.
Violation of
Assignment
Cost UAV Rules LEGEND
Threshold Assignment InformationExceeded Error Attac
A AtakAvoid/
IAvoid/
4 Survive
Stakeholder---- ----
UAV unsUAVNotOperator Large Increase in
vEv
t Threshold Terrorist Reinforcing
Witdrwa -o nOeao o
ReahedAttack RaLoop
FIGURE 7-4: GOOD CANDIDATES FOR POSSIBLE POINTS OF INTERVENTION
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7.4 STRATEGIES FOR INTERVENTION IN THE MARSEC EXAMPLE
By using the cause-effect mapping to generate perturbations of interest (Figure 7-5),
recognizing the differences between system and global contexts, and looking at some related
historical cases, some interesting strategies for enabling viability emerge. These new viability
strategies are discussed in this section.
Information
Attack
LEGEND
Principle of Violation of
Least Assignment Redirection
LPrivilege Rules PrubtoPeubation.
UAV
Stockpile Assignment Throttling Terminal
Error 
-- Evn
UAV Runs UAV Not Operator Large Increase in Spontaneous
Out of Fuel Available Overworked Target Arrivals Event
Rocket UAV Not In Task Failure Operator Not Strategy
DelcinAttack Range Available
Reinforcing
Commitment 0SaeodrI Vigilance Trsod erritLoop
FIGURE 7-5: CAUSE-EFFECT MAPPING FOR MARSEC WITH VIABILITY STRATEGIES APPLIED
7.4.1 COMMITMENT
One of the key characteristics of systems of systems is the fact that they are never fully formed
and have what is referred to as evolutionary development. This means that stakeholders and
consistent systems often come and go and their participation is not always guaranteed.
Furthermore, if their values are not in line with those of the overall SoS, they may simply
change the way their constituent systems operate in a way that disrupts the concept of
operations for other systems in the SoS. For example, the satellite provider may unilaterally
implement security features that reduce the effective bandwidth and unintentionally delay
certain communications between the UAVs and ground control station.
Suppose system A belongs to a system of systems (SoS X) that includes system B. System B
provides a critical functionality to system A. In general, if the critical functionality to system A
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is being provided by system B that is controlled by its own stakeholders (i.e. FB ), then the
viability of system A does not depend on the viability of system B. It is not necessary that
system B remain viable. System B's stakeholders can replace system B with something else that
can provide the critical functionality. However, to buffer the system context of A, stakeholders
of system B should be committed to providing the critical functionality to system A.
A common way of ensuring commitment to a SoS, and thereby protecting the local contexts of
constituent systems from internal, stakeholder withdrawals, is to require Service Level
Agreements (SLA) between the constituent systems (Bianco, Lewis, & Merson, 2008). A SLA is
a contract between the stakeholders, outlining the required services each stakeholder is
responsible for, and penalties for not providing such services when needed. By setting
appropriate penalties, system architects can either prevent stakeholders from withdrawing in
the first place, or use the penalties to help mitigate or recover from the withdrawal. The SLA
protects both the content provider and the content consumer. A constituent system in a SoS
wants to ensure that its context is protected from voluntary stakeholder withdrawals and
service disruptions. Similarly, it may want to discontinue providing services to other
constituent systems, if that service is causing other unintended interactions that are disrupting
the system context. The case of Wikileaks and the Amazon EC2 cloud highlights the
importance of the SLA in protecting the system in scenarios similar to the latter.
7.4.1.1 HIsTORICAL CASE: AMAZON & THE WIKILEAKS
On November 28, 2010, the website Wikileaks began to publish the first set of confidential
diplomatic cables from US embassies on its site, causing a diplomatic crisis in the United States
and front-page news across the world. After a set of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks on its Swedish servers, Wikipedia decided to move its servers to Amazon as part of their
EC2 cloud solutions. Almost immediately, WikiLeaks was subject to further DDoS attacks,
which Amazon proudly claimed to have thwarted. However, a few days after being contacted
by Senator Joseph Lieberman asking why the American-based company would host services for
a website that was illegally distributing stolen and confidential materials, Amazon voluntarily
terminated their contract with Wikileaks and stopped hosting their website (Benkler, 2011).
There were many speculations as to why Amazon had to do this, but Amazon claimed it was
because Wikileaks violated the SLA (Babcock, 2010). As part of the SLA between Amazon and
its customers, the customers agree not to host content that they do not legally own, nor post
content that could potentially harm someone. While these terms may seem quite vague,
Amazon had the legal right to terminate the arrangement and protect themselves from further
hacker attacks and unwanted Federal investigations.
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7.4.2 STOCKPILING
To perform an action, systems typically consume resources. At a minimum, some amount of
energy is always expended to perform work (at least from a physics perspective), so energy is
typical consumable. Energy is usually provided to systems in the form of direct AC/DC current,
batteries or fuel. Other common consumables include raw materials like iron and oxygen, as
well as money to pay salaries and purchase whatever is needed, when it is needed.
Unless the system is self-sufficient, consumables need to be acquired from external sources and
brought into the system context. However, due to a variety of perturbations, the system may
not be able to get the consumables as easily as expected. Fuel prices may rise dramatically,
external funding may be cut, or power may be unavailable, for example.
The ability to survive, despite disruptions in external sources of consumables, is often a number
one priority for many systems. In fact, for many living organisms, survival is almost exclusively
dependent on the ability to get energy from food sources to meet its daily demands. Similarly,
system architects should ensure that reserves of critical consumables are kept and made
available to mitigate perturbations in the global conditions, from affecting the system context.
This is known as stockpiling and has been used in many systems, in a variety of ways.
7.4.2.1 HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE
(SPR)
Oil is a vital resource for any industrialized nation and it is one of the most traded and volatile
commodities on the free market. The extraction, production, sale and transport of oil are truly
global endeavors that are subject to wide variety of contextual perturbations. Changes in
weather, environmental laws, politics, and economies all have had major impacts somewhere
along the supply chain.
Not surprisingly, the United States is the largest consumer of oil in the world, with an estimated
consumption of 18,690,000 bbl/day (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012b). Perhaps surprising to
some, the United States also produces 9,056,000 bbl/day, which makes it the third largest
producer globally. Clearly, like China, Japan, the UK, Germany and many other powerful
nations, the United States does not produce as much oil as it consumes, and must import oil
from other parts of the world. A quick glance at the top 10 oil exporters in the world (Table
7-2), shows that the most of the US's oil imports either come from the volatile Persian Gulf
region (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq) or from countries that not overly friendly to US
interests (Russia, Venezuela). For this reason, it is not surprising to think that something could
happen where these countries do not supply the level of oil that is needed for the US to
121
continue operating at a military or economic level that the government expects. Thus, one can
say that the US is not viable to its current expectations, without an adequate supply of oil.
TABLE 7-2: LIST OF TOP OIL EXPORTERS
(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 2012A)
Saudi Arabia 8,900,000 bbl/day 12007
Russia 5,430,000 bbl/day 2009
United Arab Emirates 2,700,000 bbl/day 2007
Iran 2,400,000 bbl/day 2010
Kuwait 2,349,000 bbl/day 2007
Nigeria 2,327,000 bbl/day 2007
Venezuela 2,182,000 bbl/day 2007
Norway 2,150,000 bbl/day 2009
Canada 2,001,000 bbl/day 2008
Iraq 1,910,000 bbl/day 2009
A catastrophe caused by a shortage of oil may be avoided in several ways. One way is to
increase internal oil production. The problem with this approach is that there is only a finite
amount of oil in the United States as well as an environmental impact that limits the oil
production. Other strategies, advocated by President Jimmy Carter in response to the 1979
energy crisis, are for Americans to reduce their energy consumption and for the United States
to discover alternate means of energy production (Carter, 1979). However, in the more than
30 years since that crisis, there have not been any major engineering breakthroughs that have
significantly reduced the United States dependence on oil and it is clear that there will be a
significant gap in oil consumption vs. production for the foreseeable future. Therefore, the
United States, for the time being, is dependent on oil imports and is subject then to external
perturbations as a result.
Although there are many causes (war, political pressure, environmental laws, oil spills, natural
disasters, etc.) there are two terminal events for the U.S. The first is that the cost of oil rises
beyond the critical threshold set by the stakeholders. At this point, Americans can no longer
afford the oil and either must take additional measures to continue the status quo (such as
borrowing money) or reduce their consumption. Changes in oil prices are common and a
critical rise in the price of oil is probably the most common threat. The second terminal event is
the supply of oil just does not meet the demand. If for some reason, there just are not enough
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barrels of oil available to satisfy the demand of the U.S., then the U.S. has a problem that
money cannot solve. The threat of there not being enough oil at all to meet demand is a much
more serious, but less likely event, at least for the near future. However, the amount of oil
available from fossil fuels is limited and this problem may in fact end up being very real in a
generation or two (Figure 7-6).
To reduce the impact of external perturbations on the supply of oil to the United States, the
American government has adopted two major strategies. First, the Carter Doctrine follows the
strategy of preemption by openly declaring that the US will use military force to protect its
national interests in the Persian Gulf region. This threat was a direct response to the energy
crisis caused by Iran hostage situation in 1979. The second strategy is the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR). According to the U.S. Department of Energy (www.fossil.energy.gov), the SPR is
the largest oil reserve in the world, capable of storing 727 million barrels of oil. Currently, the
SPR holds around 694 million barrels of oil, or about 95% of its capacity. At current US import
rates, this translates into a supply that would last 80 days.
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7.4.3 STRATEGY OF LEAST PRIVILEGE
For engineered systems to be viable, their components need to be able to interact and
influence each other, to some extent, and produce high-level behavior that provides benefit to
the stakeholders. Sometimes, however, components of a system can be influenced to perform
actions that threaten the viability of the overall system. This is particularly a problem in
systems of systems because of the independence and geographical separation of components.
For example, many systems of systems allow constituent systems to interact with each over the
Internet, or similar networks. These interactions are necessary; for example, Facebook would
not be viable without users being able to connect with each other through the Internet, but the
interactions can also result in disastrous consequences if not managed properly.
The strategy of least privilege (more commonly referred to as the principle of least privilege),
was first introduced by Saltzer and Schroeder (1975), and generally accepted as being a
fundamental principle to system security (Yee, 2003). It can be summarized as the following:
Constituent systems should only have the minimum privileges necessary to perform their
intended tasks. A privilege is the ability to influence the system in some way. Implementation
of the principle of least privilege can be most easily seen in computer systems where users are
assigned accounts based on what they need to do. Most users are provided with a basic
account, which restricts their privileges to simple tasks such as word processing, e-mail and
document printing. Typically, executing these tasks does not alter the system's operation for
other users. A select few users are given administrator rights that include the ability to alter
the system by installing and removing software components.
The principle of least privilege addresses two vulnerabilities that are particularly problematic
for systems of systems. The first obvious vulnerability includes attacks made by hostile entities
spoofing consistent systems, and performing nefarious actions within the SoS. This is a
problem due to the fact that systems of systems often have geographically separated
components, and the determination of whether an entity is within or outside the SoS is not
necessarily trivial. The second vulnerability is to accidental actions and unintended interactions
caused by legitimate users and other constituent systems with good intentions (Anderson &
Mutch, 2011).
To implement the principle of least privilege, there must be some sort of authentication where
the constituent systems identify themselves, and some level of restriction by which
unauthorized entities are prohibited from influencing, or compromising the SoS. The issue of
restricting certain entities from being able to change the system, is typically referred to as
security. Depending on the system, there numerous security strategies ranging from physical
locks and keys, to passwords, virtual firewalls and encryption (Stallings, 2003). However, there
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are no perfect solutions, and the ability to make a large system of systems completely secure,
particularly those that are open to the public such as Facebook, is non-trivial.
7.4.3.1 HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: DATA BREACH AT THE MASSACHUSETTS UNEMPLOYMENT
AGENCY
On April 20, 2011, a computer worm known as W32.QAKBOT infected as many as 1,500
computers in the Departments of Unemployment Assistance and Career Services at the
Massachusetts Unemployment Agency (MUA), stealing extremely sensitive personal
information such as addresses, social security numbers and bank information of potentially
hundreds of thousands of individuals and employers. Like many computer worms,
W32.QAKBOT has to be installed to run its nefarious instructions which requires administrator
rights, and could have been prevented by implementing the strategy of least privilege (McFee,
2011).
7.5 VIGILANCE
The boundaries between what is internal and external to a complex system, and systems of
systems in particular, are often not distinct. In many traditional systems, the components are
together inside a physical enclosure that clearly separates what is inside the system, from what
is outside. In highly complex systems, such as networks or power plants, something can be
inside the system, even though it is exogenous to it. A person may be walking around inside an
airport, interacting internally with various components of the system, before they board a
plane and depart. These hostile entities may harm the system once they are inside, unless the
principle of least privilege restricts their ability to do so. Passengers must always check in, show
ID and be subject to potential search. However, even after a passenger has been
authenticated, care must be taken to ensure that the authentication was not premature.
Terrorists, for example, may have slipped past previous authentication checkpoints for any
number of reasons. While they are waiting for their opportunity, however, they may appear as
simple passengers. Only when the opportunity presents itself, they may change their mode of
operation and expose themselves. Such was the case with the hijackers aboard the aircraft on
9/11, in which they passed by initial security measures at Logan and other airports, and
appeared perfectly normal right up until they initiated hostile action aboard the aircraft. It is
for this reason that many airports have multiple checkpoints where authentication is required
(Hogan, 2001).
Hostile actions are not limited to external entities, such as terrorists, thieves and hackers.
According to a survey done by InformationWeek, authorized users and employees are the
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sources of 64% of the security breaches that pose the greatest threat to small and medium-
sized businesses (Figure 7-7).
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FIGURE 7-7: SOURCES OF SECURITY BREACHES
(ROITER, 2011)
Since hostile actions may be taken by previously authorized entities at some later point, it is
important that a system practice the strategy of vigilance. Vigilance is defined as the ability to
continuously monitor internal interactions for operational violations.
7.5.1.1 EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY: APPLYING VIGILANCE TO THE MARSEC
The concept of vigilance can be demonstrated by the MarSec DES described in Chapter 2. In
the terrorist scenario, the terrorist ship appears as a fisherman when enters the AOI, typically
passing through the normal detection/identification phase as any other civilian ship would.
When the terrorist is close to the port, he/she speeds up and ignores coastal regulations on its
way to detonate a bomb in the port. If the MarSec is not vigilant, then by the time it notices
the infraction and sends a patrol boat to intercept, the terrorist has already reached the port
and detonated the bomb (a terminal event). However, the strategy of vigilance can be applied
where friendly vehicles heading to port are tracked by patrol boats after they have been
identified.
Performing a 2x2 DOE, where the vigilance strategy is applied against the control group, and
looking at both a light traffic (A = 11.25 ships / h) and heavy traffic (A = 22.5 ships / h) context,
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the following two contingency tables were generated after running each treatment 10,000
times Table 7-3, Table 7-4.
TABLE 7-3: CONTINGENCY TABLE OF BOMB DETONATION FOR LIGHT TRAFFIC
;. Jl SI IAIe 'I6
2783 7217 10000
6334 3666 10000
9117 10883 20000
TABLE 7-4: CONTINGENCY TABLE OF BOMB DETONATION FOR HEAVY TRAFFIC
: 0 11571111 * 1 * leil-iA *i : 1 Jill
1833 8167 10000
3756 6244 10000
5589 14411 20000
Graphing the results shows a strong difference in both contexts when the vigilance strategy is
applied (Figure 7-8). Using a Fisher exact t-test, there is a significant difference between the
vigilant strategy and the control in both the light traffic and heavy traffic contexts (p < 0.0001).
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FIGURE 7-8: RESULTS OF VIGILANCE STRATEGY ON THE MARSEC DES
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7.5.1.2 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REDUNDANCY, MARGIN, VIGILANCE, LAYERED DEFENSE.
The strategies of redundancy, margin, vigilance and layered defense may seem similar at first
and can be implemented together in various ways, but they are distinctly different. To illustrate
the difference, consider the scenario of an airport trying to avoid the terminal event of a
passenger boarding an aircraft with a gun. At the airport is a security clearance checkpoint,
where passengers have to pass through. There are numerous security mechanisms that the
airport can use, with varying levels of success (Table 7-5). Suppose a manual pat-down can
detect weapons on a passenger 90% of the time, and this is the minimum requirement
according to regulations. An x-ray machine has a 95% chance of detecting a weapon, but is
more expensive since it requires both equipment and an operator. When used together in
series, the pat-down and the x-ray machine is 99% effective at detecting weapons, and 97%
effective when used in parallel.
Margin. Although a manual pat-down would satisfy regulators currently, the airport decides to
use the x-ray machine for the 5% margin, just in case regulators decide to raise the minimum
threshold at a later date.
Physical redundancy. The airport decides to use two x-ray machines, so that if one fails, the
other can still provide adequate value. Note, having an additional x-ray machine at the security
point clearance does not improve the probability of detection over having a single x-ray
machine.
Functional redundancy. The x-ray machine is used as the means of detection, however if the x-
ray machine becomes unavailable for any reason, or if a passenger strongly opposes, there are
staff that can perform manual pat-downs on the passengers instead.
TABLE 7-5: HYPOTHETICAL DATA FOR SECURITY MECHANISMS AT AN AIRPORT
Manual Pat-down 9 UU/0
X-ray machine 95%
Two Manual Pat-Downs (serial) 97%
Two Manual Pat-Downs (parallel) 95%
X-ray machine and Manual Pat-Down (serial) 99%
X-ray machine and Manual Pat-Down (parallel) 97%
Two X-ray machines (serial) 95%
Two X-ray machines (parallel) 95%
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Margin & physical redundancy (Layered Defense). Two pat-down inspections in serial would be
an example of both margin and physical redundancy, however, it is important to note that in
this case, the margin itself is not redundant. The 97% success rate (2% margin) is only achieved
when both pat downs are performed. If either pat down is not performed, then the margin
disappears and the probability of detection falls to just 95% (the minimum).
Margin & functional redundancy (Layered Defense). Having an x-ray machine and a manual
pat-down provides both margin and functional redundancy, provided that both mechanisms
are functioning. Like physical redundancy, the margin is not redundant.
Vigilance. Before boarding the aircraft, a member of the crew performs a manual pat-down on
the passengers. From the perspective of the airline, this is considered vigilance because they
were protecting their own context within the SoS by not assuming that the passengers crossing
into their context were ok just because they were already in the secure part of the airport.
From the perspective of the airport, this is a strategy that could be considered redundancy, as
well as vigilance, since the inspection is done at a different time and place than the original
inspection. The distinction in time and area is important, since things could have changed since
the initial checkpoint. For example, a "passenger" may not even be a passenger at all, but
rather someone who used a back door and an employee accomplice to enter the secure area.
Another example would be that after passing the security checkpoint, the passenger may have
gone to a restroom, disassembled his laptop, phone and other electronic devices and created a
shank 3 from the bits of metal and glass.
7.6 DIVERSION
Some components are more vulnerable to certain perturbations than others. Often, this
vulnerability is constant, such as electronics being vulnerable to electrical surges, while in other
cases it is matter of circumstance, such as the influx of tasks exceeding a component's capacity.
In either case, if the perturbation cannot be avoided by the SoS, then the system should protect
the context of the vulnerable components by diverting the perturbation away. There are two
types of diversion strategies; redirection and deflection. If perturbations are generated
internally, as in the case with clients requesting operations from servers, then this strategy can
be considered redirection, where the constituent systems redirect their outputs away from
vulnerable (e.g. overworked) components. Part of the TCP/IP protocol includes TCP packet
3 Since prisoners are obviously prohibited from possessing traditional weapons, a shank is a prison term for a
make-shift knife, usually formed by filing a piece of scrap metal into a sharp blade.
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redirection where loads on servers are mitigated by redirecting packets (i.e. information
transmitted through the network) towards less utilized servers. If the perturbations originate
externally, then this strategy can be considered deflection. A classic example of defection is the
use of lightning rods on buildings to divert electrical energy away from critical components and
into the ground where it can dissipate safely. One of the most famous lightning rods it the
Empire State Building in New York. According to its official visitor website
(http://www.esbvisit.com/index.html, accessed November 25, 2012), the Empire State Building
is designed to serve as a lightning rod for the surrounding area and is struck by lightning about
100 times per year (Figure 7-9).
FIGURE 7-9: EMPIRE STATE BUILDING STRUCK BY LIGHTNING
7.6.1 HISTORICAL EXAMPLE: USING DECOYS IN WWII.
Military deception is just one method of deflecting perturbations away from critical systems.
Perhaps one of the greatest examples of diversion occurred during the Normandy Invasion of
1944. "Operation Titanic" involved the Royal Air Force (RAF) dropping hundreds of fake
paratroopers away from where the actual invasion was occurring (Vego, 2009). The deception
worked, as the dummies (Figure 7-10) successfully diverted German forces away from the
actual landings used by the British and Americans on D-Day (Barbier, 2007; Ramsey, 1995).
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FIGURE 7-10: DUMMY USED IN OPERATION TITANIC, 1944
7.6.1.1 EMPIRICAL CASE: APPLYING REDIRECTION TO THE MARSEC
As discussed in Section 6.4, the MarSec is similar to a queuing system, where each vehicle in the
MarSec acts like a server with its own service time for each task (i.e. detection, identification,
observation and interception). Under normal operations, the command center assigns tasks to
the vehicle that is closest to the target, regardless of whether it is busy. Unfortunately, this
means that the task has to wait for some finite period before the vehicle is available. If a string
of tasks, all in the same area arise, then it is possible that a significant queue will arise, resulting
in a potential perturbation. A new strategy of redirection was implemented, where the
command center assigns tasks to the nearest, non-busy vehicle. The strategy was implemented
for the SoS in Figure 6-2 and Figure 6-3, under both regular and heavy traffic conditions.
Compared with baseline SoS described in Section 6.4, the redirection strategy improves the
performance of under normal conditions (probability of ID = 0.972) , but more importantly
keeps the SoS viable when the heavy traffic disturbance is encountered (probability of ID = 0.
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FIGURE 7-11: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH REDIRECTION STRATEGY APPLIED TO SOS EXPERIENCING REGULAR TRAFFIC
Probability of ID [Redirection, High Traffic]
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FIGURE 7-12: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH REDIRECTION STRATEGY APPLIED TO SOS EXPERIENCING REGULAR TRAFFIC
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7.7 SUMMARY
Using the concept of local context and cause-effect mapping, eight additional strategies for
enabling viability were introduced in this chapter. All of the strategies were empirically
validated through historical cases, and two were also validated through the MarSec DES. In the
next chapter, problems associated with endogenous change will be discussed, and the need for
an "-ility" that restricts change, for the purpose of increasing viability, is described. Appendix A
summarizes the new viability strategies introduced in this chapter.
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8 ENDOGENOUS CHANGE
Up until this point, most of the perturbations that have been considered have been exogenous
in nature. In some cases, such as the development of the commitment strategy, it was
acknowledge that systems of systems in particular are never quite fully formed, and undergo a
considerable amount of internal changes during its lifetime. While the ability to change has
been identified in the literature as something to be desired, this chapter argues for the need to
restrict endogenous change by providing several historical examples of voluntary changes that
actually made the systems of systems they affected worse and not better.
It is likely that large-scale, complex systems will need to change at some point in their lifecycle,
particularly systems of systems that have numerous, diverse stakeholders and operate in
dynamic contexts.
There has been increasing research studying how, when and why systems need to change in
response to shifts in context (McManus and Hastings, 2006). In particular, research includes
areas such as:
e Designing latent capabilities that grant the ability to change at a later date (de Neufville
& Scholtes, 2011)
e The ability to change during operational phases (Gupta & Goyal, 1989)
* The ability to change easily / rapidly (McGaughey, 1999)
e The ability to change in size only (Elkins, Huang, & Alden, 2004)
The terms "flexible", "adaptable", "agile", and "modifiable" are some of the labels that have
been used to describe the ability to change. The ability to change, known as changeability
(Ross et al., 2008), is an important quality of a system that allows stakeholders to reduce the
impact of uncertainty of future contexts. Changeability addresses the issue of being able to
change, but it does not specify anything about the change itself. What type of change occurs?
Who performs the change? How quickly does the system change? Researchers have defined
and used other change-related "ilities", such as "agility", "flexibility" and "adaptability" in the
literature to address specific change-related properties that answer some of these questions.
Unfortunately, these terms are not well defined in the literature (McManus & Hastings, 2006).
This makes it very difficult for stakeholders to communicate the properties that they desire, and
for architects to know that they have met those requirements (Ross, Beesemyer, & Rhodes,
2011). For the purposes of this dissertation, the definitions in Table 8-1 are used.
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TABLE 8-1: DEFINITION OF VARIOUS "-ILITIES"
The ability of a system to maintain value delivery (Ross & Rhodes, 2008a)in spite of changes in contexts or needs
The ability of a system to maintain its level and (de Weck, Ross, & Rhodes, 2012;
onset of specification parameters in the context of Ross, et al., 2008)
changing system external and internal forces
The ability of a system to alter its form, and (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
aconsequently possibly its function, or operations, Ross, et al., 2008)
at an acceptable level of resource expenditure
The ability of a system to be changed by a system- (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
external change agent with intent Ross, et al., 2008)
DAYThe ability of a system to be changed by a system- (de Weck, et al., 2012;
internal change agent with intent Ross, et al., 2008)
The ability of a architecture to be inherited and Rhoes, 21; de Weck, Ross, et
changed across generations (over time) a., 2012)
The ability of a system to minimize the impact of a (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
finite duration disturbance on value delivery Richards, 2009)
The ability of a system to satisfy diverse needs for (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
the system without having to change form Ross, et al., 2011)(measure of latent value)
The ability of a system to change the current level (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
of a system specification parameter Ross, et al., 2008)
The ability of a system to change the current set (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
of system specification parameters Ross, et al., 2008)
The ability of a system to effectively interact with (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
other systems Ross, et al., 2011)
The ability of a system to change its configuration (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
(component arrangement and links) Ross & Rhodes, 2011)
The ability of a system to change in a timely (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012;
fashion Ross, et al., 2011)
The ability of a system to accommodate new (de Weck, Ross, et al., 2012)features after design
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Change-based "-ilities" are increasingly realized as desirable properties in systems (McManus,
Richards, Ross, & Hastings, 2007). However, not all changes are positive and implementing the
strategy of least privilege (Section 7.4.3) requires that restrictions are placed on what can
change, and who can perform those changes. Most of the definitions in Table 8-1 seem to
encourage change in various forms and none specifically address the issue of controlling
endogenous change (although value robustness and survivability indirectly do by discussing
value impact in general).
There are many types of change to consider, but they can be broadly categorized into
intentional changes and unintentional changes.
Intentional Changes. Intentional changes are those that decision makers choose to execute,
often in response to a shift in context or stakeholder needs. An example of an intentional
change would be if airline engineers added AC power ports to all the seats in an existing aircraft
to keep up with market demand. Intentional changes are typically the types of changes
described by researchers when they discuss changeability, flexibility, agility and other types of
change-related system properties. However, the concept of "intentional" changes should be
clarified further than has traditionally been the case. Sometimes, decision makers may want to
implement a change to improve value delivery, but end up reducing it instead. This is because
as the system complexity grows, and as more changes are made to the system, it becomes
increasingly difficult to verify and validate the effects that changes will have. Sometimes, the
original architects and engineers who designed the system and really understood the CONOPs
may no longer be available to evaluate impacts of planned changes. Subtle assumptions that
were not made explicit, may be violated with any new changes and could prove to be not only
disastrous, but difficult to find until it is too late. This is particularly a problem with systems of
systems that have autonomous constituent systems with emergent behavior that is notoriously
difficult to model. The larger the system, or the more expensive, or the more stakeholders
involved, the likelihood of someone wanting to accept responsibility for any one particular
change decreases. Thus, there may be a substantial bureaucratic process involved for any
complex system that makes it extremely time-consuming and costly for all but trivial changes to
be made. This "red tape" can seriously impair the ability of the system to respond quickly to
changes in context, especially if it takes years to approve any significant changes.
Unintentional Changes. Unintentional changes are those that the system is "forced" to
undergo, that is, changes that occur whether the decision makers want them to or not. Some
unintentional changes just happen without any intervention or "approval" from the
stakeholders. A collision with a bird may cause an engine to malfunction, or a power outage
may cause a monitoring system to fail. Other unintentional changes happen after decision
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makers authorize them, but only because they have to, in response to some other event
beyond their control. A labor strike may force a city's engineers to shut down the subway, or a
new environmental regulation may cause a chemical plant to replace certain older equipment
with newer, more environmentally-friendly models. Since unintended changes are likely to be
problematic, system architects typically try to minimize their causes and effects as much as
possible. Unintentional changes that are the result of endogenous forces, such as random
component failure, are the focus of reliability engineering (Leveson, 1995), whereas system
survivability and robustness strive to prevent, mitigate and recover from unintended changes
caused by exogenous forces such as lightning strikes and resource shortages.
8.1.1 CHANGE CAUSING LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS To FAIL
Three recent examples of endogenous changes causing large-scale systems of systems to fail
are briefly discussed below.
8.1.1.1 HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE NEW ORLEANS EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICE
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southeast Louisiana, causing one of the
deadliest and most expensive disasters in North American history. Normally, local emergency
services for a particular area belong to a system of systems that is coordinated through a
central dispatch (i.e. "911"). However, when Hurricane Katrina struck, the efforts of all of these
independent services, with their own personnel, vehicles, communication systems and
supporting equipment, were to be coordinated and supervised by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) (Figure 8-1). Although FEMA was intended to improve emergency
response, the change in management of the independent services had the opposite effect. The
poor emergency response that the police, fire and ambulance provided in the aftermath of
Katrina was widely condemned by the media and led to the resignation of FEMA director
Michael Brown (Stevenson, 2005).
8.1.1.2 GPS DISPATCH UPGRADE TO TAIWAN TAXICAB SERVICES
In 2001, Comfort Cabs of Singapore updated their taxicab dispatch system from radio-paging to
satellite-based GPS with great success, improving both accuracy and productivity of its taxicab
network (Liao, 2003). Since Taipei is similar in size and traffic to Singapore, Taiwan Taxi
Company assumed that switching to a GPS-based dispatch would be equally successful.
However, when the upgrade was made, a large number of the independent Taiwanese taxicab
operators rejected the new dispatch system. Although Taiwan Taxi expected to attract more
than 20,000 operators to sustain the company by the fourth year, they were only able to attract
7,000 members during an 8 year span (2001 to 2009) (Hsiao, Compeau, & Hou, 2010).
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FIGURE 8-1: HURRICANE KATRINA RESCUE OPERATIONS, NEW ORLEANS, 2005
8.1.1.3 COMPUTER AIDED DISPATCH AND THE LONDON AMBULANCE SERVICE
The London Ambulance Service is the largest free to patient ambulance services in the UK,
responding to over 1.5 million calls a year in the London Area. On October 29, 1992, a new
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) was introduced to optimize ambulance allocation and reduce
wait times. Overloaded with calls and working with imperfect information, the CAD system
failed to dispatch ambulances in a timely manner and was blamed by the media for as many as
30 deaths (Long, 2009). It was removed several days later, in what became one of the most
well-known examples of large-scale IT project failures in history (Beynon-Davies, 1999).
The Taiwan Taxi Company, London Ambulance, and Hurricane Katrina emergency are examples
of system of systems that failed to provide acceptable value to stakeholders after changes were
made. These systems of systems were composed of geographically disperse, socio-technical,
independent constituent systems, that collaborative together to achieve some overall mission
objectives and/or mutual benefit. In the Hurricane Katrina example, the SoS failed when it was
forced to change management CONOPs in response to context changes brought about by the
hurricane. In the Taiwan Taxicab Company and London Ambulance situations, the systems of
systems failed when the stakeholders voluntarily decided to make endogenous changes to take
advantage of some new technology.
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8.2 ENDOGENOUS CHANGE WITHIN THE MARSEC
The MarSec is complex system that can change in many ways, through form and CONOPs, at
the system and SoS level. In terms of form, the number of vehicles that make up the MarSec
can vary between some minimum necessary to achieve the necessary task throughput, to some
maximum defined by the space in the hangers and docks. This is an example of a SoS-level
change. At the system level, the actual vehicles themselves can change from manned to
unmanned, and from one payload type to another. The CONOPs can change as well, such as
whether the vehicles operate in a mechanistic (i.e. specialize in one task) or organic (i.e.
perform multiple tasks) manner. However, as with any complex system, care must be taken
before any change is attempted, for there are many details and interactions that may be
critical, but not salient.
An example of the need for restricting change in the MarSec would be the following. Suppose
that the MarSec consisted of several large, medium-range UAVs that had a communication
range that spanned the entire AOI. A command center in the middle of the AOI assigns tasks to
the UAVs via a wired connection to the ground control stations. Suppose at some time after
the MarSec has been designed and implemented, a political opportunity arises to exchange
UAVs with another government agency. Instead of replacing them with the same UAVs, the
new owners of the MarSec decide to "upgrade" the SoS by changing the UAVs into smaller,
swarms of tactical UAVs. The tactical UAVs are faster, cheaper and have just as good a payload,
and do not require the use of a command center to coordinate task assignment. The
disadvantage is that their line-of-sight (LOS) range is only half of what the old, larger UAVs had.
To get around this issue, the owners decided to split the AOI into two zones (Figure 8-2) and
have half of the UAVs operate in one zone and half in the other.
The CONOPs makes sense on paper, so the owners decide to move ahead and make the
"upgrade". Unfortunately, without realizing all of the details surrounding the original design
and context, the new system fails. The reason it fails is because the process of detection,
identification and interception is a linear process (i.e. first detection occurs, then identification,
then interception if necessary) and the target ships are moving through the AOI as it occurs. If
the ship makes it to the midway point of the AOI, they then cross into the other zone. Although
there in intra-swarm communications between the UAVs, there is no inter-swarm
communication since they do not have the range to traverse the entire AOI. If there is no
communication sharing between the two swarms of UAVs, then any information about a target
that crosses the zone change line will be lost and the new swarm will have to start the process
at the first step of detection. This means that for certain fast ships, and busy contexts, an
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unacceptable number of ships will be able to make it through each sub-zone, and hence the
entire AOl, before the entire process can be completed by either swarm of UAVs.
FIGURE 8-2: SCREENSHOT OF MARSEC SOS DES SHOWING TWO DISTINCT ZONES SEPARATED BY A WHITE DIVIDING LINE
This change, as well as those described in the case studies mentioned in this chapter, should
not have been allowed by the architects who designed the systems in the first place. The
stakeholders did not understand the complexity of the systems, and what should have been
positive upgrades, ended up making the systems unviable. In the next chapter, a new "ility" is
defined that sets limits on endogenous change and actually increases viability as a result.
8.3 SUMMARY
This chapter showed that while changeability is often a desirable and even necessary quality for
a system to have, it is difficult for decision makers to know whether their changes will have
unintended consequences, perhaps many years after the original system has been built.
Several historical examples of spectacular failures are presented in this chapter to highlight that
systems of systems are particularly vulnerable to this problem. In the next chapter, the concept
of pliability will be introduced, which is an "ility" that both facilitates and restricts a system's
ability to change.
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9 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND PLIABILITY
In the previous chapter, several examples of harmful endogenous changes were shown, where
the stakeholders had good intent, but ended up harming the system instead of improving it. In
this chapter, a new "ility" is introduced that sets limits on the amount of change that systems
will be allowed to undergo. To help define this "ility", and clarify what is meant by "allowed",
the idea of a system architecture is necessary.
9.1 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The Department of Defense defines system architecture as a framework or structure that
portrays relationships among all the elements of the system (Department of Defense, 2008a).
Crawley (2004) defines system architecture as the description of the components of a system
and the relationships between them. In this sense, the system architecture includes both what
the system is composed of, and how these components work together. At a minimum, the
system architecture should describe the functional behavior of the system, i.e. which tasks the
components perform, as well as when and how the tasks are executed, similar to the Capability
and Operational Views found in the Department of Defense Architectural Framework 2.0
(Department of Defense, 2010). For simple systems, the emergent behavior of the system is
often predictable from the system architecture, through aggregating the functional behaviors
of the components. For more complex systems, emergent behavior is more difficult to predict
and the primary technical role and responsibility of a system architect is to ensure that the
interconnections of the components achieve the necessary "system functions" to meet the
overall purpose (Maier & Rechtin, 2000).
Although there are several definitions already in the literature, for the purposes of this
dissertation, system architecture is defined as a collection of components and an associated
concept of operations (CONOPs), whose instances provide some value, within a particular
context. The terms components, CONOPs and instances are described below.
9.1.1 COMPONENTS
The components of a system architecture describe what the system architecture is composed
of. The components include a description of all the Operational Elements (OEs) that perform,
or could perform some function, as well as any additional entities that belong to the system.
OEs are defined by their properties and capabilities. Properties are the physical characteristics
of the components, such as length, mass and color. The capabilities describe the functional
behavior that the OEs can perform, such as fly, transmit data, or store energy. The capabilities
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describe what the OEs can do, but not necessarily what they actually do. Unused capabilities
are latent capabilities, representing potential value in the system architecture. For example, a
UAV may be able to relay communications to other vehicles, however in cases where it is
performing solo missions, this capability is not used.
9.1.2 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
The Concept of Operations (CONOPs) describes what the system does. Specifically, the CONOPs
describes the tasks that the OEs perform, as well as the logic for how the OEs perform these
tasks, within a particular context. While some definitions of CONOPs assume that operators are
external to the system, this definition includes operators as part of the system (in fact, they are
considered OEs). Thus, the actions the operators perform within the system are part of the
CONOPs, as well as the actions of other OEs.
Tasks. All systems do something, and that something can be referred to as tasks. Tasks can be
broadly defined, such as "perform maritime surveillance" or they can be specific, such as
"accelerate vehicle to 93.7 mph". Typically, broadly defined tasks are broken up into a set of
smaller, specific sub-tasks. Each of these sub-tasks can then be further broken down into more
specific sub-tasks. Typically, broader tasks have multiple OEs involved in performing those
tasks, while lower-level sub-tasks are often performed by a single OE.
Logic: Merely specifying a set of tasks will not be sufficient to describe the manner by which the
system achieves its purpose. Additional information, in the form of logic, must be specified as
well.
" Order. The tasks must be given an order in which they are performed. Order does not
have to be strict, as some tasks may be performed concurrently or even randomly.
e Task Assignment. The logic of the CONOPs specifies which OEs perform which task.
Sometimes the output from one OE becomes the input to another OE. Specifying which
OE performs a task is especially important when multiple OEs share the same
capabilities, such as one might expect in a complex SoS.
" Conditions. Many tasks have conditions associated with their execution. Conditions may
exist to determine whether a task gets performed at all. Conditions may also specify
how a task gets executed. For example, if a hostile, anti-aircraft gun is present in the
area, a UAV will fly at a higher altitude than it normally would. Other common
conditions include starting and stopping conditions for tasks that are not being
performed continuously.
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9.1.3 INSTANCES
In many system architectures, there will be fixed and variable parameters. In a certain
maritime security SoS architecture, as an example, the system architects may deem four patrol
boats, six manned helicopters and two ground radar towers as fixed parameters. This means
that any marine security SoS that adheres to this system architecture must have these
components. Similarly, the architects may specify a certain CONOPs as fixed as well, such as
the fact that the radar towers perform detection, the helicopters perform identification, and
the patrol boats perform boarding. However, the architects may include some variability in the
components and/or CONOPs specified in a system architecture, to satisfy a diverse set of
environments and/or stakeholder preferences. For example, in the same maritime SoS, the
system architecture may also require UAVs. The UAVs may be either short-range or long-range
and there may be a command center or not. The CONOPs may also vary as well. For example,
the tasks may be shared amongst the UAVs in a distributed authority manner, or they may be
assigned via a central authority. Another CONOPs parameter is whether to separate the AOl
into one or two zones and split the SoS accordingly.
Due to the variability in some of the parameters, most system architectures can allow systems
to have different sets of components and CONOPs. A design is a specific set of components
(known as its form) and a specific CONOPs (known as its mode of operation) that belongs to a
system architecture. Thus,
Dij = [Fi, MOj] (1)
where D;; is the design consisting of the ith form specified in the set of components and the jth
mode of operations specified in the CONOPs of some particular system architecture. In this
maritime security SoS example, there are 16 possible designs (4 different variables to be
specified, at 2 levels each).
A design is still conceptual and it only exists as an idea. However, a system is an actual physical
realization of a design that provides value to stakeholders. To clarify the difference between
system, design and system architecture, three types of system architectures will be examined;
the Apple iPhone, the Nimitz class aircraft carrier and the International Space Station.
9.1.3.1 APPLE IPHONE AND SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES OF MASS PRODUCED SYSTEMS
The Apple iPhone is a system architecture consisting of core components (touchscreen, RAM,
communication technology, etc.) and a CONOPs (what happens when a button is pressed, how
the phone doubles as a MP3 player, etc.). The iPhone 4 and 4S are similar, but they are
different architectures. The 4S has an upgraded communications technology, as well as better
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camera, and it supports voice-activated commands via Sir. It is also important to point out that
there is no official (i.e. Apple approved) way of turning a 4 into a 4S or vice versa. As of 2012 in
the United States, iPhone 4S comes in three different forms on three different cell phone
carriers. The forms are 16GB/32GB/64GB RAM and the carriers are AT&T/Sprint/Verizon.
Although the hardware is the same, an iPhone 4S behaves differently depending on the
network technology that the carriers use. Currently, AT&T uses an advanced HSPA network,
while Sprint and Verizon use an older EVDO network. Due to the differences in the networks, a
user can make a phone call and surf the Internet simultaneously on an AT&T iPhone 4S, but
cannot with a Sprint or Verizon iPhone 4S. The iPhones 4S are "locked" to a particular carrier,
meaning that a Sprint iPhone 4S cannot be used on an AT&T network, unless it is "unlocked" by
Sprint - a process that is possible, but not always available to the consumers.
There are millions of iPhone 4/4S systems in the US, each with their own unique serial number.
However, each one of the iPhone 4/4S cell phones in the US is an instance of one of the designs
shown in Table 9-1. Even though many iPhones are identical in design, they are not the same
system, just as two identical twins are not the same person. However, two systems with the
exact same design can be considered equivalent.
TABLE 9-1: THE 18 UNIQUE DESIGNS OF THE APPLE IPHONE 4S IN THE US, 2012
DESIGN R AM 
N ETWORK
(FORM) (MODE OF OPERATION)
1 16GB AT&T HSPA
2 32GB AT&T HSPA
3 64GB AT&T HSPA
4 16GB Sprint EVDO
5 32GB Sprint EVIDO
6 64GB Sprint EVIDO
7 16GB Verizon EVDO
8 32GB Verizon EVDO
9 64GB Verizon EVDO
9.1.3.2 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES OF LARGE, COMPLEX SYSTEMS
For mass produced systems such as an iPhone, it is unusual and impractical to have only a single
instance for a given design. However, for larger and more complex systems, it is far more likely
that systems are unique instances of a particular design. For example, a Nimitz-class aircraft
carrier is the system architecture of which the USS Ronald Reagan, USS Theodore Roosevelt and
USS Carl Vinson ships belong. While these carriers adhere to the same system architecture,
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there are some differences that make them unique. While the USS Ronald Reagan carries 2
RIM-7 Sea Sparrow and 2 RIM-116 missile systems, the USS Theodore Roosevelt carries 3 RIM-7
Sea Sparrow missile systems and 3 Phalanx anti-ship, Close-In Weapon (CIWS) systems. In the
extreme case, there may only be one instance of a particular system architecture in existence,
so the system, design and architecture are all the same. Such is the situation with the
International Space Station (Table 9-2) or Facebook.
One of the primary differences between smaller, mass-produced systems and larger, unique
systems of systems is the viability expectations in regards to the systems lifespan. A mass
produced smartphone, for example, is probably only expected to be viable for several years
before it is completely replaced by a new model. A larger SoS like Facebook, however, may be
expected to last indefinitely, even if its individual constitute systems (users, servers, source
code) gets replaced several times over. The longer a system is expected to exist, the harder it
will be for its original system architecture to remain viable since it will be very difficult to
architects to predict so far into the future during the design stage. For this reason, longer
lasting systems should probably be changeable and/or versatile to be able to meet new
demands. However, care must be taken to ensure that those changes do not violate the
existing concept of operations and make the system unviable overall.
TABLE 9-2: EXAMPLES OF SYSTEMS, DESIGNS AND SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES.
(ADAPTED FROM BEESEMYER, 2012)
iPhone Aircraft Carrier Space Station
[iPhone 4, iPhone 4S] [Nimitz, Enterprise, Ford]
[Black/White,
16GB/32GB/64GB, International Space
AT&T, Sprint, Verizon] [USS Ronald Reagan, USS Station
Brian's iPhone. Theodore Roosevelt, USSCarl Vinson]
SYTM (Black, 64GB, Sprint
version)
9.2 PLIABILITY
The English word pliable is defined as "capable of being bent or flexed or twisted without
breaking" (WordNet, 2011). For systems engineering, pliability can be defined as "the ability of
a system to change, without breaking its system architecture". The pliable set, is the set of all
validated designs that can be transitioned to, within a system architecture. Thus, we can write
that for system architecture X:
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Pliable set of X = { D3 1 .. , Dnm 1 (3)
where n is the number of sets of components and m is the number of modes of operation
specified in the form and CONOPs respectively of that system architecture.
9.2.1 ARCHITECTURE AND INSTANCE TRANSITIONS
Pliability is the property of a system to be able to switch to other viable instances, specified by
the architecture's pliable set. If a system architecture has multiple allowable designs, then a
system is always an instance of one of these designs at any time t, and can transition to the
other instances defined in the pliable set of its system architecture, while remaining the same
system. If a system transitions to an instance outside of its system architecture, then it
becomes an unapproved system. Whether this new system will be viable is unknown (at best),
since it does not belong to the set of viable instances, defined by the architects responsible for
its value delivery. Thus, it is usually in the best interest of the architects and decision makers
not to let systems change into instances outside of their system architecture.
9.2.1.1 VIABLE DESIGNS AND ALLOWABLE TRANSITIONS
Any design that is part of the pliable set for a system architecture is viable, meaning that the
system architects have approved that particular instance. A viable design is one whose
instances provide acceptable value to the stakeholders. In the maritime security SoS example
described earlier, there were four parameters in the system architecture (UAV Range, Presence
of Command Center, Number of Zones, Authority) with each parameter being two levels for a
total of 16 possible designs. However, not all 16 designs are viable. Obviously, the central
authority CONOPs requires a command center component to which the detection and
identification information is sent, and from which the orders are given. Therefore, all designs
that specify a central authority CONOPs, must also include a command center in the form. In
addition, since the AOI is too large, short range UAVs cannot effectively communicate with each
other if they are located at opposite ends of the AOI. Therefore, a distributed authority with
two zones is not viable. Removing these unviable designs, leaves 10 possible designs (Table
9-3).
An allowable transition is one where the switch from one design to another is allowed by the
system architects. There are a number of reasons why a system transition may not be allowed
by the system architects. A system's ability to transition to other systems is referred to as
system changeability (Ross, 2006). Changeability is affected by a number of factors including
stakeholder support and cost. A laptop computer can be turned into a fighter jet, step-by-step,
given infinite time, resources and stakeholder support. The question of whether system
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architects would allow such a transition would likely depend on the answer to the following
questions: Is there enough time to transition from a laptop to a fighter jet? Is the cost of
transition (probably at least the cost of building a fighter jet from scratch) worth it? Does it
matter if none of the original laptop components are used in the final fighter jet design (i.e.
they all get removed or replaced at some stage in the transition)? Does it matter whether or
not the intermediate stages between the original laptop and the final fighter jet are still viable
systems themselves?
TABLE 9-3: VIABLE DESIGNS FOR THE MARITIME SECURITY SOS EXAMPLE
4 Long-Range UAVs, No Command Center 1 1 Zone, Distributed Authority
D12  1 4 Long-Range UAVs, No Command Center 2 2 Zones, Distributed Authority
D21  2 4 Long-Range UAVs, Command Center 1 1 Zone, Distributed Authority
D2 2  2 4 Long-Range UAVs, Command Center 2 2 Zones, Distributed Authority
D2 3  2 4 Long-Range UAVs, Command Center 3 1 Zones, Central Authority
D2 4  2 4 Long-Range UAVs, Command Center 4 2 Zones, Central Authority
D3 2  3 8 Short-Range UAVs, No Command Center 2 2 Zones, Distributed Authority
D4 2  4 8 Short-Range UAVs, Command Center 2 2 Zones, Distributed Authority
D4 3  4 8 Short-Range UAVs, Command Center 3 1 Zone, Central Authority
D4 4  4 8 Short-Range UAVs, Command Center 4 2 Zones, Central Authority
Although there are 10 viable designs in the maritime security SoS example above, not all
designs may be reachable from all other designs. Determining which designs are reachable
from other designs, is how the system architects define the pliable sets and the system
architectures. Going from a command center to no command center is trivial, however going
from no command center to a command center is not, if the command center is not already
available. Similarly, transitioning from long-range to short-range UAVs and vice versa, can be
costly if acquiring and preparing the vehicles require a significant cost. The CONOPs transitions
are typically much easier, although there may be a non-trivial cost associated with re-training.
Due to the inability to transition from the no-command center designs to the command center
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designs, as well as the inability to transition between the different types of UAVs, there are
actually four pliable sets here, as shown in Figure 9-1.
Each pliable set in Figure 9-1 defines a different architecture. Note than system architecture X
is a subset of system architecture A, while system architecture Y is a subset of system
architecture B. The reason why X is distinct from A, and Y is distinct from B, is simply that
systems which start as designs in X or Y will never be able to transition out of X or Y, and thus
there is no point validating any other instances in A or B.
9.2.2 NON-PLIABLE TRANSITIONS
If a system changes in ways allowed by its system architecture, then this is a pliable change and
something that is allowed, if the context change requires it. This is one of the main attractions
of having a pliable system. However, if the new instance is not allowed by the system
architecture, then this change can be considered a "hack". Sometimes hacks work, such as
when users "jailbreak" their Apple iPhone 4S to run on unauthorized networks. Sometimes,
however, the hacks fail to work, primarily due to the complexity of the system and the fact that
the changes were never considered or approved by those who were responsible for building it
in the first place. In some cases, non-pliable changes can result in a system that becomes a
design of a different system architecture, if such an architecture is already defined, or requires
a new system architecture to be defined. This is a more serious change that often requires
stakeholder approval and input from system architects. If the new system architecture is
validated by the system architects, then, like pliability, this type of transition is a special case of
changeability known as evolvability (Beesemyer, Ross, & Rhodes, 2012).
System Architecture A System Architecture B
System Architecture X System Architecture Y
FIGURE 9-1: THE PLIABLE SETS OF THE MARITIME SECURITY SOS EXAMPLE
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Another type of system transition is degradation. This type of transition is when the system
changes in a way that deviates from any design within the system architecture and fails to
provide value accordingly. For example, losing one of the four Long-Range UAVs in system
architecture A would result in a degraded system, since there were no designs that have only
three Long-Range UAVs. For the system to return to viability, it would need to replace the UAV
and restore the system to its original system architecture, or transition to some other design
that is viable through adaptation. Figure 9-2 shows the types of transitions discussed in this
section.
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FIGURE 9-2: SYSTEM TRANSITIONS
9.2.3 ARCHITECTURE TRANSITIONS AND VIABILITY
Survivability requires the effective handling of change within systems, either by preventing,
mitigating or recovering from unwanted change caused by perturbations, or intentionally
changing in response to new contexts. By requiring that systems be pliable, viability can be
increased in three different ways; (1) By requiring system architects to go through a design
cycle that explores the limits of their systems, (2) by increasing the number of viable instances
that system can transition to, and (3) pre-validating change options to reduce the time and
effort required for stakeholders to approve changes, allowing them to be implemented quicker
and easier. These benefits are discussed below:
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9.2.3.1 DISTURBANCE DISCOVERY AND THE PLIABILITY DESIGN CYCLE.
In defining the pliability of systems, the architects must specify what is allowed to be
changeable within the system, which means they must provide some guarantee that such
changes will not adversely harm its value delivery. To do this, they need to examine the
parameters within the system architecture, both in components and in CONOPs, to see what
can vary, what can't, and what the limits should be. This exercise forces architects to think
about the causes and effects of change within their system, perhaps at a level they normally
would not have. In the maritime security example, system architects would have to determine
how many UAVs the SoS would support. This is because it is possible that some disturbance
may cause UAVs to be unavailable, or perhaps an increase in traffic would necessitate adding
additional vehicles to meet the demand. In this example, they might realize that due to
bandwidth constraints, the maximum number of UAVs would be 12. At this point, they can
analyze whether these constraints will satisfy their value robustness requirements. What
conditions would have to exist for the system to need more than 12 UAVs? Similarly, what is
the likelihood, given labor shortages, bad weather, random component failures, and other
disturbances, that the SoS may find itself with less than 4 Long-Range UAVs or 8 Short-Range
UAVs? What is the minimum number of UAVs required to continue to provide acceptable
value? In an iterative fashion, as more disturbances and change agents are considered, changes
in a candidate architecture are made, which lead to an expansion or reduction in the pliable set,
from which feasible systems are evaluated. Thus, the process of defining an architecture and
its pliable set becomes a cycle (Figure 9-3), where system architectures and systems are
analyzed in the presence of disturbances and change agents, through the concept of pliability.
FIGURE 9-3: SYSTEM CYCLE FOR PLIABILITY
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9.2.3.2 INCREASING AVAILABLE OPTIONS
If a system is pliable, this means it can change (to some extent) and still maintain acceptable
performance under the original contexts considered. Survivability is increased automatically as
the pliable set of a system architecture expands, simply because the outcome system state of
an unintentional change is more likely to be contained within the pliability of the system it
affects. Returning to the maritime security example, design D23 in system architecture A is
more survivable than design D11 in system architecture X, simply because of the availability of
the command center and the central authority CONOPs. If anything happens to the command
center, or if the central authority CONOPs becomes unviable, then an instance of D23 can just
transition into D21 or D11. However, if a perturbation suddenly makes the distributed CONOPs
unviable (for instance, if there is a security breach and a hostile entity gets the ability to spoof
UAV-to-UAV communications), then an instance of D11 cannot transition to any other viable
designs and thus a system that is part of that system architecture will be unviable for that
particular perturbation.
Disturbances may break the architecture of a particular system by altering one of the fixed
parameters, or by forcing a parameter to go outside its pliable range. Since the system was not
designed to operate outside of its architecture, there is a risk that the disturbance will not be
survivable if the new, architecture non-conforming, instance is not viable. In this situation, the
system needs to either return to its original architecture through repair or replacement, or
adapt to a new, viable system architecture. In other cases, disturbances may not break a
system architecture, but instead change the context in such a way that the system will not be
survivable unless it adapts to a new, viable system architecture (Table 9-4).
TABLE 9-4: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR DEALING WITH DISTURBANCES
EFFECT OF DISTURBANCE RECOMMENDED ACTION
Changes a system's parameters that violate the Repair system to original SA, validate new SA, or
pliability of SA change to an alternative, viable SA
Changes context so current SA not producing value Change SA
Change context so current system not producing Change system instance
value
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9.2.3.3 INCREASING AGILITY
By pre-validating reachable instances during architecting, the amount of approval necessary for
changes after design should decrease. This reduces the "red tape" and allows systems leverage
their pliability, allowing them to respond quicker to context shifts, increasing the ability for a
system to change quickly (i.e. increasing agility (McGaughey, 1999) in response to changes in
context).
9.3 PLIABILITY STRATEGIES FOR ENABLING VIABILITY
Using the concept of pliability, several new strategies for viability can be developed. These
strategies attempt to reduce the risk associated with making a large transition., by being able to
transition into viable instances that are not necessarily the instances that the system is
intending to transition to. Using the legend shown in Figure 9-4, the following pliability
strategies are defined:
Strategy of Reversion: Being able to revert back to an instance within the pliable set, in case
new system does not provide acceptable value (Figure 9-5).
Strategy of Stable Intermediate Instances: Transitioning to a less-risky instance within the
pliable set, before attempting to transition to a higher-risk instance, in case the system never
makes the full transition (Figure 9-6).
Strategy of Contingency. Transitioning to an instance within the pliable set that is intermediate
between what the system was, and what it was trying to be, in case the new system does not
provide acceptable value (Figure 9-7).
LegendO Within System New System
Architecture Architecture
Outside of System Degraded, Same
Architecture System Architecture
FIGURE 9-4: LEGEND USED FOR FIGURES 9-5, 9-6 AND 9-7
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FIGURE 9-5: STRATEGY OF REVERSION FIGURE 9-6: STABLE INTERMEDIATEINSTANCES FIGURE 9-7: STRATEGY OF CONTINGENCY
9.4 PLIABILITY AND OTHER CHANGE-RELATED "ILITIES"
At first glance, pliability may seem to be the same as some other "ilities" already used such as
"flexibility", "modifiability" or "adaptability". The following is a description of how pliability is
related to, but distinct from, the other "ilities" as defined in Table 8-1.
Value robustness. Pliability is only concerned with changes in the system, and whether such
changes are allowed under the SA. Implicit in the specification of "allowable under the SA" is
the concept of value robustness. Pliable systems that undergo an allowable transition will retain
value robustness for contexts that were considered in the design of the SA. Pliability does not
guarantee value robustness in contexts that were not considered in the design of the SA,
regardless of whether the system transition was allowable or not.
Modifiability. Pliability requires either modifiability or scalability, i.e. the parameter can
change in some way. However, a system may be modifiable in a parameter beyond what is
included in the pliable range.
Changeability. A system must be changeable to be pliable, but does not have to be pliable to be
changeable. Pliability requires that the transition to a new system is possible (i.e. the system is
changeable), but also that the new system is part of the same system architecture (not a
requirement for changeability). In this way, changeability is more general than pliability.
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Adaptability. Pliable systems need to be changeable, but they do not need to be changeable by
an internal change agent. A system that is changeable only by an external agent can also be
pliable.
Flexibility. Pliable systems need to be changeable, but they do not need to be changeable by
an external change agent (an internal change agent will do), nor does the agent need intent.
Pliable systems can transition to other systems by accident (e.g. as the result of a disturbance).
In fact, one of the main goals of having a pliable system is that if a disturbance does cause an
involuntary transition, the transition will be more likely to result in a system still within the
system architecture.
Evolvability. A system that transitions to another instance within its SA is demonstrating
pliability not evolvability. Evolvability requires changes in a system with inheritance during
"redesign." This may correspond to changes in an inherited system architecture.
Agility. Pliability does not explicitly require timely changes, just as long as the transition "is
possible". If stakeholders are not concerned with timeliness, then timeliness is not a factor in
the pliability of the system. However, pliability may enable agility by reducing "red tape" for
change.
Scalability. Pliability requires either modifiability or scalability, i.e. the parameter can change in
some way. However, a system may be scalable in a parameter beyond what is included in the
pliable range.
Versatility. Pliability allows change in Form and/or CONOPs. A system may be versatile and
pliable if it changes CONOPs (only), within the pliable range, to satisfy diverse needs.
Reconfigurability. Reconfigurability is a specific change in CONOPS (one that changes the
relationships between the Operational Elements). This change may or may not be in the pliable
range, hence a system may be pliable and reconfigurable, pliable only (if the allowable changes
do not include CONOPs changes concerning OE relationships) or reconfigurable only (if the
CONOPs changes are not part of the pliable range).
Extensibility. Assuming that "new features" were features not included in the original design
(i.e. SA), then extensibility and pliability are independent properties. For example, a computer
can be both extensible and pliable. Performing an authorized upgrade from 2GB to 4GB RAM is
pliability, if 4GB is part of the system architecture for that computer. Adding third-party
peripherals or software is extensibility. Like any other change, adding features to a system may
violate the SA, if it causes a parameter to change outside its pliable range (e.g. "power supply
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needed"). Architects should try to safeguard the parameters of their SA when designing for
extensibility.
Robustness. A pliable system may be robust, if it does not need to transition to a new instance
to provide value under a new context. Pliability provides the system with the option to change,
but does not require it to.
Modularity. Pliability is not concerned with the ability of a system to be composed of modules,
although, modularity will likely make a system more changeable, thus facilitating pliability
should the system architects wish to make those parameters pliable.
Interoperability. Not directly related to pliability, but a SA that supports interoperability will
likely require a larger pliable set than a similar SA that doesn't, particularly if the system is
taking a defensive posture (proposed Type I survivability design principle). This is because the
range of what the system may need to accommodate will likely be larger than what would be
needed if the interfaces were custom.
Survivability. Systems that are more pliable will be more survivable, due to the fact that there
are validated system changes available should stakeholders need to change in response to a
disturbance (Type I survivability). Systems may also be more survivable due to an increase in
the likelihood that an involuntary change brought about by a disturbance, will still transition
into one of the validated instances of the SA (Type 11 survivability).
9.5 SUMMARY
This chapter introduced the concept of pliability and defined it relative to a system architecture
than includes both a form and a CONOPs. Not all change is valuable, and successful systems
will be able to avoid, mitigate and recover from harmful changes, and implement beneficial
ones in a timely and cost-efficient manner. Incorporating change into engineering design is
something that many researchers and practitioners realize is necessary; however, pliability
distinguishes systems from their architectures, and introduces the concept that the
architecture should be validated so that it has multiple valid instances to which a system may
transition, should the need arise. In this way, pliability increases survivability, value robustness,
and possibly agility, by requiring architects to consider disturbances, context changes and
changes that might not have been considered, increases the safe options available to a system
in the event that a change occurs (intentional or not), and decreases the red tape involved in
implementing intended changes.
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10 CONCLUSIONS
Engineered systems are designed to deliver some benefit to stakeholders. When cost and other
factors are considered, the net benefit, or value, that engineered systems deliver to
stakeholders has to be acceptable, otherwise the system will be unsuccessful. System
architects and stakeholders do not want their systems to fail, so they need to ensure that their
engineered systems have the quality (or qualities) necessary to ensure that they will continue
to provide acceptable value to their stakeholders. If nothing changes, then an engineered
system that was designed to provide value for its stakeholders under a particular context or set
of contexts, will continue to do so, and does not need to have any special qualities, other than
being feasible. However, we live in a world where change is inevitable, and engineered systems
need to be able to manage that change effectively, so that they can continue to provide value
to their stakeholders for long periods and possibly numerous contexts. As technology
improves, particularly communication technology, systems are being interconnected into
larger, more complex, systems of systems with long, sometimes infinite lifespans. These
systems of systems often operate in diverse contexts, in which both temporary and permanent
perturbations exist that threaten the value delivery of the SoS. Furthermore, the systems of
systems themselves are often dynamic, and can change their form voluntarily or involuntarily in
response to contextual variability or stakeholder whims. Therefore, more often than not,
system architects need to design systems that are more than just feasible, but able to provide
value for their stakeholders over their expected life era, which may or may not involve some
degree of change.
10.1 VIABILITY DEFINED FOR ENGINEERED SYSTEMS
Researchers have defined viability for biological systems and organizations, but not for systems
that are engineered to provide value to stakeholders. To recognize that engineered systems
may need to be more than just feasible, the concept of viability for engineered systems was
defined in Chapter 4 as the likelihood that the engineered system will provide acceptable value
to its stakeholders, over its life era. This is distinct from other previously defined concepts of
value sustainment since it accepts that there is some uncertainty as to whether the system
actually possesses the desired property or not. Although viability is a likelihood and certain
systems may be more viable than others, a system itself is viable if it is expected to provide
acceptable value to its stakeholders, over its life era, and not viable otherwise. This definition
gives viability some important properties that system architects and stakeholders need to
understand in order for them to apply the concept properly:
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Viability is a Prediction. Viability is a likelihood of a system being able to provide acceptable
value during its life era, but it is not a guarantee. If the life era of the system is different from
the expected life era at the time viability was assessed, then viable systems may fail, and
unviable systems may succeed. Since viability is a prediction, it involves risk. Assessing viability
involves predicting what the system will encounter during its life era, what the system will be
expected to do, and in the case of complex systems (particularly systems of systems), what the
system will actually do.
Viability is Subjective. A system may be viable to one stakeholder and not to another, based
on differences in the stakeholder preferences, and/or differences in the stakeholder's risk
tolerance. This was shown in Section 4.3, where Designs II was viable to one stakeholder but
not to others, based on lower preference thresholds.
Viability is not Invulnerability. A system may be viable, even if perturbations exist that may
cause it to fail, as long as the chance of encountering those perturbations and/or the chance of
not surviving them is low enough that the stakeholders do not expect them to be problematic.
Viability is Dynamic. Any engineered system should be viable throughout its life era, however
it may become unviable at any time, as the system, context of expectations of the stakeholders
change.
Viability is Relative. Some systems will be more likely to provide acceptable value to
stakeholders than other systems, and thus some systems will be more viable as well. For
example, consider a bomber that will fly missions over hostile territory. Although it is supposed
to be accompanied by fighter jets, the bomber may find itself alone once in a while and needs
to survive an encounter with hostile enemy aircraft. The stakeholders of the bomber do not
expect that the bomber will be able to survive solo encounters 100% of the time, but they do
expect it to be able to survive at least 90% of the time to be viable. Bomber design A is
considered viable, because according to simulation, it can survive 94% of encounters with
hostile enemy aircraft. However, bomber design B has additional margin on the wings, and as
such, can survive 99% of encounters with hostile enemy aircraft. Both designs are viable
because they exceed the thresholds set by the stakeholder, but design B is more viable since it
is more likely to provide value to the stakeholders than design A.
Viability is not Existence. As discussed in Chapter 4, the ability to exist is mentioned in
definitions for viability in both the life sciences and cybernetic management literature. A
system needs to exist in order to be viable, but it does not need to be viable in order to exist. A
system that cannot last the coming winter, for example, may be expected to die, even though it
exists and perhaps is even providing acceptable value to stakeholders currently. Similarly, a
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viable system can suddenly become unviable due to a change in stakeholder preference, but
that does not mean it suddenly stops existing. It may continue to exist for a while, either until a
change is made so that the system can become viable again, or until the system is terminated.
Viability does not Require Autonomy. According to the viable systems model found in the
cybernetics management literature (Beer, 1984), a viable organization needs to be able to be
autonomous and retain its independence. This may be true for systems like organizations
where the distinction between stakeholders and the system itself is not clear, but for
engineered systems that have separate and distinct stakeholders, it is not necessary for the
system itself to be autonomous to provide acceptable value to its stakeholders, and thus be
viable. If fact, systems that are designed to be constituent systems in systems of systems
should be viable, even if that viability is dependent on other systems.
10.1.1 VIABILITY AND OTHER "-ILITI ES"
From this broad definition, it seems intuitive that all engineered systems should be viable, and
thus if a system may experience endogenous or exogenous change, viability will require other
qualities other than just feasibility, to maintain its value delivery to stakeholders. Researchers
have identified several system qualities, known as "ilities", which help a system maintain value
in spite of change. In Chapter 3, several system qualities such as "survivability", "robustness",
"resilience", and "reliability" were discussed and it was shown that there is lack of consensus in
the literature as to their exact definitions. This makes applying the concepts difficult, but each
of these terms relative to viability was explored in Chapter 4.
Viability and Survivability/Robustness/Resilience. There is a lack of consensus in the literature
as to the exact definitions of survivability, robustness and resilience. For example, resilience
alone has at least 35 different definitions (Sheard & Mostashari, 2008). In general, however, all
of these terms have been used to describe a systems ability to continue to provide value in
spite of perturbations, i.e. be value sustainable (Beesemyer, 2012).
This research demonstrated that more often than not, perturbations do not occur in isolation
and that each perturbation may have multiple causes and multiple effects, which are also
perturbations themselves. In some cases, effects of a certain perturbation may become the
causes (directly or indirectly) of the same perturbations, in a reinforcing loop (Figure 10-1).
These loops are particularly dangerous and can cause cascading failures, like those seen in large
SoS failures like the Northeast Blackout of 2003.
Certain perturbations are not survivable, and have been called terminal events. Any system
may encounter a terminal event; in fact, it is those terminal events that define when a system
stops delivering acceptable value to its stakeholders and ceases to exist. Therefore,
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survivability to a particular perturbation, is really about avoiding the terminal events eventually
caused by the perturbation, by mitigation and/or resilience. Therefore, viability and
survivability are not the same, but rather it can be stated that for a system to continue to exist,
it must avoid the perturbations that it cannot survive, and survive the perturbations that
cannot avoid.
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FIGURE 10-1: MULTIPLE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF PERTURBATIONS, INCLUDING FEEDBACK LOOPS
Viability and Reliability. Reliability is ability of a system to continue to provide the outputs it
was designed to provide. Thus, systems have to be reliable in order to be viable, unless they
are resilient to involuntary changes.
Viability and Changeability. The viable system model also requires that systems have the
ability to change, known as changeability, but it is not necessary for some engineered systems
to have such an ability if the context and stakeholder needs remain fixed. A system that can
only be viable if the context remains fixed is defined as fragile and fragile systems do not need
to be changeable, accordingly. Of course fragile systems can be changeable, but it is
unnecessary.
10.2 STRATEGIES FOR VIABILITY
A system that is expected to encounter perturbations will have to survive them in order for that
system to be viable. Thus, existing strategies for survivability will also be strategies for viability,
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in the cases where those perturbations can be expected in the system's life era. The technical
literature has identified dozens of design principles for survivability, which include strategies for
avoiding, mitigating and recovering from perturbations. Unfortunately, researchers have
developed their own lists of design principles for survivability that have very little overlap with
each other. It was shown that these design principles are not invariant, and are application
dependent in many circumstances. Worse, it was also shown that implementing some of these
principles may actually decrease survivability to other perturbations. Care must be taken when
applying some of these existing design "principles", but in those situations, the "principles" are
really just guidelines to consider and not rules that should always be followed. For these
reasons, the existing survivability design principles were re-classified into two types of
strategies for enabling system viability: patterns and heuristics.
10.2.1 DESIGN PATTERNS FOR ENABLING VIABILITY IN SYSTEMS
The first type of survivability strategies identified in the literature are solutions to certain types
of perturbations. In Chapter 6, these solutions were expanded into design patterns similar to
those introduced by Alexander (1977), in the field of architecture, but used in software
engineering and recently in systems engineering. Design patterns specify a general solution to
a typical problem, in such a way that it can be applied to many different systems in diverse
contexts. Design patterns also cross reference other design patterns, and denote drawbacks
associated with the solution, to help system architects avoid conflicts that may arise when
multiple perturbations need to be addressed. Design patterns were divided into structural
patterns, which deal with improvement to the system's form to enable viability, and
operational design patterns, which attempt to improve the operation of the system to enable
viability. Dividing the design patterns into these two types helps specific decision makers apply
the concepts. For example, operators do not design the system, so they often not have much
influence over its form. However, they do have some say in how the system operates, and thus
would likely focus on operational design patterns as opposed to structural ones.
10.2.2 DESIGN HEURISTICS
The second type of survivability design principles found in the technical literature, were not
solutions to specific perturbations, but guidelines that may enable survivability in general.
These survivability design principles were adapted into design heuristics for viability.
Implementations of design heuristics often do not result in verifiable differences that can be
quantifiably demonstrated like the implementations of many design patterns can. For example,
a system analyst could show that implementing the design pattern of redundancy for a
particular system may reduce the chance of complete system failure by a certain amount. This
type of analysis makes the value of implementing certain design patterns easier to assess. Most
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design heuristics, however, are not as easy to assess because they attempt to increase
survivability by following good design and operational practices, as opposed to implementing
solutions to known problems. An example of a heuristic is complexity avoidance, where the
design is simplified as much as possible, (such as using the Rule of Simplicity in the Unix
Operating System) to avoid hidden interactions which may either cause perturbations, or make
responding to perturbations more difficult. The value of design heuristics may intrinsic and
difficult to quantify in the design stage, but helps systems deal with unknown unknowns.
A summary of the design patterns and heuristics for viability is given in Table 10-1.
TABLE 10-1: DESIGN PATTERNS AND HEURISTICS FOR VIABILITY
Design Pattern Operational Mobility (Richards, 2009)
Design Pattern Structural Concealment (Richards, 2009)
Design Pattern Operational Concealment (Richards, 2009)
AT A Design Pattern Structural Concealment (Richards, 2009)
Design Pattern Structural Containment (Richards, 2009), Loose
Coupling (Jackson, 2012)
Containment (Richards, 2009), Loose
SAA Design Pattern Structural Coupling, Localized Capacity (Jackson,
2012), Distribution (Richards, 2009)
Design Pattern Operational Deterrence (Richards, 2009)
Design Pattern Structural Drift Correction (Jackson, 2012), Repair,Replace (Richards, 2009)
Design Pattern Operational Fail-safe (Richards, 2009)
Design Pattern Operational Hardness (Jackson, 2012; Richards, 2009)
Redundancy (Richards, 2009), Physical
Design Pattern Operational Redundancy (Jackson, 2012)
Design Pattern Structural Heterogeneity (Richards, 2009), FunctionalRedundancy (Jackson, 2012)
Design Pattern Operational Margin (Jackson, 2012; Richards, 2009)
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HUMAN-IN-THE-pratona Human-in-the-Loop (Jackson, 2012)
FAILUR MODEisc .Failure Mode Reduction (Richards, et al.,
Design Heuristic 2009)
Design Heuristic Layered Defense (Jackson, 2012)
Design Heuristic Avoid Human Error (Jackson, 2012)
Design Heuristic Complexity Avoidance (Madni & Jackson,
AVOIDANCEtc2009)
R Design Heuristic Independent Review (Jackson, 2012)
10.3 APPLYING VIABILITY STRATEGIES AT THE SoS-LEVEL
Since systems of systems are also a class of systems, then existing strategies for viability can
also be applied to systems as systems as well. However, there are several important caveats
which this dissertation highlighted, that need to be taken into consideration when considering
viability at the SoS-level.
Viability to the System vs. Viability to the SoS. Viability is defined relative to needs of a
particular set of stakeholders. This means that in a SoS, a constituent system may be viable to
its own stakeholders, but not to the SoS stakeholders, or vice versa. As discussed in Chapter 6,
this has important consequences for decision makers, since changes to a system may affect the
viability of its constituent systems, or to the SoS to which it belongs, in unexpected ways. This
means that a change to increase the viability of a SoS, for example, may in fact backfire in the
long run, because that change unexpectedly decreased the viability of a particular constituent
system, which caused it leave the SoS, resulting in an unexpected SoS perturbation.
Axiom of Component Viability: In order for a system to be viable, a necessary and sufficient
set of its components must be viable with respect to the system and contexts under
consideration.
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Strategies at the System vs. SoS level. Strategies for enabling viability can be applied at the
constituent system or SoS-level. Some strategies are more effective at constituent system-
level, whereas other strategies are more effective at the SoS-level. The example of margin
being applied at both levels of a maritime security system of systems, was shown to be more
effective at the system level, mostly because the changes at the SoS-level did not take into
consideration bottlenecks in the overall concept of operation, which nullified the benefits of
the strategy.
Strategies as Points of Intervention. Since strategies have costs associated with them, and in
some cases drawbacks as well, it is not possible to implement every type of viability strategy,
and system architects and stakeholders need to make tradeoffs. The principle of viability is
used to identify points of intervention in cause-effect chains, where viability strategies would
have the most impact. Specifically, events that have many causes (i.e. are likely to be
encountered) should be mitigated or recovered from, while events that have many effects
(likely not to be survivable) are good candidates for strategies that focus on avoidance or
prevention.
10.4 PLIABILITY To RESTRICT AND FACILITATE ENDOGENOUS
CHANGE
Researchers have been promoting various system qualities that allow for, or facilitate
endogenous change, such as flexibility, adaptability, extensibility, and modifiability. Through
historical cases such as the London Ambulance and the emergency response systems
assembled for Hurricane Katrina, as well as an example from the MarSec DES, Chapter 8 gave
examples of endogenous changes that were made to make systems more viable, but instead
made them not viable at all. While there has been a considerable amount of empirical research
to show that systems that have the ability to change are more value sustainable than systems
that do not, there has not been much discussion in the literature about the need for system
qualities that deliberately restrict change that could have prevented such failures from
occurring.
To restrict change, one must first define exactly what a system is, and what change explicitly
means. In Chapter 9, a concept of system architecture is explained that describes how actual,
implemented systems can be thought of as instances of system architectures. System
architectures were defined in terms of form and a concept of operations, and instances of these
architectures were referred to as designs. A new "-ility", pliability, was defined to be the ability
of a system to change, without breaking its system architecture. The pliable set, was defined to
be the set of all validated designs that can be transitioned to, within a system architecture.
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Pliability both restricts and facilitates endogenous change, and enables viability as a result. It
restricts change because decision makers will be less likely to approve transitions to unverified,
and possibly unviable designs, when viable design transitions exist. It facilitates change,
however, because in large complex systems, particularly systems of systems, where there are
diverse stakeholders and many possible unintended interactions between the components,
getting major changes approved can be a very lengthy process that may hinder a systems'
ability to rapidly respond to changes in contexts or needs. By pre-validating transitions,
decision makers can have confidence in the changes to be made and approve them quickly,
thereby allowing systems to remain viable when rapid transitions are necessary. Large pliable
sets also enable viability by increasing the chance that a perturbation that causes an
involuntary change in the system, such as a maritime security SoS losing a UAV, will be within
the pliability of the system.
10.5 NEW STRATEGIES FOR VIABILITY
Using historical case studies, such as the Northeast Blackout of 2003, and experimenting with
the MarSec DES, some strategies for avoiding and/or surviving perturbations, particularly in
systems of systems, were discovered when the systems.
Intensity Regulation. Components within a system should be able to regulate their output so
as not to disturb the local contexts of other components within the overall system.
Diversion. The local context of systems should be protected by diverting perturbations away
from critical components. Deflection is diversion of exogenous perturbations (such as lighting
rods deflecting lighting strikes) and redirection is diversion of endogenous perturbations (such
as flow control between routers inside a network).
Stockpiling. The local context is protected by perturbations of resource availability by storing
reserves of critical resources and using them when necessary.
Commitment. The local context of systems are protected against perturbations caused by
stakeholders not providing the level of service or resources expected according to the concept
of operations. Commitment can typically be implemented through service level agreements, as
an example.
Authentication. The identify of constituent systems is verified before access to critical system
resources and functions are granted.
Vigilance. Entities within the system of system boundaries are monitored for violation of the
concept of operations, even if they have been authenticated previously.
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Least Privilege. Once the identity of a constituent system has been identified, it is granted the
minimum authority necessary to perform it tasks within the concept of operations.
Pliability. The strategy of pliability to design for change and pre-validate viable instances at the
design stage to a) facilitate stakeholder approval for voluntary transitions and b) increase the
changes that involuntary transitions will be viable.
Reversion. Allow the possibility of reverting back to the original, viable design of a system, in
case the new design is not viable.
Stable Intermediate Instances. If a significant transition is to be performed that requires the
system to be unviable for a significant period of time, attempt to transition into several,
intermediate viable designs along the way to the final design instead. That way, if the final
design cannot be reached, the system will still be viable.
Contingency. If reversion is not possible, then ensure that the system can transition into
another viable state, in case the intended becomes unviable.
10.6 SUMMARY OF RESPONSES To RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Direct answers to the research questions posed in Section 1.2 are presented below:
RQ1: What does it mean for an engineered system to be viable? How does viability relate to
existing "-ilities" already defined?
An engineered system is viable if it is likely to provide value for its stakeholders, during
its life era. A system needs to be reliable to be viable, and survivable if perturbations
are to be expected. A system does not have to be survivable to contextual
perturbations, however, if its context remains static. Keeping the local context of a
constituent system static, is the key to some of the new viability strategies introduced in
this dissertation.
RQ2: How does viability of constituent systems relate to the viability of systems of systems?
Viability is relative to stakeholder expectations and risk tolerances. Since constituent
systems can have different stakeholders than the system of systems it belongs to, then
the viabilities can be different as well. This can have important consequences since
actions and strategies that affect the viability of a system, can have the opposite effect
on the viability of the SoS, and vice versa.
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RQ3: Do existing system-level strategies for enabling systems to resist the harmful effects of
contextual change apply to systems of systems as well? Are there additional strategies
that enable viability in systems, particularly systems of systems?
A SoS is still a system, so existing viability strategies still apply to systems of systems as
well. However, the same strategy applied at the constituent system level, can have
different results than if it were applied at the SoS level, so care must be taken.
Additional viability strategies other than the ones currently evident in the systems
literature, were discovered, including some that were SoS-specific (such as redirection).
Many of these strategies centered on the need to keep local contexts of constituent
systems static, if they are fragile to certain contextual changes.
RQ4: Is changeability always a good thing? What can system architects do to enable positive
change in complex systems, while restricting change that can be harmful?
The ability to change is usually a desirable trait for systems that may experience
dynamic contexts and/or stakeholder expectations, but as systems become more
complex, intentional changes can have undesirable side effects. System architects
should design pliable systems, where pre-verified, allowable changes are defined so that
decision makers can quickly approve such changes to their systems without worrying
about making them unviable.
10.7 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The main contributions of this research relate to the responses to the four research questions
posed in Section 1.2.
1. The concept of viability is defined for engineered systems and its importance is shown.
When comparing viability to other similar "-ilities" such as survivability and robustness,
a lack of consensus in the literature emerges. In Section 3.4, the literature in regards to
these "-ilities" is clarified, and viability is uniquely placed with the other "-ilities" already
defined.
2. The viability of constituent systems and viability of the systems of systems that they
belong to are shown to be related, but not the same. Furthermore, a SoS may be viable
even if its constituents systems are not, and vice versa. This has important
consequence for stakeholders since decisions concerning the viability of systems need
to be taken carefully, as they may affect other stakeholders in unexpected ways.
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3. Existing strategies for viability are transformed into design patterns and heuristics, to
make them more useable by researchers and practitioners. Application of existing
viability strategies are applied to the SoS level and shown to be still applicable.
Perturbations are shown to occur in causal chains and not in isolation, and as such using
cause-effect mapping, several new viability strategies are proposed and validated
empirically with historical examples.
4. Several historical examples highlight the danger of making well-intended changes to
complex systems without really understanding the impact, As such, "pliability" is
proposed as a new "-ility" and strategy which is shown to improve viability by both
facilitating and restricting endogenous changes.
10.8 APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The contributions of this dissertation were developed and/or validated using historical cases
and a simulation of a maritime security system of systems, as described in the research
approach (Chapter 2). Although the system that was modeled quantitatively was a directed
SoS, the historical cases used to develop and validate the concepts and strategies in this
dissertation ranged from simple, traditional systems (e.g. CPUS in laptops throttling their
output to reduce heat), to virtual systems of systems (e.g. the TCP protocol used to regulate
flow between routers in the Internet). This suggests that while the viability strategies and
concepts introduced in this dissertation are applicable to traditional systems and directed
systems of systems, they may be generalizable and applicable other systems and systems of
systems, however there are some limitations.
First, viability can only be determined if the system has clearly defined stakeholders,
stakeholder preferences and a means of assessing value delivery. For simple engineered
systems, the stakeholders and value delivery of the system are often clearly defined, so the
concept of viability and its associated strategies can be used. For engineered systems of
systems that are directed or acknowledged (see Section 3.2.1), the SoS typically has clearly
defined objectives and a central management where value delivery (and thus viability) for the
entire SoS can be assessed. However, for natural systems, or systems of systems that are
collaborative or virtual in nature and that lack SoS objectives and management, then the
concept of viability, as it is defined in this dissertation, may not apply.
Even for systems where the concept of viability does apply, certain viability strategies may be
ineffective due to the particular characteristics of the system and/or its context. As already
demonstrated in Section 6.3, viability strategies for a SoS can have different effects if they are
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implemented at the system or SoS-level, and sometimes it is not possible or effective to
implement them at all. For example, increasing the technology of the UAVs may be a system-
level implementation of the principle of margin, but the ability to do so may not be possible
due to trade restrictions, for example. Thus, the stakeholders may be restricted to increasing
the number of UAVs (a SoS-level implementation) instead, which may or may not be as
effective. Even if the system-level implementation of margin could be implemented, it may not
make the system viable if it is not effective against a potential disturbance. For example, if an
earthquake damages the command center that directs all the tasks to the UAVs, then the SoS
may become unviable regardless of the number of UAVs. For this reason, care must be taken
when choosing viability strategies to ensure that they are applicable to the system and context
of interest, and effective against the disturbances that the system is expected to encounter
over its lifetime.
10.9 FUTURE WORK
As with any research, the contributions of this research were constrained by the time and
resources available. However, this research made several enhancements to the body of
knowledge, and laid the foundation for future contributions in the area of system of systems
viability. Over the course of the research, limitations and areas for further exploration and
research were identified and are presented below:
10.9.1 EXPANDING THE LIST OF STRATEGIES FOR ENABLING VIABILITY
This dissertation introduced viability, and several strategies for viability were derived from
existing survivability strategies, and generated from historical cases and empirical research
done with the MarSec DES. However, the viability design patterns and heuristics presented in
this dissertation can be expanded through additional research into related strategies in other
disciplines that have similar problems to system engineering. For example, the area of
computer science has similar problems of hardware and software entities interacting with each
other to provide some benefit to stakeholders, and the area of operating systems and
computer security may provide additional strategies that can be generalized for engineered
systems. Additionally, other systems of systems besides maritime security should be simulated
and used as experimental research test-beds where existing strategies can be refined (such as
whether they are more applicable at the system or SoS-level), and new strategies can be
discovered.
10.9.2 QUANTITATIVE TOOLS AND METRICS FOR ASSESSING VIABILITY
Viability was qualitatively defined in Chapter 4, however it may be possible to define precise,
quantitative tools and metrics that will help stakeholders and system architects assess viability,
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so that they can compare different designs with tradespace exploration methods such as Multi-
Attribute Tradespace Evaluation (MATE) (Ross, Hastings, Warmkessel, & Diller, 2004). Since
viability has been defined as a likelihood, a simple start could be to say that the viability of a
system can be represented by a real number between 0 and 1, where 0 is a system that
absolutely will not provide value to its stakeholders for the life era considered, and 1 absolutely
will. However, it may be misleading to assign a specific value to a concept that is not trivial to
measure. Assessing the viability for a particular system may involve a considerable amount of
uncertainty, including
* Assessing the probability of occurrence and impact of rare events.
* Quantifying subjective qualitative preferences, such as "fun to use".
* Aggregating (or not) a viability into a single metric that covers a number of different
stakeholders preferences, as well as a number of different possible life eras.
" Assessing viability for systems that are difficult to model, such as those that have
considerable amounts of human decision-making.
" Assessing viability for contexts that have unknown perturbations.
These and other issues need to be addressed for a viability metric to be useful across many
complex engineered system, but it was beyond the scope of this research.
10.9.3 EXPLORING THE ISSUE OF REAL VS. PERCEIVED CONTEXT
One of the key properties that distinguishes a system of systems from a traditional system, is
the managerial and operational independence of the constituent systems. This means that in
many cases, the constituent systems have decision-making ability within the SoS. Even if the
SoS is directed, i.e. constituent systems are under the orders of a central command, and the
constituent systems have to follow a strict concept of operations, the constituent systems are
still responsible for sensing and interpreting the context, and taking appropriate action. Ideally,
the actions (and thus the attributes) the system takes depend solely on the system context, px.
In reality, the system takes action based on what the system perceives as context, Tp4.
However, the results of those actions depend upon the (real) system context px, not the
perceived context Tp . For example, suppose a MarSec (system A), falsely identifies a civilian
ship in its AOl as a pirate. The MarSec decides to attack the ship with a combat UAV, resulting
in the ship being sunk. The real context (TA) before the attack was that there was a civilian ship
in the AOI which was misidentified as a pirate. The context as perceived by the MarSec (Tp'),
was that there was a ship identified as a pirate in the AOI. The action the MarSec took based
on p', was to sink the pirate ship. However, the results of that action, was that a civilian ship
was sunk. The difference between perceived and real context is a source of vulnerability to
many systems, but also a source of survivability, and should be explored.
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10.9.4 PLIABILITY IN TRADESPACE STUDIES
Tradespace studies are often used to help decision makers assess and compare various system
designs in the conceptual stage of a system's lifecycle (Stump et al., 2004). Typically, designs
are modeled and simulated and their overall utility (as determined by stakeholder/decision
maker preferences) is plotted against cost. For a system that does not change, the utility and
cost is constant for a particular context (Figure 10-2). However, if the system is pliable, such as
that for a given context, there can be a range of utility/cost that a system can achieve or change
to . Several interesting questions arise. Suppose in Figure 10-2, that system B differs from
system A only in that an extra component is added (providing additional value at additional
cost). Should the changeability of systems A and B be represented somehow in the tradespace
(Ross and Hastings, 2006) and if so, how should their utilities/costs be aggregated so that they
can be compared against one another?
Static Design Changeable Design
Utility Utility
Cost Cost
FIGURE 10-2: SAMPLE UTILITY-COST PLOTS OF A STATIC (L) SYSTEM AND A PLIABLE (R) SYSTEM
Changes are not always as discrete and obvious as adding components. Sometimes small
changes in the way a system operates could have large cost and performance consequences. As
an example, if a 911call center prioritizes calls based on location, it may have vastly different
performance results that one whose mode of operation is to respond to calls in a first-in, first-
out manner. Explicitly trading the modes of operation may result in multiple points in the
tradespace for the same set of components. If the modes of operation are not traded, then
system architects must recognize that if operators use the same system in a different way, it
may appear to "move" in the tradespace. It is for this reason that system architects should
explicitly consider an operations "envelope" around points to account for various modes of
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operation, and future work should examine how to assess and utilize such an "envelope" when
attempting to compare pliable systems in tradespace studies.
10.9.5 USING SYSTEMIC MODELS To DERIVE VIABILITY STRATEGIES
The cause-effect mapping used in Section 7.1 was useful for determining intervention points
where decision makers can implement strategies that prevent terminal events from occurring
by avoiding, mitigating and recovering from the perturbations that cause them. Like causal
diagrams used in system dynamics (Sterman, 2001), the cause-effect mapping in Section 7.1
included non-linear relationships that include reinforcing loops. However, causal diagrams such
as those used in this dissertation and cause-effect relationships that form the basis of many of
the hazard analysis techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Event
Chain Analysis (FMECA), tend to rely on knowledge gained from existing designs to determine
what could go wrong and why (Ishimatsu et al., 2010). For system architects designing cutting-
edge systems, this type of experience is not to be taken for granted. Newer approaches in
system safety have looked at developing systemic models, such as the System-Theoretic
Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) that look at accidents (system failures) as a dynamic
control problem instead of a perturbation problem. According to STAMP, perturbations are the
result of inadequate control that result from the lack of constraints in system design and
operations (Leveson, 2004). Future work in viability should look at applying techniques similar
to STAMP to determine how control strategies affect viability of complex systems in avoiding
and surviving perturbations that have unknown causes and unknown effects.
10.10 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
As John F. Kennedy and many others have pointed out, change is inevitable. As existing
systems are being interconnected into systems of systems, they are becoming more complex,
they operate in multiple contexts, have diverse stakeholders, and exist for long periods of time.
As such, system architects must consider how exogenous and endogenous change will affect
their system and design accordingly.
"Things alter for the worse spontaneously, if they be not altered for the better designedly.
-Francis Bacon
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GLOSSARY
The ability of a system to be changed by a system-internal change agent with intent.
rThe ability of a system to change in a timely fashion.
CRIT CA L Any component, whose presence or operation is required for adequate value
CO M  N N T delivery to the stakeholders.
COM N C USE A perturbation that has many effects.
CO MM N E F CT A perturbation that has many causes.
A system that is a component of a larger system of systems.
C H N EABl ITY The ability of a system to alter its form or operations, and consequently possibly its
function, at an acceptable level of resources.
D ESG N ECIIO N Someone who is able to make decisions about what the system is, or what the
M A ERsystem does, at the design level.
D ESGN P TT R N A solution to a design problem.
D ECSIONM AKE R Someone who is able to make decisions about what the system is, or what the
system does, at the design, strategic or operational level.
D ISU P~O N An Instant (or near-Instant) perturbation.
D IS U RBA NC E A perturbation of finite length, i.e. after some change has occurred, the original
context resumes.
E POH SE FT A permanent change in context.
E XTENSIBI LITY The ability of a system to accommodate new features after design.
Ev0 LA BI ITY The ability of a design to be inherited and changed across generations (over time).
F LEI~l ITY he bility of a system to be changed by a system-external change agent with intent.
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IN E OP RA B L TY The ability of a system to effectively interact with other systems.
M ODIIA B LITY The ability of a system to change the current set of specified system parameters.
MODU L RITY The degree to which a system is composed of modules.
OPERAIONAL Someone who is able to make decisions about what the system is, or what the
D ECIION MKE R system does, at the operational level.
An imposed state change in a system's form, operations, or context which could
P ERTU RB ION jeopardize value delivery
P LI BI TY The ability of a system to change, without breaking its system architecture.
The ability of a system to change its configuration (component arrangement and
RECO~lGRABIITY links).
The ability of a system to maintain its level and/or set of specified parameters in the
ROBUSNESS context of changing system external and internal forces.
ScA L BI ITY The ability of a system to change the current level of a specified system parameter.
An event that has no cause of relevance to the system.
ST R T Elc ECIION Someone who is able to make decisions about what the system is, or what the
MAKE Rsystem does, at the strategic level.
STRATEGYA general approach to a problerm.
The ability of a system to minimize the impact of a finite duration disturbance on
SURVVA~llTY value.
SYSTEMA collection of components and an associated concept of operations (CONOPs),
A R H r ECTUR E whose instances provide some value, within a particular context.
A system whose components are systems themselves, i.e. they can provide value on
SYSTM O SYSEMS their own outside the system.
T RADTIONAL A ystem whose components are not able to provide value to stakeholders on their
SYST M on.
173
A dimensionless measure of usefulness to a stakeholder. Typically, utility is
measured between 0 and 1, with 0 being useless and 1 being the most useful.
The net benefit or utility (i.e. when cost is taken into consideration) that magee
an engineered system provides to its stakeholders.
The ability of a system to maintain value delivery in spite of changes in needs or
context.
The ability of a system to satisfy diverse needs for the system without having to
change form (measure of latent value).
The likelihood that an engineered system will provide acceptable value to its
stakeholders, over its life era.
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APPENDIX A: VIABILITY STRATEGIES
The strategies for avoiding/mitigating certain perturbations and enabling viability, as discussed
in Chapter 6 and 7, are summarized below for reference.
PERTURBATIONS STRATEGY STAEYHISTORICAL CASEMEHDO
DESCRIPTION GENERATION
Store excess
consumable
resources to prevent
disruptions of supply.
Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR) by the
United States.
Derived from
cause/effect
mapping of MarSec
SoS. Validated with
hisotrical case study.
Divert perturbations
away from the Derived from
system. Deflection is Chaff used during WWII cause/effectRocket Deflection diversion of to deceive radar mapping of MarSecAttack exogenous systems. SoS. Validated with
perturbations away hisotrical case study.from critical
components.
Ensure that critical Derived from
Stakeholder entities do not Service Level cause/effectCommitment withdraw their Agreement (SLA) such mapping of MarSec
Withdrawal support to the as Google API SLA. SoS. Validated with
system. hisotrical case study.
Username and Derived from
Verify entities before password on major cause/effect
Authenticaion allowing them within commercial websites, mapping of MarSec
system boundary. ID badges at nuclear SoS. Validated with
Violation of power plants hisotrical case study.
Assignment
Rules Components should User account privileges Derived from
Strategy Of only be limited in on computer networks cause/effect
Least their influence of such as the Sony mapping of MarSec
Privilege other components to PlayStation Network SoS. Validated with
only what is (PSN). hisotrical case study.
necessary.
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Cost
Threshold
Exceeded
UAV Runs
Out of Fuel
Stockpile
Monitor for both
internal and external
changes.
Multiple security
checkpoints at an
airport.
Derived from
historical case study.
Validated through
MarSec SoS DES
(Section 7.5.1.1)
Divert perturbations
away from critical
components. Derived from
Operator Redirection is Transfer Control historical case study.
Overworked Redirection diversion of Protocol (TCP) used in Validated through
endogenous the Internet. MarSec SoS DES
perturbations away (Section 7.6.1.1).
from critical
components.
Reduce intensity of CPU downclocking to Derived from
Large Increase in outputs to prevent avoid excessive heat cause/effect
Target Arrivals Throttling perturbations to spreading to nearby mapping of MarSec
nearby contexts. components. hisotr alidated sty.
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UAV Not In
Range Vigilance
PERTURBATIONS STRATEGY STAEYHISTORICAL CASEMEHDO
DESCRIPTION GENERATION
APPENDIX B: VIABILITY DESIGN PATTERNS
The following are a re-classification of existing survivability/resilience design principles into
viability design patterns, which are re-usable solutions to common perturbations.
Operational
Mobility (Richards, 2009)
System is within the physical sphere of influence of a hostile entity
Hostile entity with ability to physically harm system if system is within sphere of
influence
The system moves away from the hostile entity, reducing the impact of its influence.
The system may move outside of the sphere of influence of friendly entities, making
communication, coordination, resource sharing, etc. more difficult. May violate the
concept of operations for a SoS
Navy TACAMO E-6 strategic communications aircraft, which keeps moving to avoid
detection.
Separation
Structural
Concealment (Richards, 2009)
System can be detected by hostile entity
Hostile entity with ability to visually detect entity, and ability to harm entity
The system reduces its visual signature by using colors that are not easily
distinguished from the environment
The system cannot be easily seen by friendly entities. This may delay or hinder
collaboration and/or resource sharing, as well as possibly cause collisions
Painting Abrams tanks colors that match terrain (i.e. tan, green, etc.)
Skulking, Miniaturization
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Sructural
Cnainment (Richards, 2009), Loose Coupling (Jackson, 2012)
Perturbation spreads from component to component due to the physical influence
the components have on each other
Components that have physical influence on each other, and perturbations that are
physically based
Physical barrier is placed between components to disrupt the physical influence
they have on each other
Reduced communication, coordination and cooperation between components (may
conflict with inter-node impediment strategy)
The steel or reinforced concrete structures that houses most nuclear reactors
Spration, Fail-safe
Structural
Containment (Richards, 2009), Loose Coupling, Localized Capacity (Jackson, 2012),
Distribution (Richards, 2009)
Perturbation spreads from component to component due to the physical influence
the components have on each other
Components that have physical influence on each other
Perturbation that is physically based
Components are located beyond their physical spheres of influence
Reduced communication, coordination and cooperation between components (may
conflict with inter-node impediment strategy)
Blackhawk helicopter using quick disconnects and leak isolation valves in the flight
control system
Evasion, Containment, Fail-safe
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Operational
Deterrence (Richards, 2009)
Hostile entity wishes to perform an unpermitted act against or within system
Hostile entity with opportunity within visual proximity of the system
Constituent systems with monitoring and possible effectors (e.g. weapons, etc.)
purposely at boundary of system and environment, in view of potential hostile
entities
Conflicts with concealment strategy
Security patrols around an airport
Camuflage
Operational
Drift Correction (Jackson, 2012), Repair, Replace (Richards, 2009)
Components naturally degrade over time, resources are consumed and must be
replaced
Any complex system where resources are consumed and must be replaced and
components degrade over time
Replace consumables to adequate levels, ensure that components are operating as
expecting and repair/replace those that are not
May need to make system inoperable while checks are being performed, even if
nothing needs to be done
Aircraft maintenance checks mandated by the FAA for commercial aircraft
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Structural
Fail-safe (Richards, 2009)
The system may not have the time or resources necessary to implement an active
solution to a perturbation and prevent its effects from propagating
A perturbation whose effects can be interrupted through a passive solution
Leverage the physics of the failure to implement a passive solution that does not
require resources or time to engage
Automatic response may be unnecessary or even dangerous if context is not what
the designers had in mind
Dead-man's switch on trains
Containment, Separation
Structural
Hardness (Jackson, 2012; Richards, 2009)
A physical attack on the system
The system is within the physical influence of a physical perturbation (hostile
attack, environment, etc)
Encase delicate materials within an enclosure that can withstand the physical
perturbation
Armor may interfere with communications, may add unnecessary size (reducing the
strategy of miniaturization), may add unnecessary weight (making the strategy to
mobility difficult to achieve)
Composite Armor on m1 Abrams Battle Tanks
Containment, Deflection
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Structural
Redundancy (Richards, 2009), Physical Redundancy (Jackson, 2012)
Failure of a component leaves system without capability
A component provides a unique capability and failure of the component is possible
Duplicate component and allow for spare to be used in the event that the original
fails or is otherwise unable to provide the capability
May add unnecessary size (reducing the strategy of miniaturization), may add
unnecessary weight (making the strategy to mobility difficult to achieve). The
probability of at least one component failing actually increases, if failure is
completely independent. This may cause additional maintenance actions, reducing
the overall value delivery of the system
Space Shuttle avionics systems (five identical general-purpose computers)
Heterogeneity, Maintenance, Margin
Operational
Heterogeneity (Richards, 2009), Functional Redundancy (Jackson, 2012)
Capability is not being provided adequately.
A necessary operation is not being completed, because there is perturbation that
interferes with the standard operations of the system
The same capability can be achieved through a different operation
May require additional components, meaning unnecessary size (reducing the
strategy of miniaturization), and/or unnecessary weight (making the strategy to
mobility difficult to achieve)
Nuclear "triad" of bombers, ICBMs and nuclear submarines.
Physical Redundancy, Margin
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Operational
Margin (Jackson, 2012; Richards, 2009)
Capability is not being provided adequately
Perturbation causes the output of system to be inadequate
Have system be capable of producing more output than necessary.
May require additional components, meaning unnecessary size (reducing the
strategy of miniaturization), and/or unnecessary weight (making the strategy to
mobility difficult to achieve)
Extra-long wings on an A-10 aircraft, which generates enough lift in the event that
part of the wings are destroyed or damaged
UN NEW Heterogeneity, Physical Redundancy
Operational
Human-in-the-Loop (Jackson, 2012)
Automation performs inappropriate action, or fails to perform proper action.
Automation capable of performing an action independently
Require human input before critical actions are taken or ignored
May delay critical actions
Predator UAV requires human authorization for missile launch at target
Heterogeneity, Physical Redundancy
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Structural
Stockpiling
Supply of external resources diminishes, or cost is raised
System cannot get enough external resources at a reasonable cost
Store excess resources when supply is plentiful/cost is low, use when needed
May add require additional components, meaning unnecessary size (reducing the
strategy of miniaturization), and/or unnecessary weight (making the strategy to
mobility difficult to achieve)
United States Strategic Petreleoum Reserve (SPR)
Structural
Deflection
External perturbation disurpts critical component
Critical component exposed to external perturbation
Divert external perturbation away from critical component
May add require additional components, meaning unnecessary size (reducing the
strategy of miniaturization), and/or unnecessary weight (making the strategy to
mobility difficult to achieve)
Lightning rod diverting lightning away from rest of building
Armor, Redirection
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Operati onal
Diversion
Internal consitutuent system has exceded capacity
Constitunet systems send tasks / information / materials to each othe (flow)
Constinetunet systsems send flow to other consituent sytems that have note
xceedec capcity
Delays in flow being sent, addiiontal cost to handle, re-route flow
Flow control on TCP/IP protocol
Deflection, Throttling
Operational
Commitment
Staekholders not providing critical services
SoS relies on constientu system providing critical services
Make consituten systesm commit to providing services buy making it unattractive
not to
Commitment may be two-way street and may lock up rest of SoS in an unviable
state, if context, needs or rest of system changes
Google Service Level Agreement (SLA)
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Operational
Vigilance
Entity inside of system boundary performs unauthorized action
Entity has already entered system and has ability to influence the system from
within
Continually monitor the actions of entities interla to the system to ensure they do
not violated CONOPs
Additional cost, delays in oeprations if additional monitoring requires addiitonal
authenticion, disurption in CONOPs if friendly entities fails authentication (for
forgetting ID, etc)
Requiring user names and passwords to be re-entered before crtiical actions, even
after initial authenticiation
Authentication
Operational
Strategy of Least Privledge
Entities must be verified as being part of system before privelgse are granted
SoS allows entities to interact with system and access / control critical information
/ services
Verify the identity of the entity wishing to gain access to the system
Additional cost, delays in operation, disruption in CONOPs if friendly entities fails
authentication (for forgetting ID, etc)
Username and password being required before logging into online bank services
Vigilance
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Operational
Intensity Regulation
Unintended interations between consiteunt systesms
Qatiy of output from one consituen system may disrupt the context of other
costeunt systesms
Rdce the quantity ofoutput from consituent system (throttle)
Reduced output of system
CPUs downclocking to reduce overall heat in system, routers delaying sending
packets to other overworked routers
Redirection
Operational
Strategy of Least Privledge
Entities must be verified as being part of system before privelgse are granted
So allows entities to interact with system and access / control critical information
/services
Verify the identity of the entity wishing to gain access to the system
Additional cost, delays in operation, disruption in CONOPs if friendly entities fails
authentication (for forgetting ID, etc)
Username and password being required before logging into online bank services.
Vigilance
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APPENDIX C: VIABILITY DESIGN HEURISTICS
The following are a re-classification of existing survivability/resilience strategies into viability
heuristics or "rules-of-thumb" that enable viability in systems (or systems of systems).
- e e" a e Description: Elimination of system hazards through intrinsic design.
.* Example: Replacing Teflon insulation with stainless steel for the Apollo 13
mission.
Description: Use more than one independent viability strategy to address a
- a Bsingle perturbation.
e i Example: Most servers use a firewall as well as usernames and passwords to
protect user accounts.
Description: Strategies should be employed to reduce human error,
particularly for humans involved in critical decision making.
Example: Confirmation dialog on most graphical user interfaces.
e - e aDescription: The system should not be more complex than necessary.
Example: The Rule of Simplicity used in the Unix Operating System
(Raymond, 2004) .
Description: Have experts who are not stakeholders or the system architects
a a "to review the design for viability.
Example: The independent Standing Review Board assessment that is part of
NASA's engineering design life cycle for space flight projects (NASA, 2011).
Description: Grant entities the minimum privileges necessary to satisfy the
system's CONOPs.
Example: User accounts that do not have administrator access in Windows
systems.
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Description: Ensure that there are multiple, viable instances that a system
may transition to in case in needs to.
Example: Convertible in automobile can put top on in case of rain.
Description: Before a transition, ensure that revision to the original instance
is possible.
Example: If upgrading the UAVs in a MarSec, do not get rid of the old UAVs
as they may be needed if new UAVs do not work as intended.
Description: Before making a large transition, make smaller transitions to
viable intermediate instances first, in case larger transition becomes
impossible to implement.
Example: If upgrading an entire network, make small transitions first, such
as upgrading each client computer one at a time, and verify before
proceeding.
Description: When reversion is not possible, make sure that there is an
alternate design availabel to transition to, incase intended design becomes
unviable or impossible to implement.
Example: When replacing radar towers with UAVs in a MarSec, make sure
that manned patrol aircraft can perform same job in case UAVs cannot be
implemented, or are not as viable as thought.
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APPENDIX D: SUMMARY OF SIMULATION DATA
A summary of the quantitative data generated by the MarSec SoS DES and used in this
dissertation is presented here.
FIGURE D-1: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH BASELINE SOS EXPERIENCING REGULAR TRAFFIC
Probability of ID [High Traffic]
0.1 0.84 0.7 0.90 0.93
99% Confidence Intervals
Anderson-Darling Normality Test
A-Squared 3.07
P-Value < 0.005
Mean 0.86734
StDev 0.02158
Variance 0.00047
Skewness -0.117864
Kurtosis -0.046164
N 10000
Minimum 0.78700
1st Q uartile 0.85300
Median 0.86800
3rd Quartile 0.88200
Masimum 0.94400
99% Confidence Interval for Mean
0.86679 0.86790
99% Confidence Interval for Median
0.86700 0.86900
99% Confidence Interval for StDev
0.02120 0.02198
Medan i
0.8670 0.675 08680 0.8685 0.8690
FIGURE D-2: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH BASELINE SOS EXPERIENCING HEAVY TRAFFIC
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Probability of ID [Regular Traffic]
0.864 0.888 0.912 0.936 0.960 0.984
9
99
99% Confidence Intervals
9
Mean |
Med0a .. 4
0.941 0.942 0.943 0.944
Anderson-Darling Normality Test
A-Squared 22.80
P-Value < 0.005
Mean 0.94122
StDev 0.02094
Variance 0.00044
Skewness -0.336077
Kurtosis 0.057255
N 10000
Minimum 0.85800
1st Q uartile 0.92800
Median 0.94400
3rd Q uartile 0.95500
Maidmum 1.00000
9% Confidence Interval for Mean
0.94068 0.94176
% Confidence Interval for Median
0.94100 0.94400
9% Confidence Interval for StDev
0.02057 0.02133
Probability of ID [System-Level Margin, High Traffic]
Anderson-Darling Normality Test
A-Squared 20.06
P-Value < 0.005
Mean 0.96023
StDev 0.01241
V ariance 0.00015
Skewness -0.341471
Kurtosis 0.221438
N 10000
Minimum 0.90600
1st Q uartile 0.95300
0.915 0.930 0.945 0.960 0.975 0.990 Median 0.96100
3rd Quartile 0.96900
Maximum 0.99600
99% C onfidence Interv al for Mean
0.95991 0.96055
99% Confidence Interval for Median
99% Confidence Intervals 0.96100 0.96100
99% Confidence Interval for StDev
0.01218 0.01264
Meclan
0.9600 0.9602 0.960.9 6.9606 0.9608 0.9610
FIGURE D-3: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH SYSTEM-LEVEL MARGIN STRATEGY (UNDER REGULAR TRAFFIC)
Probability of ID [SoS-Level Margin, High Traffic]
Anderson-Darling Normality Test
A -Squared 4.26
P-Value < 0.005
Mean 0.88462
StDev 0.02055
V ariance 0.00042
Skewness -0.158665
Kurtosis -0.035189
N 10000
Minimum 0.80800
1st Q uartile 0.87100
0.816 0.840 0.864 0.888 0.912 0.936 Median 0.88500
3rd Quartile 0.89900
Maximum 0.95300
99% Confidence Interval for Mean
0.88409 0.88515
99% Confidence Interval for Median
99% Confidence Intervals 0.88500 0.88600
99% Confidence Interval for StDev
Mean- 0 0.02018 0.02093
Medan- 4
0.8840 0.8845 0.8850 0.8855 01860
FIGURE D-4: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH SYSTEM-LEVEL MARGIN STRATEGY (UNDER HEAVY TRAFFIC)
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FIGURE D-5: CHANCE OF SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST ATTACK ON BASELINE SOS (GVIEN ATTEMP UNDER REGULAR TRAFFIC CONDITIONS)
[No Vigilance, Heavy Traffic]
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FIGURE D-6: CHANCE OF SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST ATTACK ON BASELINE SOS (GIVEN ATTEMPT UNDER HEAVY TRAFFIC CONDITIONS)
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FIGURE D-7: CHANCE OF SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST ATTACK ON VIGILANT SOS (GIVEN ATTEMPT UNDER REGULAR TRAFFIC CONDITIONS)
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FIGURE D-8: CHANCE OF SUCCESSFUL TERRORIST ATTACK ON VIGILANT SOS (GIVEN ATTEMPT UNDER HEAVY TRAFFIC CONDITIONS)
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FIGURE D-9: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH REDIRECTION STRATEGY (UNDER REGULAR TRAFFIC)
Probability of ID [Redirection, High Traffic]
Anderson-Darling Normality Test
A-Squared 7.49
P-Value < 0.005
Mean 0.93491
StDev 0.01530
Variance 0.00023
Skewness -0.215456
Kurtosis 0.070762
N 10000
Minimum 0.87500
1st Q uartile 0.92500
0.882 0.900 0.918 0.936 0.954 0.972 0.990 Median 0.93500
3rd Q uartile 0.94600
Maximum 0.98800
99% Confidence Interval for Mean
0.93451 0.93530
99% Confidence Interval for Median
99% Confidence Intervals 0.93500 0.93600
99% Confidence Interval for StDev
Mean- I0.01503 0.01559
Medan.
0.93450 0.93475 0.93500 0.9325 0.93550 0.93575 0.93600
FIGURE D-10: PROBABILITY OF ID WITH REDIRECTION STRATEGY (UNDER HEAVY TRAFFIC)
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Probability of ID [Redirection, Regular Traffic]
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